Does Liberal Democracy Require a Gandhian Approach to Religion?

Acorn ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-129
Author(s):  
Sanjay Lal ◽  
Jeff Shawn Jose ◽  
Douglas Allen ◽  
Michael Allen ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Religious Values ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Unity In Diversity

In this author-meets-critics dialogue, Sanjay Lal, author of , argues that Gandhian values of nonviolence raise aspirations of liberal democracy to a higher level. Since Gandhian values of nonviolence are closely associated with religious values, liberal democracy should make public commitments to religions on a non-sectarian basis, except for unreasonable religions. Critic Jeff Shawn Jose agrees that Gandhian values can strengthen liberal democracy. However, Jose finds a contradiction in Lal’s proposal that a liberal state should support reasonable religions only. A more consistent Gandhian approach would focus on everyday interactions between citizens and groups rather than state-directed preferences. Critic Douglas Allen also welcomes Lal’s project that brings Gandhian philosophy into relation with liberal democratic theory; however, he argues that universalizing the Absolute Truth of genuine religion is more complicated than Lal acknowledges. D. Allen argues for a Gandhian approach of relative truths, which cannot be evaluated apart from contingency or context, and he offers autobiographical evidence in support of his critical suspicion of genuine religion. Critic Michael Allen argues that Lal’s metaphysical approach to public justification violates a central commitment of political liberalism not to take sides on any metaphysical basis. M. Allen argues that democratic socialism is closer to Gandhi’s approach than is liberalism. Lal responds to critics by arguing that Gandhi’s evaluation of unreasonable religions depends upon an assessment of violence, which is not as problematic as critics charge, either from a Gandhian perspective or a liberal one. Furthermore, by excluding unreasonable or violent religions from state promotion, Lal argues that he is not advocating state suppression. Finally, Lal argues that Gandhian or Kingian metaphysics are worthy of support by liberal, democratic states seeking to educate individuals regarding peaceful unity in diversity.

The reasons of the unreasonable: Is political liberalism still an option?

2021 ◽  
pp. 019145372110405
Author(s):  
Benedetta Giovanola ◽  
Roberta Sala
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
Harsh Criticism ◽  
Sense Of Justice

In this study, we claim that political liberalism, despite harsh criticism, is still the best option available for providing a just and stable society. However, we maintain that political liberalism needs to be revised so as to be justifiable from the perspective of not only the “reasonable” in a Rawlsian sense (that we define as “fully” reasonable) but also the ones whom Rawls labels as “unreasonable.” To support our claim, going beyond Rawls’s original account, we unpack the concept of unreasonableness and identify three different subsets that we label as the “partially reasonable,” the “non-reasonable,” and the “unreasonable.” We argue that both the “fully” reasonable and the “partially reasonable” would be included into the constituency of public justification; more specifically, we claim that the latter would support liberal institutions out of their reasons: we define these reasons as mutually intelligible reasons and claim that they allow to acknowledge the importance of a convergence approach to public justification. As for the “non-reasonable” and “unreasonable,” we claim that they cannot be included in the constituency of public justification, but they nonetheless could be compliant with liberal institutions if political liberalism offers them some reasons to comply: here, we claim that political liberalism should include them through engagement and propose reasoning from conjecture as an effecting way of offering reasons for compliance. In particular, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, the “non-reasonable” could find conciliatory reasons to comply with liberal institutions on a stable base. With regard to the “unreasonable” in the strict sense, we claim that through reasoning from conjecture, their unreasonableness could be contained and they could find reasons—even if just self-interested—for complying with liberal institutions rather than defying them. In our discussion, we consider the different subsets not as “frozen” but as dynamic and open to change, and we aim to propose a more complex and multilayered approach to inclusion that would be able to include a wider set of people. To strengthen our argument, we show that the need for a wider public justification and for broader inclusion in liberal societies is grounded in respect for persons both as equal persons and as particular individuals. In particular, we claim that individuals’ values, ends, commitments, and affiliations activate demands of respect and can strengthen the commitment to the liberal–democratic order. Through a reformulation of the role of respect in liberal societies, we also show a kind of social and communitarian dimension that, we claim, is fully compatible with political liberalism and opens it up to “civic friendship” and “social solidarity,” which are constitutive elements for the development of a sense of justice and for the realization of a just and stable society.

Toleration, Political Liberalism, and Peaceful Coexistence in the Muslim World

2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Bican Sahin
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Muslim World ◽  
Cultural Groups ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Peaceful Coexistence ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Democratic Regimes

How can Muslim societies marked by religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity secure peace and stability? I argue that the principle of toleration provides the most appropriate environment for the peaceful coexistence of these differences, for individuals living in a polity can adopt different moral views and experience their cultural, ethnic, and other differences peacefully. Toleration is mainly a characteristic of liberal democratic regimes. However, different traditions of liberalism lead to different versions of liberal democracy. Also, not all versions of liberalism value toleration to the same degree. I argue that a liberal democracy based on “political” rather than “comprehensive” liberalism provides the broadest space for the existence of differences, for it does not present a shared way of life, but only a political framework within which individuals and groups with different worldviews can solve their common political problems. However, a liberal democracy based on comprehensive liberalism requires cultural groups and/or individuals to subscribe to fundamental liberal values (e.g., autonomy), and this stance limits its room for toleration. Thus, if liberal democracy is going to be introduced into the Muslim world to bring about peace and stability, it must be a liberal democracy based on political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism.

C. B. Macpherson's Critique of Liberal Democracy and Capitalism

1994 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 646-661 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Morrice
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Socialist Society ◽  
Economic Liberalism ◽  
Liberal Tradition ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Theory Of Human Nature ◽  
Market Relations

C. B. Macpherson's project was to revise liberal-democratic theory in the light of Marxism, to rescue the valuable part of the liberal tradition from the dangers of capitalist market relations, and to democratize socialism. I identify Macpherson's concept of political theory, which informs his project; reconstruct his criticisms of liberal democratic theory and capitalist market relations; and note his prescriptions for a better political theory and practice. The project remains significant and valuable in a world in which political and economic liberalism is said to be triumphant and socialism dead or in retreat. It is not without its problems, however, which include an inadequate theory of human nature and a lack of detail on the nature of a democratic socialist society.

Is There a Right to Polygamy? Marriage, Equality and Subsidizing Families in Liberal Public Justification

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 246-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew March
Keyword(s):  
Public Reason ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Public Justification ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Civil Union ◽  
Union Status ◽  
Common Objection ◽  
Domestic Partnerships ◽  
The Right ◽  
Female Equality

AbstractThis paper argues that the four most plausible arguments compatible with public reason for an outright legal ban on all forms of polygamy are unvictorious. I consider the types of arguments political liberals would have to insist on, and precisely how strongly, in order for a general prohibition against polygamy to be justified, while also considering what general attitude towards "marriage" and legal recognition of the right to marry are most consistent with political liberalism. I argue that a liberal state should get out of the "marriage business" by leveling down to a universal status of "civil union" neutral as to the gender and affective purpose of domestic partnerships. I then refute what I regard as the four most plausible rational objections to offering this civil union status to multi-member domestic partnerships. The most common objection to polygamy is on grounds of gender equality, more specifically, female equality. But advancing this argument forcefully often involves neglecting the tendency of political liberalism (by whatever name it goes in contemporary, complex, multicultural societies) to tolerate a certain amount of inequality in private, within the bounds of robust and meaningful freedoms of choice and exit. Properly understood, polygamy involves no inherent statement about the essential inferiority of women, and certainly not more than many other existing practices and institutions (including many expressions of the main monotheistic religions) which political liberals regard as tolerable, even reasonable. Arguments from the welfare of children, fairness in the spousal market, and the abuse of family subsidies are also considered and found insufficient for excluding polygamy.

scholarly journals The limits of conjecture: Political liberalism, counter-radicalisation and unreasonable religious views

Ethnicities ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriele Badano ◽  
Alasia Nuti
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrine ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Theory Reasoning ◽  
The Stability

Originally proposed by John Rawls, the idea of reasoning from conjecture is popular among the proponents of political liberalism in normative political theory. Reasoning from conjecture consists in discussing with fellow citizens who are attracted to illiberal and antidemocratic ideas by focusing on their religious or otherwise comprehensive doctrines, attempting to convince them that such doctrines actually call for loyalty to liberal democracy. Our goal is to criticise reasoning from conjecture as a tool aimed at persuasion and, in turn, at improving the stability of liberal democratic institutions. To pursue this goal, we use as case study real-world efforts to counter-radicalise at-risk Muslim citizens, which, at first glance, reasoning from conjecture seems well-placed to contribute to. This case study helps us to argue that the supporters of reasoning from conjecture over-intellectualise opposition to liberal democracy and what societies can do to counter it. Specifically, they (i) underestimate how few members of society can effectively perform reasoning from conjecture; (ii) overlook that the burdens of judgement, a key notion for political liberals, highlight how dim the prospects of reasoning from conjecture are and (iii) do not pay attention to the causes of religious persons’ opposition to liberal democracy. However, not everything is lost for political liberals, provided that they redirect attention to different and under-researched resources contained in Rawls’s theory. In closing, we briefly explain how such resources are much better placed than reasoning from conjecture to provide guidance relative to counter-radicalisation in societies (i) populated by persons who do not generally hold anything close to a fully worked out and internally consistent comprehensive doctrine and (ii) where political institutions should take responsibility for at least part of the existing alienation from liberal democratic values.

scholarly journals Political Authority, Personal Autonomy and Higher Education

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-170
Author(s):  
Christopher Martin
Keyword(s):  
Higher Education ◽  
Personal Autonomy ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Compulsory Education ◽  
Educational Choices ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Direct Role ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Educational Authority ◽  
Service Conception

Does the liberal state have a role in helping mature citizens make worthwhile educational choices? The question has clear relevance for the aims of higher education in a liberal democratic society. As systems of higher education internationalize, it has become difficult for liberal states to steer high education policy in directions that serve civic interests. This is, in part, because political liberalism imposes restrictions on what one might call directive educational authority: the power to direct citizens toward specific kinds of knowledge, understanding and skills in the interests of making their lives better. This restriction follows from the view that citizens have the capacity to make thier own decisions about how best to live, including decisions about the kind of education they need. My aim in this paper is to make the case for a more direct role for the state in promoting a good life through higher education. In particular, I argue that the liberal state’s obligation to promote autonomy across its citizenry confers legitimate educational authority over post-compulsory, as well as compulsory, education. This argument affirms the State’s educational obligations to citizens beyond a basic or compulsory education. Getting in the way of this affirmation, however, is an overly restrictive account of educational authority that occludes these obligations under the guise of respect for autonomy. Accordingly, in making my case I propose an autonomy-based account educational authority derived from Joseph Raz’s Service Conception, defending this account against the charge that such authority is illegitimately paternalistic.

scholarly journals Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 95-98
Author(s):  
Tauseef Ahmad Parray
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Muslim Majority ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Religion And Democracy

Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy analyzes the theoretical relationshipbetween religion and democracy, specifically Islam’s relationshipwith liberal democracy. It discusses the relationship between Islam,Muslim-majority societies (viz., Iran, Turkey, and Indonesia), and liberaldemocracy in a way that advances theory and practice regarding their relationsand this relationship is the immediate focus of this study, and the conclusionshave a much broader applicability in illuminating the theoreticalrelationship between religion, secularism, and democracy in general, and incontributing to the development of a liberal-democratic theory for Muslimsocieties in particular. The author’s primary methodological approach is historical and comparative.Drawing on insights and lessons from western political theory andhistory, he examines the relationship between liberal-democratic developmentand religion both theoretically and in the context of the Muslim world.The three countries mentioned above are presented as case studies as ameans to reinforce the theoretical claims. The book consists of four chaptersfollowed by a conclusion, endnotes, a bibliography, and an index ...

Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Political Legitimacy ◽  
Western World ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Party Membership ◽  
Liberal Democratic

Since its publication in 1993, John Rawls’s Political Liberalism (2005a) has been central to contemporary debates in normative political theory. Rawls’s main goal in this book was to explain how citizens endorsing diverse conceptions of the good (ethical, religious, and philosophical) could live together under liberal democratic institutions. For this reason, his theory has strongly influenced contemporary debates concerning political legitimacy, democratic theory, toleration, and multiculturalism. Yet, despite the immense body of literature which has been produced since Rawls’s book was published, very little has been said or written regarding the place of political parties and partisanship (by which I mean participation in politics through political parties) within political liberalism. This is surprising. In spite of the ongoing decline of party membership across the western world, parties still remain central players in the democratic game of liberal democratic polities, and still play an important role in articulating diverse social demands. One would have therefore expected political theorists who, like Rawls, are concerned with issues of pluralism and diversity, to take an interest in the role of parties. Yet Rawls’s references to parties are brief and scattered, and it is not clear from his work (or from the work of those scholars who have examined his theory in detail) what role (if any) parties can play within political liberalism....

A Property Owning Democracy or a Liberal (Democratic) Socialism?

1998 ◽  
pp. 132-139
Author(s):  
Wonsup Jung
Keyword(s):  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Democratic Socialism ◽  
Mixed Regime ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Rawlsian Justice ◽  
Characteristic Features ◽  
Liberal Socialism

This paper deals with the characteristic features of Rawls’ property-owning democracy, and whether a liberal democratic socialism can be compatible with Rawls’ political liberalism. I argue that a property-owning democracy can be compatible with Rawlsian justice while liberal socialism cannot. I understand the choice between property-owning democracy and liberal socialism as the problem of which kind of regime is more compatible with the pluralism of modern democracies. Property-owning democracy is more compatible with Rawls’ political liberalism since it permits a wider variety of the conceptions of the good than liberal socialism while at the same time permitting worker-managed firms; thus I argue that it can be understood as a "mixed" regime.

Toleration, Political Liberalism, and Peaceful Coexistence in the Muslim World

2007 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Bican Sahin
Keyword(s):  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Ethnic Diversity ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Muslim World ◽  
Cultural Groups ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Peaceful Coexistence ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Democratic Regimes

How can Muslim societies marked by religious, cultural, and ethnic diversity secure peace and stability? I argue that the principle of toleration provides the most appropriate environment for the peaceful coexistence of these differences, for individuals living in a polity can adopt different moral views and experience their cultural, ethnic, and other differences peacefully. Toleration is mainly a characteristic of liberal democratic regimes. However, different traditions of liberalism lead to different versions of liberal democracy. Also, not all versions of liberalism value toleration to the same degree. I argue that a liberal democracy based on “political” rather than “comprehensive” liberalism provides the broadest space for the existence of differences, for it does not present a shared way of life, but only a political framework within which individuals and groups with different worldviews can solve their common political problems. However, a liberal democracy based on comprehensive liberalism requires cultural groups and/or individuals to subscribe to fundamental liberal values (e.g., autonomy), and this stance limits its room for toleration. Thus, if liberal democracy is going to be introduced into the Muslim world to bring about peace and stability, it must be a liberal democracy based on political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism.

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