scholarly journals The EU Referendum and Experiences and Fear of Ethnic and Racial Harassment: Variation Across Individuals and Communities in England

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alita Nandi ◽  
Renee Reichl Luthra

This paper uses nationally representative, longitudinal data to examine experiences and fear of ethnic and racial harassment in public spaces among minorities in the UK, comparing levels of both before and after the 2016 EU Referendum. We do not find an increase in the prevalence of ethnic and racial harassment, but we do find higher levels of fear of ethnic and racial harassment in the period after the Referendum. The increase in fear following the vote was concentrated among more privileged individuals: those with higher levels of education, and those living in less socioeconomically deprived areas with lower levels of previous right-wing party support. We conclude that the Referendum exacerbated already higher levels of perceived discrimination among higher educated minorities while reducing the buffering effect of residence in “safe areas.”

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 260-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Brent Sullivan

United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) supporters and non-voters in England participate respectively in forms of engaged and disengaged anti-political activity, but the role of individual, group-based, and collective emotions is still unclear. Drawing upon recent analyses of the complex emotional dynamics (e.g., <em>ressentiment</em>) underpinning the growth of right-wing populist political movements and support for parties such as UKIP, this analysis explores the affective features of reactionary political stances. The framework of affective practices is used to show how resentful affects are created, facilitated, and transformed in sharing or suppressing populist political views and practices; that is, populism is evident not only in the prevalence and influence of illiberal and anti-elite discourses but also should be explored as it is embodied and enacted in “past focused” and “change resistant” everyday actions and in relation to opportunities that “sediment” affect-laden political positions and identities. Reflexive thematic analysis of data from qualitative interviews with UKIP voters and non-voters (who both supported leaving the EU) in 2015 after the UK election but before the EU referendum vote showed that many participants: 1) shared “condensed” complaints about politics and enacted resentment towards politicians who did not listen to them, 2) oriented towards shameful and purportedly shameless racism about migrants, and 3) appeared to struggle with shame and humiliation attributed to the EU in a complex combination of transvaluation of the UK and freedom of movement, a nostalgic need for restoration of national pride, and endorsement of leaving the EU as a form of “change backwards.”


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ebtisam Saleh Aluthman

This paper presents a critical account of the representation of immigration in the Brexit corpus—a collective corpus of 108,452,923 words compiled mostly from blogs, tweets, and daily news related to Brexit debate. The study follows the methodological synergy approach proposed by Baker et al. (2008), a heuristic methodological approach that combines methods of discourse analysis and corpus-assisted statistical tools including keyword, collocation, and concordance analysis. Drawing on this methodological synergy approach, the investigation yields significant findings contextualized within the socio-economic-political context of the European Union (EU) leave referendum to trace how the issue of immigration is represented in the discourses of the Remain and Leave campaigns. The frequency results show that immigration is one of the most salient topics in the Brexit corpus. Concordance analysis of the word immigrants and collocation investigation of the word immigration reveal opposing attitudes toward immigration in the EU referendum debate. The analysis uncovers negative attitudes toward the uncontrolled flow of immigrants from other EU countries and public concerns about immigrants' negative impacts on wages, education, and health services. Other findings reveal positive attitudes toward immigrants emphasizing their positive contributions to the UK economy. The study concludes with an argument of the significant association between the political and socio-economic ideologies of a particular society and the language communicated in its media.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Stephen Trinder

As a master’s and Ph.D. student at Anglia Ruskin University in 2011, I recall the central message in lectures given by my eventual Ph.D. supervisor Professor Guido Rings was that we cannot underestimate the enduring strength of the legacy of colonialism in Europe and its influence on shaping contemporary attitudes towards immigration. Indeed, as I was completing my studies, I became increasingly aware of the negative rhetoric towards migrants in politics and right-wing press. In an attempt to placate the far-right of his party and address a growing threat from the UK Independence Party (UKIP), a discourse of ‘othernising’ migrants on the basis of their supposed rejection of ‘Britishness’ from former UK Prime Minister David Cameron in particular caught my attention. The result of this was tightening of immigration regulations, which culminated of course in the now-infamous Brexit vote of 2016. Almost a decade after my graduation, Professor Rings is currently Vice Chair for the Research Executive Agency of the European Commission and continues to work at Anglia Ruskin University at the level of Ph.D. supervisor. He still publishes widely in the field of Migration Studies and his recent high-profile book The Other in Contemporary Migrant Cinema (Routledge, 2016) and editorships in the fields of culture and identity (iMex Interdisciplinario Mexico) argue for increased intercultural solidarity in Europe as well as a strengthening of supranational organizations like the EU and the UN to offset growing nationalism. I got in touch with Professor Rings to find out where he feels Europe stands today with regard to migration and get his comments on the continued rise of nationalism on the continent.


2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
BEN BAUMBERG

AbstractStigma has long been viewed by some as essential to discourage excessive claims, yet seen by others as a cause of non-take-up by people in need and as a form of symbolic violence. More recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in the links between shame and poverty (including the role of benefits), and particular concerns about media/political rhetoric in the UK. Yet while our knowledge of benefits stigma has been enhanced by theoretical/qualitative contributions, few quantitative studies examine its extent or patterning. This paper therefore reports the results of a 2012 nationally-representative survey in the UK. It finds sub-types of stigma are reported by 10–19 per cent for each benefit, but 34 per cent report either personal stigma (their own view) or stigmatisation (perceived stigma by others) for at least one benefit, and over one-quarter say a stigma-related reason would make them less likely to claim. One-third of claimants themselves report some degree of stigma around their claim. Against the predictions of ‘dependency culture’ claims, however, respondents in high-claim areas were more likely to stigmatise benefits, both before and after accounting for other factors. The paper concludes by considering lessons for future benefits stigma studies, and policy options to reduce benefits stigma.


Subject The government's preferred timetable for the UK referendum on EU membership. Significance The EU membership referendum will be a major event in both EU and UK political and commercial life. Prime Minister David Cameron's official position is that the poll could take place any time before end-2017. He is less concerned about the likely outcome of the referendum, which he is confident will produce an 'in' result, than about achieving a margin in favour of membership that decisively settles the question and minimises the damage to the Conservative Party arising from the process. Impacts The most likely referendum date is September 15, 2016. This timetable would make the key renegotiation period the first half of 2016, when the sympathetic Dutch government chairs the EU Council. The German government would also prefer the UK referendum to be dealt with relatively quickly.


Subject The possible economic impact of the EU investment plan (the 'Juncker Plan'). Significance The EU investment plan launched by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker just over a year ago has made a slow start. This will encourage doubts that have existed since the scheme's inception about its operation and likely impact. Impacts Even by 2020, the EU economy will still probably require every effort to boost growth and make up for lost investment. Given continuing strong demand for high-grade bonds and equity investments, it should be possible to achieve the fundraising target. The plan could become a vehicle for Chinese investment into the EU: China is talking of 5-10 billion euros in future investments. The geographical distribution of funded projects could be politically sensitive within the EU. The plan could come under scrutiny during the UK EU referendum campaign; UK projects may come too late to have an impact before the vote.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julio Cesar Amador Diaz Lopez ◽  
Sofia Collignon-Delmar ◽  
Kenneth Benoit ◽  
Akitaka Matsuo

AbstractWe use 23M Tweets related to the EU referendum in the UK to predict the Brexit vote. In particular, we use user-generated labels known as hashtags to build training sets related to the Leave/Remain campaign. Next, we train SVMs in order to classify Tweets. Finally, we compare our results to Internet and telephone polls. This approach not only allows to reduce the time of hand-coding data to create a training set, but also achieves high level of correlations with Internet polls. Our results suggest that Twitter data may be a suitable substitute for Internet polls and may be a useful complement for telephone polls. We also discuss the reach and limitations of this method.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (128) ◽  
pp. 20170030 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander M. Petersen ◽  
Michelangelo Puliga

The extent to which international high-skilled mobility channels are forming is a question of great importance in an increasingly global knowledge-based economy. One factor facilitating the growth of high-skilled labour markets is the standardization of certifiable degrees meriting international recognition. Within this context, we analysed an extensive high-skilled mobility database comprising roughly 382 000 individuals from five broad profession groups (Medical, Education, Technical, Science & Engineering and Business & Legal) over the period 1997–2014, using the 13-country expansion of the European Union (EU) to provide insight into labour market integration. We compare the periods before and after the 2004 enlargement, showing the emergence of a new east–west migration channel between the 13 mostly eastern EU entrants (E) and the rest of the western European countries (W). Indeed, we observe a net directional loss of human capital from E → W, representing 29% of the total mobility after 2004. Nevertheless, the counter-migration from W → E is 7% of the total mobility over the same period, signalling the emergence of brain circulation within the EU. Our analysis of the country–country mobility networks and the country–profession bipartite networks provides timely quantitative evidence for the convergent integration of the EU, and highlights the central role of the UK and Germany as high-skilled labour hubs. We conclude with two data-driven models to explore the structural dynamics of the mobility networks. First, we develop a reconfiguration model to explore the potential ramifications of Brexit and the degree to which redirection of high-skilled labourers away from the UK may impact the integration of the rest of the European mobility network. Second, we use a panel regression model to explain empirical high-skilled mobility rates in terms of various economic ‘push–pull’ factors, the results of which show that government expenditure on education, per capita wealth, geographical proximity and labour force size are significant attractive features of destination countries.


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmy Eklundh

Much attention has been devoted to how right-wing populists in Europe challenge the consensus on the benefits of European integration, but left-wing resistance to the EU is less discussed. Existing analyses tend to distinguish between three constructions of political community: a postnational EU, the populist right invoking national sovereignty, and the populist left invoking popular sovereignty. However, empirical analyses struggle to find consensus on how left populists relate to the EU, and if they invoke claims to national or popular sovereignty. This article argues that this empirical impasse stems from that populism and Euroscepticism are performative categories and not simply analytical tools, and serve to produce exclusion. There are two dichotomies in this exclusionary frame: emotional populists/rational EU, and the postnational EU/nationalist populists. Through an analysis of Podemos in Spain and the UK Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, I show how the lines between the postnational EU, the national sovereign, and the popular sovereign are frailer than previously thought. The article concludes that these categories are less analytically astute than they are politically motivated, and analyses of the populist left in Europe must consider the performative dimension of its key terms.


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