scholarly journals Pension Fund Management: The Case of Ethiopian Social Security Agency

Author(s):  
Kokobe Seyoum Alemu
2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-141
Author(s):  
Kokobe Seyoum Alem

The research study evaluated pension fund management of Ethiopian social security agency. To attain these objectives, eleven years’ financial statements were used as a secondary data and different ratio analysis was carried out to examine the status of fund management of Ethiopian social security agency. Those ratios shows that the organization current assets is very much large when compared with its current liabilities which shows the organization is in the best position to pay off all of its current liability. Again, the finding displays the asset turnover has been decreasing from time to time which shows under utilization of companies asset. In addition to this, large percentage of the asset of social security is financed by equity and small percentage is financed by debt. Lastly,the analysis puts that the organization is absorbent up to 50% of its income. That means up to 50% of them is consumed by its expenses.


2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-500 ◽  
Author(s):  
NIKOLAOS T. MILONAS ◽  
GEORGE A. PAPACHRISTOU ◽  
THEODORE A. ROUPAS

AbstractEconomic and demographic slowdown has put under strain public pension systems around the globe. In this paper, we discuss the characteristics of the Greek social security system and investigate the issue of pension fund management. Our empirical analysis focuses on whether flexible investment rules (including equity investment) could have taken the pressure off the Greek public pension system while reducing the risks associated with such flexibility. The empirical results of the paper suggest that efficient management of reserves can result in additional significant revenues at acceptable levels of financial risk. However, pension fund management flexibility cannot by itself resolve the problem of social security system.


Omega ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 127-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vittorio Moriggia ◽  
Miloš Kopa ◽  
Sebastiano Vitali

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEORGE PENNACCHI ◽  
MAHDI RASTAD

AbstractThis paper presents a model of a public pension fund's choice of portfolio risk. Optimal portfolio allocations are derived when pension fund management maximize the utility of wealth of a representative taxpayer or when pension fund management maximize their own utility of compensation. The model's implications are examined using annual data on the portfolio allocations and plan characteristics of 125 state pension funds over the 2000–2009 period. Consistent with agency behavior by public pension fund management, we find evidence that funds chose greater overall asset – liability portfolio risk following periods of relatively poor investment performance. In addition, pension plans that select a relatively high rate with which to discount their liabilities tend to choose riskier portfolios. Moreover, consistent with a desire to gamble for higher benefits, pension plans take more risk when they have greater representation by plan participants on their Boards of Trustees.


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