scholarly journals Endogenous Stackelberg leadership within a team. The coalition effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-79
Author(s):  
E.M. Skarzhinskaya ◽  
◽  
V.I. Tsurikov ◽  

The article engages in a theoretical investigation of the possibility of implementing the Stackelberg strategy within a team. It is assumed that the team gene-rates aggregate income that increases as the efforts invested by each agent intensify, subject to the law of diminishing returns. The goal of each agent in a team is to maximize his own individual gain. In order to achieve an outcome that is Paretopreferable over Nash equilibrium, two approaches may be used: identifying a leader or forming a smaller group (coalition) within the team whose members, in pursuance of increased individual gains, choose the route that maximizes coalition gains. It is shown that the advent of a coalition in a team results in Pareto-improvement in a simultaneous game. We analyse the possibility of endogenous leadership forming according to the Stackelberg model when using the mechanism of timing decisions. It is established that under autonomy of all team members, leadership formation can only be confidently predicted in specific individual cases. In a significantly more general case, all of the prerequisites for the formation of leadership are created by the presence of a single coalition interested in implementing the Stackelberg strategy.

2011 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 297-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Korzhyk ◽  
Z. Yin ◽  
C. Kiekintveld ◽  
V. Conitzer ◽  
M. Tambe

There has been significant recent interest in game-theoretic approaches to security, with much of the recent research focused on utilizing the leader-follower Stackelberg game model. Among the major applications are the ARMOR program deployed at LAX Airport and the IRIS program in use by the US Federal Air Marshals (FAMS). The foundational assumption for using Stackelberg games is that security forces (leaders), acting first, commit to a randomized strategy; while their adversaries (followers) choose their best response after surveillance of this randomized strategy. Yet, in many situations, a leader may face uncertainty about the follower’s surveillance capability. Previous work fails to address how a leader should compute her strategy given such uncertainty. We provide five contributions in the context of a general class of security games. First, we show that the Nash equilibria in security games are interchangeable, thus alleviating the equilibrium selection problem. Second, under a natural restriction on security games, any Stackelberg strategy is also a Nash equilibrium strategy; and furthermore, the solution is unique in a class of security games of which ARMOR is a key exemplar. Third, when faced with a follower that can attack multiple targets, many of these properties no longer hold. Fourth, we show experimentally that in most (but not all) games where the restriction does not hold, the Stackelberg strategy is still a Nash equilibrium strategy, but this is no longer true when the attacker can attack multiple targets. Finally, as a possible direction for future research, we propose an extensive-form game model that makes the defender’s uncertainty about the attacker’s ability to observe explicit.


2012 ◽  
Vol 512-515 ◽  
pp. 416-420
Author(s):  
Feng Lian Sun ◽  
Wei Wei Wang ◽  
Zhong Ji Wang

Through the analysis on the relations of the three main participants of the government, the enterprise and the farmers, the thesis has established the gaming model between the enterprise and the forest farmers and found that only when the additional benefit they each obtain is larger than the construction cost for the development they paid, optimal combination of Nash equilibrium can be accepted by enterprises and forest farmers and Pareto improvement will be possibly formed, the smooth development of energy forest construction can be ensured.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (6) ◽  
pp. 759-773
Author(s):  
Tyree David Mitchell ◽  
Jasmine Hu ◽  
Lars Johnson

A large body of evidence has concluded that there are positive linear relationships between leadership behaviors and leadership emergence. Drawing on insights from the leadership and teams research, we hypothesized that above certain levels of task-oriented and relationship-oriented behaviors, such behaviors will have diminishing returns for leadership emergence. Hypotheses were tested using a sample of 105 leaderless teams within an assessment center setting. Our results indicate that team members’ behaviors have linear and non-linear relations with leadership emergence. We discovered that the association between relationship-oriented behaviors and leadership emergence in self-managed teams is curvilinear, whereas the association between task-oriented behaviors and leadership emergence is linear but not curvilinear. Overall, the relationships between member behaviors and leadership emergence are more complex than the independent, positive linear relationships observed throughout the literature.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Paul Studtmann ◽  
Shyam Gouri Suresh

Abstract The Nash counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were I to change my behaviour assuming no one else does. By contrast, the Kantian counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were everyone to deviate from some behaviour. We present a model that endogenizes the decision to engage in this type of Kantian reasoning. Autonomous agents using this moral framework receive psychic payoffs equivalent to the cooperate-cooperate payoff in Prisoner’s Dilemma regardless of the other player’s action. Moreover, if both interacting agents play Prisoner’s Dilemma using this moral framework, their material outcomes are a Pareto improvement over the Nash equilibrium.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Artem Baklanov

We explore how an incremental change in complexity of strategies (“an inch of memory”) in repeated interactions influences the sets of Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategy and payoff profiles. For this, we introduce the two most basic setups of repeated games, where players are allowed to use only reactive strategies for which a probability of players’ actions depends only on the opponent’s preceding move. The first game is trivial and inherits equilibria of the stage game since players have only unconditional (memory-less) Reactive Strategies (RSs); in the second one, players also have conditional stochastic RSs. This extension of the strategy sets can be understood as a result of evolution or learning that increases the complexity of strategies. For the game with conditional RSs, we characterize all possible NE profiles in stochastic RSs and find all possible symmetric games admitting these equilibria. By setting the unconditional benchmark as the least symmetric equilibrium payoff profile in memory-less RSs, we demonstrate that for most classes of symmetric stage games, infinitely many equilibria in conditional stochastic RSs (“a mile of equilibria”) Pareto dominate the benchmark. Since there is no folk theorem for RSs, Pareto improvement over the benchmark is the best one can gain with an inch of memory.


2012 ◽  
Vol 424-425 ◽  
pp. 410-414
Author(s):  
Gong Shu Lu ◽  
Cun Bin Li ◽  
Xian Li

Nash equilibrium is the foundation of traditional game theory, while the benefits of game players under the Nash equilibrium are constant, so the core idea of generic risk transmission was applied to traditional static game. Accordingly a risk static game model, in which the benefits of players were subject to triangular distribution, was constructed. Then we obtained different equilibrium states under the different risk types of players. Furthermore, the classic Prisoners’ Dilemma was used to demonstrate the practice value of risk game. Through analyzing and solving the risk Prisoners’ Dilemma model which changed from the classic Prisoner's Dilemma model according to actual situation, the Pareto improvement strategy combination could be achieved. The new equilibrium result can give an appropriate explanation why there is always some prisoners conceal the corpus delicti in adventure


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Kaihong Wang ◽  
Xu Yang ◽  
Yiwan Sun ◽  
Chuan Ding

This paper studies channel consisting of a manufacturer and two retailers. As a basis for comparison, the first, multiagent Stackelberg model has been structured based on perfect rationality. Further, fairness preference theory will be embedded in marketing channel multiagent Stackelberg model, and the results show that if the retailers have a jealous fairness preference, the manufacturer will reduce the wholesale price, retailers will increase the effort level, product sales will be increased, and the total channel utility and manufacturers’ utility will be pareto improvement, but the pareto improvement of retailers’ utility is associated with the interval of jealousy fairness preference coefficient. If the retailers have a sympathetic fairness preference, the manufacturer increases wholesale price, retailers reduce the effort level, and the total channel utility, manufacturer’s utility, and retailers’ utility are less than that of the no fairness preference utility.


1986 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 230-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lou Tomes ◽  
Dixie D. Sanger

A survey study examined the attitudes of interdisciplinary team members toward public school speech-language programs. Perceptions of clinicians' communication skills and of the clarity of team member roles were also explored. Relationships between educators' attitudes toward our services and various variables relating to professional interactions were investigated. A 64-item questionnaire was completed by 346 randomly selected respondents from a two-state area. Classroom teachers of grades kindergarten through 3, teachers of grades 4 through 6, elementary school principals, school psychologists, and learning disabilities teachers comprised five professional categories which were sampled randomly. Analysis of the results revealed that educators generally had positive attitudes toward our services; however, there was some confusion regarding team member roles and clinicians' ability to provide management suggestions. Implications for school clinicians were discussed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 1267-1282
Author(s):  
Jessica Salley ◽  
Sarah Krusen ◽  
Margaret Lockovich ◽  
Bethany Wilson ◽  
Brenda Eagan-Johnson ◽  
...  

Purpose Through a hypothetical case study, this article aimed to describe an evidence-based approach for speech-language pathologists in managing students with moderate-to-severe traumatic brain injury (TBI), particularly within a formal statewide-supported school-based brain injury team model, such as the BrainSTEPS Brain Injury School Consulting Program operating in Pennsylvania and Colorado. Conclusion Upon transitioning from the medical setting back to school, children with TBI present with unique educational needs. Children with moderate-to-severe TBIs can demonstrate a range of strengths and deficits in speech, language, cognition, and feeding and swallowing, impacting their participation in various school activities. The specialized education, training, and insight of speech-language pathologists, in collaboration with multidisciplinary medical and educational team members, can enable the success of students with TBI when transitioning back to school postinjury ( DePompei & Blosser, 2019 ; DePompei & Tyler, 2018 ). This transition should focus on educational planning, implementation of strategies and supports, and postsecondary planning for vocations or higher education.


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