scholarly journals The Effect of Formal Contracts, Transaction Cost, Agency Cost, Principal Agent Conflicts and Principal Agent Relationships on Village Funds Allocation in Facing the Covid 19 Crisis in Dolok Masihul District, Serdang Bedagai Regency

2021 ◽  
Vol 04 (12) ◽  
Author(s):  
Syofyan Amrani ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Public Institution ◽  
Principal Agent ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Funds Allocation ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Village

This study is related to the concept of public institution on principal agent relationship, namely the relationship between the Village Head and the Village Secretary in local government named Dolok Masihul. The number of villages studied were 44 respondents. Analysis statistical investigates relationship of research variable and using multiple regressions model. After analysing was known that formal contract had a significant positive effect on village funds allocation with value of 0.355. it means both head villager and secretaries had the competence and authority to carry it out, as Pascal (1997), Meinard (1997), Sarwoko (2010: 28) and Syofyan (2019). Hypothesis is accepted. Transaction costs have a negative effect and the hypothesis is rejected. Transaction costs refer to the governance structure as (Klein, 1999: 464-466), (Williamson, 1985). This result is different from the research by Syofyan (2019). Agency costs have coefficient value 0.072. It means agency cost significant to village funds. The hypothesis is accepted. Agency costs in this study are coaching and supervision that are positively related to the total allocation of village funds. This result is in line with Syofyan (2019).

Agency Cost and Dividend Pay-out: A Study of Selected Listed Manufacturing Firms in Nigeria

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helen Obiageli Anazonwu ◽  
Francis Chinedu Egbunike ◽  
Felix Nwaolisa Echekoba
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Manufacturing Firms ◽  
Free Cash Flow ◽  
Dividend Payments ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Cost Studies ◽  
Positive Effect

Agency cost is an internal cost which arises between management (agent) and shareholder (principal), because of the diverging interest of the two parties. Dividend payments are often employed to mitigate this cost. Studies have examined the effect of dividend pay-outs on agency costs documenting mixed findings. However, the literature on the reverse effect of agency costs on dividend pay-outs is still nascent. The main objective of the study is to examine the effect of agency cost on dividend pay-out of listed manufacturing firms in Nigeria. The study used a panel research design. The population of the study comprised listed manufacturing firms, but delimited to firms in conglomerate and consumer goods sectors of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Data for the study were collected from yearly financial statements of the selected firms. The hypotheses were tested using pooled OLS Regression. The dependent variable of the study was dividend pay-out, while assets to sales ratio, leverage, and free cash flow were proxies of agency cost. Firm size and profitability measures (ROA and ROE) were used as control variables in the study. The study found a significant and positive effect of assets to sales ratio and free cash flow, and a significant and negative effect of leverage on dividend pay-out. The study recommended amongst others that, managers should consider the implication of agency costs in the design of in the design and implementation of a dividend policy.

scholarly journals Principal-Agent in Implementing Village Funds in Linggo Village, Kejayan District, Pasuruan Regency

2021 ◽  
Vol 006 (02) ◽  
pp. 5-12
Author(s):  
Aminullah Aminullah
Keyword(s):  
Principal Agent ◽  
State Budget ◽  
Role Of Principal ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Many ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Village ◽  
The Relationship

The village fund is one of the many policy programs carried out by the government sourced from the state budget (APBN) which is allocated directly to the village. But in the implementation of the village fund, there are still problems so that in general the village fund is still not effective. This study analyzes the role of actors in the implementation of village funds from the perspective of the principal-agent whose locus is in Linggo village, Kejayan district, pasuruan regency. The focus in this study is the role of principal and agent in the stages of planning, implementation, and reporting of the village fund by measuring the effectiveness of implementation through the principles for cultivating effective implementation practice. Novelty of this research is to see the effectiveness of the implementation of the village fund from the perspective of the relationship of the principal agent. This study aims to create a model of the effectiveness of the village fund policy implementation in linggo village, kejayan district. The results showed that the relationship between the principal and agent must increase oversight so that the policy objectives can be achieved.

Hubungan Iklim Komunikasi Organisasi dengan Kepuasan Kerja untuk Meningkatkan Kinerja Aparatur Pemerintahan Desa

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 517
Author(s):  
Bella Oktavianita ◽  
Sarwititi Sarwoprasodjo
Keyword(s):  
Job Satisfaction ◽  
Organizational Communication ◽  
Survey Method ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Communication Climate ◽  
Real Relationship ◽  
Village Government ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Village ◽  
The Relationship

Iklim komunikasi organisasi merupakan persepsi pegawai mengenai peristiwa yang terjadi di lingkungannya. Kantor Desa Cibalung, Kecamatan Cijeruk, Kabupaten Bogor merupakan salah satu kantor desa yang memiliki berbagai prestasi. Prestasi yang sudah diraih tentu saja tidak lepas dari peran kinerja aparatur pemerintahan desa dan masyarakat yang terlibat dalam menciptakan lingkungan kerja yang produktif dan kepuasaan kerja yang dirasakan. Maka dari itu, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk melihat hubungan iklim komunikasi organisasi dengan kepuasan kerja dan hubungan kepuasan kerja dengan kinerja aparatur pemerintahan desa. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kuantitatif melalui metode survei dengan kuesioner yang didukung oleh data kualitatif melalui teknik wawancara mendalam dan studi literatur dengan responden sebanyak 36 orang. Hasil penelitian yang diperoleh menunjukkan bahwa terdapat hubungan nyata antara iklim komunikasi organisasi dengan kepuasan kerja dan hubungan sangat nyata antara kepuasan kerja dengan kinerja aparatur pemerintahan desa.Kata Kunci: iklim komunikasi, kepuasan kerja, kinerja, komunikasi organisasi=====ABSTRACTOrganizational communication climate was the employee's perception of events that occurred in their environment. The Cibalung Village Office, Cijeruk Subdistrict, Bogor District was one of the village offices that had various achievements. The achievements that have been achieved certainly could not be separated from the role of the performance of the village government apparatus and the community involved in creating a productive work environment and perceived job satisfaction. Therefore, this study aimed to analyze the relationship of organizational communication climate with job satisfaction and the relationship of job satisfaction with the performance of village government officials. This study used a quantitative approach through a survey method with a questionnaire supported by qualitative data through in-depth interview techniques and literature studies with 36 respondents. The results obtained indicated that there was a real relationship between organizational communication with job satisfaction and the very obvious relationship between job satisfaction by the performance of the village government apparatus.Keywords: communication climate, job satisfaction, performance, organizational communication

Auditing, Attestation, and Financial Reporting for an Early American Charity

2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-46
Author(s):  
Michael Braswell ◽  
Roger B. Daniels
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Social Costs ◽  
Limited Resources ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Early American ◽  
Financial Condition ◽  
The City

ABSTRACT Our study examines assurance and attestation practices of the Charleston Orphan House from 1790 to 1825 and represents a response to Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) call for research into the nature of stewardship and agency costs among nonprofits by providing evidence of the largely unexplored early American practices (Moussalli 2008; Sargiacomo and Gomes 2011). We document the origins of the assurance and attestation techniques used to legitimize the Charleston Orphan House and to minimize the agency costs faced by its public and private funders. We find that assurance and attestation practices were reflected in the routine publication of the Committee on Accounts reports that served as vital elements of a governance structure that enabled the municipality and philanthropists to monitor the financial condition of the institution. These oversight efforts helped minimize agency costs that naturally arose between the Orphan House and resource providers, making it possible for the City of Charleston and private funders to efficiently allocate limited resources to mitigate social costs of managing the post-revolutionary orphan problem. Our findings provide new insights into early assurance and attestation practices and support Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) conjecture that nonprofits face similar economic motivations for utilizing financial reporting, auditing, and attestation as monitoring mechanisms as do their profit-seeking counterparts.

scholarly journals How to encourage innovation failure knowledge sharing in virtual research organization: an incentive mechanism based on game theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhuang Xiong ◽  
Pengju Wang ◽  
Chengxia Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Knowledge Sharing ◽  
Fault Tolerant ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Research Organization ◽  
Incentive Model ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Innovation Ability ◽  
Relationship Of

AbstractInnovation failure knowledge sharing plays an important role in reducing the probability of repeated failure of subsequent innovation and improving innovation ability of virtual research organization. However, it is very difficult for members to actively share the innovation failure knowledge without incentives. To promote the sharing behavior of innovation failure knowledge in virtual research organization, by using game theory, considering the risk aversion degree of members and the negative effect of fault-tolerance environment, the incentive model of innovation failure knowledge sharing of virtual research organization was constructed, the incentive relationship of innovation failure knowledge sharing between organization and its members under the influence of different states was analyzed, and the theoretical model was simulated and verified through a case study from China. Results show that: (1) without considering the negative effect of fault-tolerant environment, the optimal incentive coefficient of innovation failure knowledge sharing is positively related to the shareable rate and the transformation ability of innovation failure knowledge of members, and negatively related to the sharing cost and risk aversion degree of members; (2) considering the negative effect of fault-tolerant environment, virtual research organization should make a corresponding modification of sharing incentive intensity according to the estimation of tolerance degree to fault-tolerant environment by itself and its members, so as to reduce the knowledge input of organization. The findings obtained from this study provide a novel idea and method for the design of incentive mechanism of innovation failure knowledge sharing of virtual research organization.

scholarly journals Firms' Choice of Regulatory Instruments to Reduce Pollution: A Transaction Cost Approach

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magali Delmas ◽  
Alfred Marcus
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Command And Control ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Negotiated Agreements ◽  
Regulatory Instruments ◽  
Market Opportunities ◽  
And Control

This paper compares the economic efficiency of firm-agency governance structures for pollution reduction using transaction costs economics. Two governance structures are analyzed with the transaction costs approach: command and control regulation (CCR) and negotiated agreements (NAs). We propose that the choice of governance structure depends on the strategies firms pursue given the attributes of their transactions and their market opportunities. The application of transaction cost economics analysis leads to different choices of regulatory instruments. Firms in more mature, stable industries are likely to choose command and control, while firms in new, dynamic sectors are more likely to opt for negotiated agreements. Frequency of transactions is a key factor in firm choice.

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