scholarly journals FAKTOR DOMESTIK DALAM KEBIJAKAN PEMERINTAH HUNGARIA TERHADAP PENGUNGSI DAN MIGRAN DARI TIMUR TENGAH PERIODE TAHUN 2015-2019

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-41
Author(s):  
Angga Nurdin Rachmat

Hungary has become a party to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol on Refugees which requires it to adhere to the principle of non-refoulment towards refugees and migrants from the Middle East who came to the country in 2015. However, in reality Hungary has implemented a policy of detaining and returning refugees even by repressive means. This policy also clearly contradicts the principle of protection against refugees and the policies of the European Union (EU) in which Hungary is a member. The policies taken by Hungary cannot be separated from domestic factors that influence the choice of the Hungarian government to take policies that are contrary to the binding Convention and EU policy. Therefore, this paper seeks to answer what domestic factors influenced Hungary's policies towards refugees and migrants from the Middle East in the 2015-2019 period. This paper uses qualitative methods with data sources obtained from literature studies on various aspects of Hungarian domestic politics. The argument in this study is that Hungarian policy towards refugees and migrants is influenced by domestic factors related to elite interests as a strategy to win political battles in the country related to Viktor Orban's ideas of national identity as the Prime Minister of Hungary as well as leader of the ruling party Fidesz, the dynamics of Hungarian domestic politics. and the strengthening of right-wing populism advocated by Fidesz's party.

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-79
Author(s):  
Demas Nauvarian

The European Union is widely referred to as the international organization at the regional level with the highest integration phase. His journey is thought to have united the continent of Europe in a post-modern supranational political institution with a new post-Westphalia identity - European continental identity. This can be defined as a process of political integration. The process marked by the transfer of sovereignty, for example, can be seen in the European Union's ability to handle the Euro crisis in 2008. However, along the way, the political integration of the European Union is considered to be weakening. Post-Crisis 2008, the European Union experienced another challenge in the form of the 2014-2015 Refugee Crisis. This paper aims to answer questions related to why there is a weakening of the political integration of the European Union in these two challenges. By using the method of cross-longitudinal comparative studies on the responses of countries to the EU's decisions in the two challenges above, this paper argues that the increase in right-wing populism in various countries, particularly in Eastern and Central European countries, is a factor. the main part of the start to break up the political integration of the European Union. This paper concludes that the political values ​​of right-wing populism that focus on nation-state nationalism are contrary to the basic values ​​of the European Union which focus on liberal internationalism, and will become an obstacle to the future of EU political integration.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 99-132
Author(s):  
E. V. Khakhalkina ◽  
K. P. Andreev ◽  
A. V. Munko

The European Union undergoes several qualitative transformations. Today it faces major demographic changes, the distance between the EU and national states is growing because of Brexit and high rates of immigration to Europe. The configuration of mainstream parties is also transforming in an unpredictable way. All these processes bring the phenomenon of right-wing populism to the forefront of political life of the European Union. This phenomenon was an answer both to internal andexternal challenges. The aim of the article is to identify the components of right-wing populism using the examples of some memberstates, to show its threats and risks, as well as ways to minimize the impact of this phenomenon on all aspects of the EU life. To achieve this goal, party programs (primarily right-wing populist ones), national and European elections data, materials from the Eurobarometer and other public opinion services, speeches and interviews of leading politicians, and other materials are used. The methodological approach is based on the principles of interdisciplinarity. The authors used comparative-typological, functional and structural methods. The problems of immigration and Islamophobia in the EU are explained with the help of the civilizational concept of A.J. Toynbee. The structure of the article provides the study of the phenomenon of right-wing populism through such indicators as separation of elites from the population (including European democracy and lack of democracy), immigration (and Islamophobia), as well as the EU identity. The article provides a detailed analysis of the member- state cases including the United Kingdom, Austria, Germany, Italy, France, Sweden, the countries of Eastern Europe and others. The authors conclude that right-wing populism has dual nature, its significance in individual countries of the European Union increases, and it is deeply integrated into the party and parliamentary mechanism of European democracies.


2002 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 79-89 ◽  

Three months after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifda and several weeks before the Israeli elections brought Ariel Sharon to power, Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak gave the green light for a last-ditch Palestinian-Israeli effort to reach a peace agreement. The negotia——following tens of meetings between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, mostly in Jerusalem, almost from the collapse of the Camp David summit in July 2000——took place at the Egyptian resort town of Taba on the Red Sea from 21 to 27 January 2001. In contrast to the talks at Camp David, where the Americans played a preponderant role, no outsiders participated in the Taba talks. The Israeli delegation, led by Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami, included Yossi Beilin, Israel Hassoun, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Yossi Sarid, and Gilad Sher. The Palestinian delegation was headed by Ahmad Qurai' (Abu Ala'), speaker of the Palestinian Council, and included Yasir 'Abid Rabbuh, Hassan Asfour, Muhammad Dahlan, Saeb Erakat, and Nabil Shaath. The talks, in which the Israelis moved considerably beyond the positions they had presented at Camp David as "red lines" beyond which they could not go "without jeopardizing the state," were nevertheless largely based on President Bill Clinton's parameters of 23 December 2000 (see JPS 119, Doc. D1). The negotiations were called off by Prime Minister Barak on 27 January, on the eve of the Israeli elections held on 6 February 2001. Compared to the Camp David summit, which produced a number of accounts from members of the Israeli, Palestinian, and American delegations (see special documents in JPS 118 and 121; Docs. D3 and D4 in JPS 121), little has been written about the Taba talks. The most comprehensive account was perhaps that of Alain Gresh in Le Monde Diplomatique of September 2001, which also reproduced the official Israeli and Palestinian position papers on the issues discussed (see Doc. B4 in JPS 122 for the Israeli and Palestinian position papers on refugees). The following two texts are the only documents on the Taba talks accepted by both sides. The Israeli-Palestinian joint statement at Taba was released on 27 January 2001 and published by the Jersualem Post the following day. The document as presented here is from Le Monde Diplomatique's Web site at MondeDiplo.com/focus/mideast. The Moratinos "nonpaper" was compiled by the special envoy of the European Union to the Middle East, Miguel Angel Moratinos, at the request of the two parties——"not just for history, but because sooner or later there would have to be more talks" (Le Monde Diplomatique, September 2001). Moratinos, the only outsider present at Taba, though not at the meetings themselves, interviewed the negotiators after each session, according to Akiva Eldar in Ha'Aretz (14 February 2002), and prepared the document on the basis of their reports. The final document, successive drafts of which were sent to both sides for comment and correction, was completed and approved by both sides in summer 2001. It constitutes a kind of minutes, a summary of the positions of each side at the time the talks ended. The document, which was not to be published, was leaked and published by Ha'Aretz on 14 February 2002.


2020 ◽  
pp. 101-118
Author(s):  
Filip Ilkowski

The article presents the analysis of activities and ideological motivations of politicians and political formations connected to those parts of non-Labour British left, that appealed during the 2016 referendum to vote for leaving the European Union by the United Kingdom. It points to key ideological pillars of this heterogenic political milieu with its common and divergent elements. The thesis is put forward in the text that, as in the case of Labour politicians, also among the left-wing outside the Labour Party, we can point to two ideological and political poles that decide to opt for leaving the EU by the UK: socialist universalism and national-identity particularism. Their key determinant was the views on immigration control, also affecting their attitude to cooperation with the anti-EU right-wing political milieu.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316801877396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evgeniia Iakhnis ◽  
Brian Rathbun ◽  
Jason Reifler ◽  
Thomas J. Scotto

Was the outcome of the United Kingdom’s ‘Brexit’ referendum to leave the European Union a visible and consequential manifestation of right-wing populism? After all, skepticism in the UK towards the EU predates the recent rise of European right wing populism. Original survey data show, however, that the interaction of nativist sentiment and anti-elitist attitudes, the cocktail of right-wing populism, led to widespread support for Brexit, even while controlling for other factors. Although hostility to immigrants was an important factor, nativists were particularly prone to vote ‘leave’; if they also did not trust political elites, a crucial element of populism. Further underscoring this explanation is the conditional effect of anti-elite sentiment. The relationship between anti-elite sentiment and support for leaving the EU only exists among those with high nativist sentiment; among those low in nativist sentiment, anti-elite feelings did not increase support for Brexit.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003232922095715
Author(s):  
Daniel Kinderman

Why do some business associations mobilize, engage in collective action, and take public stands against the populist right while others do not? This article examines business mobilization against the populist right in Germany, which is heavily export-oriented and reliant on the European and global market order. Drawing on interviews with three business associations, the article presents three key findings. First, economic self-interest is a powerful driver of business mobilization: perceived threats and vulnerability spurred two German associations to act collectively against right-wing populism. However, mobilization is driven not by declining revenues or profits but by a mixture of values and material interests. Second, business associations that mobilize stress the need to reform the system, democratize the European Union, and address those who feel “left behind.” Third, medium-size, export-oriented manufacturers are the core business constituency supporting liberal democracy and the European Union. The article shows that some business factions can play a role in defending the liberal international order against right-wing populism.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document