scholarly journals Game Theory Analysis: The Stakeholder Behavior in the Rural Collective Property Rights System Reform (RCPRSR)

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 272
Author(s):  
Ruitao Zhang ◽  
Ammar Saad ◽  
Ying Xia
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Rural Economy ◽  
Rational Design ◽  
System Reform ◽  
Collective Property ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Stakeholder Behavior ◽  
Village Organization ◽  
The Village

The Rural Collective Property Rights System Reform (RCPRSR) is a process of evolution along with the equilibrium point of the game theory. It is also an institutional change involving China’s primary economic system and rural basic management system. This paper used the stakeholder theory to determine the main stakeholders in the RCPRSR and then analyzed the behavior mechanism of the main stakeholders through the method of game theory. The results indicate that the main stakeholders are farmers, village organizations, and government. The Nash equilibrium solution is executing and joining respectively village organizations and farmers. Game theory also suggests that the RCPRSR is a gradual and repetitive dynamic process, not the result of one-time rational design. Based on the conclusions of the research, it indicates that should raise the enthusiasm of the village organization. This can increase the income of farmers and flourish the rural economy of China.

The Analysis of Energy Conservation Venture Investment in a Limited Partnership Based on the Game Model of Human Capital

2013 ◽  
Vol 791-793 ◽  
pp. 1558-1561
Author(s):  
Zu Xu Zou ◽  
Yun Xia Xue
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Human Capital ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Physical Capital ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Venture Capitalists ◽  
Limited Partnership ◽  
Venture Investment ◽  
Capital Owner ◽  
The Game Theory

In the paper, we start with the game theory, by building the game theory model of Venture Capitalist (human capital owner) and Venture Investor (physical capital owner),and with the analysis and derivation of the game theory model , conclusions can be got that Venture Capitalists should share the enterprise property rights and so on. Then some researches are made to know whether limited partnership system arrangement reflects the idea that Venture Capitalists should share the enterprise property rights. At last, some ways are known for Venture Investors to realize their maximum benefits.

Property Rights Reforms and Changing Grassroots Governance in China’s Urban—Rural Peripheries: The Case of Changping District in Beijing

Urban Studies ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 509-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lanchih Po
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Power ◽  
Collective Property ◽  
Urban Rural ◽  
New Form ◽  
Village Government ◽  
The Village

This paper analyses how rural property rights reforms have reshaped grassroots governance in the rapid urbanisation process in China. The management and distribution of the villages’ collective property has become a flashpoint for local conflict when collective farmland is taken for urban uses. Changping, a rural district located on the northern periphery of Beijing, pioneered a property rights reform to convert villages’ collective assets into a new form of shareholding co-operative. Along with the election of a new board of directors that is now in charge of collective property, the reforms are redefining the jurisdiction of the party, the village government and the shareholding co-operative organisation, thus reconfiguring the political and economic power structure at the village level.

村规、法律和政府:椒江区农村村规民约解读

Rural China ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-105
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Rural Women ◽  
Land Rights ◽  
Rural Populations ◽  
Community Members ◽  
Collective Property ◽  
Collective Ownership ◽  
Single Entity ◽  
Ownership Of Land ◽  
The Village

In the villages of Jiaojiang district in Taizhou municipality, longstanding customs like the husband takes in a wife and the wife marries out to a husband have been made into binding norms by the so-called “village regulations and people’s agreements.” It is commonly thought that to interfere in the marriages of community members, especially to compel wives to move to the husbands’ residence, goes against the law and wrongfully invades the rights of rural women—something traceable to “feudal notions” of male superiority and female inferiority. In reality, however, it is collectivization of land and planned child-births that have altered the traditional village. Such traditional customs have been sustained not by the natural village but rather by the administrative village under the system of collective ownership of land. The absurdity consists in the fact that the village collectivity, which ostensibly broke with tradition, was actually something that combined blood ties and spatial ties into a single entity, such that rural populations enjoy collective land rights on the basis of blood and marriage ties. In that way, the custom of the husband taking in a wife and the wife marrying out to a husband, written into village regulations, has actually formed the required standard for maintaining orderly distribution of collective property benefits. The key to the problem thus consists not in so-called “protecting women’s rights” or changing customs, but rather in dissolving the entrapment of property rights with status. This article is in Chinese. 在台州市椒江区农村，多以村规民约的形式把男娶女嫁等习俗做成强制性的规范。通常认为，对社员婚嫁的干涉、尤其是强制妇女从夫居是与法律相抵触，并侵犯了农村妇女的权益，其根源在于男尊女卑观念和封建意识。但实际上，土地集体所有制和计划生育政策改变了传统乡村。传统习俗所依附的不是自然村落而是土地集体所有制框架下的行政村。问题的悖谬更在于作为与传统决裂而建构的村集体还是个血缘与地域合一的组织，农村人口凭基于血缘与婚姻的身份享受集体地权。如此，被纳入村规中的男娶女嫁等习俗也已经成了维护集体资产利益有序分配的必要规范。所以，问题不在于所谓的“妇女维权”或移风易俗，关键在于如何解开产权 和身份的纠缠。

Reputation and Gossip in Game Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-229
Author(s):  
Charles Roddie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Behavior ◽  
Future Behavior ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Shed Light

When interacting with others, it is often important for you to know what they have done in similar situations in the past: to know their reputation. One reason is that their past behavior may be a guide to their future behavior. A second reason is that their past behavior may have qualified them for reward and cooperation, or for punishment and revenge. The fact that you respond positively or negatively to the reputation of others then generates incentives for them to maintain good reputations. This article surveys the game theory literature which analyses the mechanisms and incentives involved in reputation. It also discusses how experiments have shed light on strategic behavior involved in maintaining reputations, and the adequacy of unreliable and third party information (gossip) for maintaining incentives for cooperation.

scholarly journals The Superiority of Quantum Strategy in 3-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1443
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Dong ◽  
Ai-Guo Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Final State ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Initial States ◽  
Quantum Strategy ◽  
Selection Of

In this paper, we extend the quantum game theory of Prisoner’s Dilemma to the N-player case. The final state of quantum game theory of N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is derived, which can be used to investigate the payoff of each player. As demonstration, two cases (2-player and 3-player) are studied to illustrate the superiority of quantum strategy in the game theory. Specifically, the non-unique entanglement parameter is found to maximize the total payoff, which oscillates periodically. Finally, the optimal strategic set is proved to depend on the selection of initial states.

DAMPAK BADAN USAHA MILIK DESA (BUMDES) TERHADAP KESEJAHTERAAN MASYARAKAT DI DESA TUTUR

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Khumaidi Khumaidi ◽  
Siti Zaynab
Keyword(s):  
Rural Communities ◽  
Rural Economy ◽  
Complex Problem ◽  
Business Development ◽  
Qualitative Approach ◽  
Depth Interview ◽  
New Business ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Village

Badan Usaha Milik Desa thereafter called BUMDes is an alternative to improve the rural economy. Unfortunately, however, the position of BUMDes had not been governed completely in existing legislation. Another more complex problem is that in choosing an appropriate enterprise for establishing BUMDes. This study aims to describe the impact of BUMDES on the welfare of rural communities. BUMDES is one of the programs to strengthen the role of the region.This research was conducted using a qualitative approach and used in-depth interview and observation techniques. The results of the study have shown that BUMDES has had an impact on the village economy. BUMDES has an impact on community business development in Tutur Village. In addition, BUMDES encourages people to start a new business according to the potential of the community. The impact of other BUMDES is to improve the level of children's education and improve public health

scholarly journals Multi-Robot Searching using Game-Theory Based Approach

10.5772/6232 ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Meng
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Dynamic Environment ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Target Searching ◽  
Multi Robot

This paper proposes a game-theory based approach in a multi–target searching using a multi-robot system in a dynamic environment. It is assumed that a rough priori probability map of the targets' distribution within the environment is given. To consider the interaction between the robots, a dynamic-programming equation is proposed to estimate the utility function for each robot. Based on this utility function, a cooperative nonzero-sum game is generated, where both pure Nash Equilibrium and mixed-strategy Equilibrium solutions are presented to achieve an optimal overall robot behaviors. A special consideration has been taken to improve the real-time performance of the game-theory based approach. Several mechanisms, such as event-driven discretization, one-step dynamic programming, and decision buffer, have been proposed to reduce the computational complexity. The main advantage of the algorithm lies in its real-time capabilities whilst being efficient and robust to dynamic environments.

A Weapon of the Weak? Shareholding, Property Rights and Villager Empowerment in China

2018 ◽  
Vol 237 ◽  
pp. 131-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karita Kan
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Community Based ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Collective Property

AbstractAs urbanization continues to fuel land and property conflicts in rural China, shareholding has been promoted as a reform in property rights that would enhance bottom-up control in the governance of collective assets. The recent proliferation of community-based shareholding companies has been credited for giving villagers new identities as shareholders, which entitle them to vote, receive their share of collective profits, and elect the managers of their wealth. This paper critically appraises these reforms and offers a contrarian perspective to singular narratives of villager empowerment. While shareholding clarifies villagers’ rights of control, income and transfer in collective property, the effective exercise of such powers is often forestalled on the ground by the concentration of power in elite hands. To the extent that formal and informal constraints on cadre power remain tenuous, shareholding could function as a vehicle for the powerful to appropriate collective wealth rather than as a weapon of the weak.

scholarly journals Durable Rural Development Through the 2014 - 2020 National Rural Development Program

2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Lucian
Keyword(s):  
Rural Development ◽  
Rural Areas ◽  
Rural Economy ◽  
Development Program ◽  
Development Programs ◽  
Local Identity ◽  
Rural Development Program ◽  
Implied Contracts ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The Village

AbstractRural Development Policy is a priority for the E.U., as half of the Union’s population lives in rural areas. This policy is focused on society’s durable development, under all its aspects: economic, social, cultural, and so on. The challenges which rural areas of member states face must be addressed, while at the same time applying European norms and standards for rural development. After Romania became a part of the E.U., rural areas here were supported through several national rural development programs, so as to create a durable and sustainable rural economy. Major changes are required to achieve this kind of development, such as replacing old agricultural structures, modernizing the village, while at the same time maintaining cultural and local identity. Rural areas in Romania are often affected by natural disasters. During the last 17 years, national rural development programs implied contracts worth billions of Euros. For instance, through the 2020 NRDP, a budget of 9.5 billion Euros was allocated, 8.1 billion Euros coming from E.U. funding and 1.34 billion Euros as national cofinancing. At the moment, Romania’s absorption degree for the 2020 NRDP is of 20% and is expected to surpass 50% by 2020. Another regional program includes the concept of Spatial Development - Romania - 2025. Spatial planning supports the avoidance of rural dispersion. The betterment of infrastructure is supported, such as access roads, expanding base utilities, consolidated works to prevent flooding or landslides, and so on.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document