scholarly journals RENT-SEEKING DECISIONS OF THE MAIN PARTICIPANTS IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY-GAME AND SYSTEM DYNAMICS

2022 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 106-119
Author(s):  
Weiwei Zuo ◽  
Qiankun Wang ◽  
Peng Li
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Interaction Mechanism ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Behavioral Characteristics ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Dynamics Method

The performance of a construction project can be severely harmed by its participants’ rent-seeking. In order to prevent such attempt, this research integrates the evolutionary game theory with system dynamics method to simulate the impact of the change of some factors that may cause/reduce rent-seeking. Based on the analysis of the behavioral characteristics and interactive relationships of the main participants (the owner, supervisor, and contractor), an evolutionary game model is constructed and simulated with the method of system dynamics based on the replication dynamic equation of the mixed strategy solution of the three-party static game model. By assigning the parameters of project scale, supervision likelihood, supervision success rate, supervision cost, and penalty intensity, the interaction mechanism of the participants on each factor is revealed through a case-based simulation. The results show that the impacts of these factors on participants’ rent-seeking decisions are significantly different. Furthermore, some management suggestions are provided to prevent rent-seeking for project owner according to the research conclusions. This research can help the project owners take proper measures to prevent rent-seeking of the supervisors and the contractors to improve the performances of the projects.

scholarly journals A Study of Taxi Service Mode Choice Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhu Bai ◽  
Mingxia Huang ◽  
Shuai Bian ◽  
Huandong Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stable States ◽  
Taxi Service ◽  
Service Mode ◽  
The Impact

The emergence of online car-hailing service provides an innovative approach to vehicle booking but has negatively influenced the taxi industry in China. This paper modeled taxi service mode choice based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The modes included the dispatching and online car-hailing modes. We constructed an EGT framework, including determining the strategies and the payoff matrix. We introduced different behaviors, including taxi company management, driver operation, and passenger choice. This allowed us to model the impact of these behaviors on the evolving process of service mode choice. The results show that adjustments in taxi company, driver, and passenger behaviors impact the evolutionary path and convergence speed of our evolutionary game model. However, it also reveals that, regardless of adjustments, the stable states in the game model remain unchanged. The conclusion provides a basis for studying taxi system operation and management.

scholarly journals System Dynamics Model for the Evolutionary Behaviour of Government Enterprises and Consumers in China’s New Energy Vehicle Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Sun ◽  
Yao Wan ◽  
Huirong Lv
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Motor Vehicle ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicle ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Vehicle Market

Exhaust pollution and energy crises are worsening worldwide. China has become the largest motor vehicle producer; thus, promoting the use of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China has important practical significance. In this paper, considering the limited rationality of governments, NEV enterprises and consumers, we study the subsidy policy of the China NEV market using the evolutionary game and system dynamics (SD) methods. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model is developed and the replicator dynamics equations and Jacobian matrix are obtained. A SD simulation of the model was conducted to further clarify the impact of the initial market proportion and three variables used in the model. The results show that the initial market proportion affects the evolution speed but does not affect the evolution result when the three group players all choose a mixed strategy. For governments, they should not hastily cancel price subsidies provided to consumers; rather, they should dynamically adjust the rate of the subsidy decrease and increase the consumers’ extra cost for purchasing fuel vehicles (FVs). NEV enterprises should appropriately increase their investments in the research and development (R&D) of NEVs.

scholarly journals Research on Cooperative Innovation Behavior of Industrial Cluster Based on Subject Adaptability

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Jia ◽  
Minghui Jiang ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Cluster ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cooperative Innovation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

From the perspective of the interactive cooperation among subjects, this paper portrays the process of cooperative innovation in industrial cluster, in order to capture the correlated equilibrium relationship among them. Through the utilization of two key tools, evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics equations, this paper considers the cost and gains of cooperative innovation and the amount of government support as well as other factors to build and analyze a classic evolutionary game model. On this basis, the subject’s own adaptability is introduced, which is regarded as the system noise in the stochastic evolutionary game model so as to analyze the impact of adaptability on the game strategy selection. The results show that, in the first place, without considering subjects’ adaptability, their cooperation in industrial clusters depends on the cost and gains of innovative cooperation, the amount of government support, and some conditions that can promote cooperation, namely, game steady state. In the second place after the introduction of subjects’ adaptability, it will affect both game theory selection process and time, which means that the process becomes more complex, presents the nonlinear characteristics, and helps them to make faster decisions in their favor, but the final steady state remains unchanged.

scholarly journals Analysis on Management of Job Burnout of Counselors in Chinese Colleges Based on Game Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (17) ◽  
pp. 207
Author(s):  
Xiaolei Wang ◽  
Ruoxuan Zhang ◽  
Zengxin Li ◽  
Junlong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Job Burnout ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Incentive System ◽  
College Counselors ◽  
Rational Choices ◽  
Multiple Scenarios ◽  
First Mover

In Chinese colleges, counselors need to simultaneously engage in teaching and management. The dual responsibilities make them probe to job burnout. To solve the problem, this paper puts forward assumptions about the behavior, income, and cost of counselors, and sets up a game model of burnout governance for college counselors. On this basis, the game between the college and counselors was analyzed under multiple scenarios: the two parties make completely independent decisions; the college is the first mover in the decision-making—— namely the equilibrium of the mixed strategy. Suppose a few colleges decide to improve the counselor management system. Based on the evolutionary game model, the authors discussed the influence of the improvement on all the colleges. The results show that the rational choices of the two parties should be “the college reforms the counselor management system”, while “the counselors work actively and avoid job burnout”; if a few colleges decide to improve the counselor management system, all the other colleges will follow suit, which leads to an improvement of efficient incentive system for college counselors. The research results provide a good reference for the burnout governance of college counselors.

scholarly journals Evaluation of the Quality Supervision System for Construction Projects in China Considering the Quality Behavior Risk Transmission

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 1660
Author(s):  
Jingchun Feng ◽  
Yuting Wang ◽  
Ke Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Construction Projects ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary System ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
System A ◽  
Low Efficiency ◽  
The Stability

In construction projects, improper quality behavior of a participant results in quality behavior risks, which can transmit to the downstream participants and may cause detrimental effects on the quality of the entity finally constructed. Controlling the transmission of quality behavior risks is the key to effectively supervising and ensuring the quality of construction projects. In this study, the effectiveness of the quality supervision system of construction projects in China was investigated by considering the transmission of quality behavior risks. A multi-player evolutionary game model consisting of the players of quality supervision of a government department, upstream participant (UP), and downstream participant (DP) was generated. By using the system dynamics theory, the game model was simulated to determine the stability of the evolutionary system and to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s current quality supervision system under different scenarios. The results showed that there is no evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the evolutionary system of the current quality supervision system in China and there are fluctuations in the evolution process. It revealed that high risk exists in the current quality supervision system in China. To resolve the problem of the low efficiency of the current Chinese supervision system, a dynamic penalty and incentive method is developed, which has been proven to be able to effectively control the quality behavior risks in construction projects and hence ensuring the quality of the entity finally constructed.

scholarly journals Security Regulation and Enterprise Innovation in Communication Industry

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Kai Gao ◽  
Lijun Ma
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Communication Industry ◽  
The Social ◽  
Enterprise Innovation ◽  
The Government ◽  
Security Regulations ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Government Security

This paper conducted an evolutionary game model of the interaction between the governments and communication enterprises and analyzed the impact of the government’s communication security regulation on the innovation decision-making of communication enterprises. The results show that the behavior of the governments depends on the social benefits, rent-seeking benefits, and regulating costs in strict and de security regulations. The communication enterprises’ behavior depends on the benefits of innovation and the costs in R&D and rent-seeking. When government subsidies are relatively inadequate, the communication enterprises’ strategy under government security regulation swings from not-innovation finally to innovation. The policy implications of this study indicate that appropriate de security regulation by the government will help communication enterprises generate a good atmosphere for innovation, and the appropriate increase in subsidies will be more conducive to driving enterprise innovation.

Rent-Seeking Game Analysis and Countermeasure Study of Contractors in Various Stages of Construction Projects

2013 ◽  
Vol 405-408 ◽  
pp. 3473-3476
Author(s):  
Cheng Zhi Li ◽  
Feng Peng
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Rent Seeking ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Countermeasure Study ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Seeking Behavior

Project quality is affected by many factors,of which the rent-seeking behavior of the contractor is an important one.In this paper,the contractor’s rent-seeking behavior in various stage of construction projects and its effect to social welfare is analyzed based on the game theory and rent-seeking theory.After building a game model among the owner,contractor and supervisor,some suggestions are propounded to forestall such behavior from the point of equilibrium solutions.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Capital-Constrained Supplier’s and Manufacturer’s Financing Schemes

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Suyong Zhang ◽  
Panos. M. Pardalos ◽  
Xiaodan Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Risk ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Interaction Mechanism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Strategy Selection ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Purchase Order ◽  
Financing Strategy ◽  
Theoretical Results ◽  
Financing Schemes

Purchase order financing (POF) and buyer direct financing (BDF) are both innovative financing schemes aiming to help financial constrained suppliers secure financing for production. In this paper, we investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers’ financing strategy selection and manufacturers’ loans offering strategy adoption under two innovative financing schemes. We developed an evolutionary game model to effectively investigate the interaction mechanism between suppliers and manufacturers and analyzed the evolutionary stable strategies of the game model. Then we used system dynamics to present the performance of the evolutionary game model and took a sensitivity analysis to verify the theoretical results. The main conclusions are as follows: in the supply chain, to deal with the noncooperation among suppliers and manufacturers on innovative financing schemes, the revenue of manufacturers, the rate of manufacturer loan, and the proper financial risk factor should be relatively high.

scholarly journals Optimization of Financial Penalties for Environmental Pollution by Chinese Traditional Energy Enterprises

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Le Chang ◽  
Yadong Song ◽  
Tao Yu
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Pollution ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Environmental Damage ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary Processes ◽  
Environmental Laws ◽  
Strategy Game

The formulation of proper financial penalties plays an important role in regulating Chinese traditional energy enterprises’ illegal pollution. Through the construction of a mixed-strategy game model and an evolutionary game model for regulatory agencies and traditional energy enterprises, the article studies how financial penalties impact players’ strategies and evolutionary processes to optimize financial penalties. It found that excessive financial penalties could reduce enforcement, but insufficient financial penalties would cause more pollution discharge violations. The article concludes that Chinese environmental laws should focus more on setting reasonable penalties based on the profit from activities that generate illegal pollution rather than on the environmental damage to improve regulatory effectiveness.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document