scholarly journals La noción de “Mundo de la vida” en el proyecto de Alfred Schutz para una fundamentación fenomenológica de las ciencias sociales

Author(s):  
Daniela Griselda López

El tema de la prioridad conceptual del mundo de la vida con relación a cualquier especulación científica abstracta es el tema recurrente en los escritos tempranos de Alfred Schutz. En ellos, la reflexión en torno al mundo de la vida se constituye como la base y el fundamento para la posterior formación de conceptos en ciencias sociales. Particularmente inten-tamos recuperar lo puede denominarse como “reivindicación epistémica” (epistemic claim) de una sociología del mundo de la vida. Esa reivindicación se enmarca en el proyecto schutziano de fundamentación fenomenológica de las ciencias sociales, cuyos orígenes pueden rastrearse en las discusiones entabladas en el marco de la Escuela Austríaca de Economía. La reconstrucción de este debate nos permitió pensar el vínculo entre mundo de la vida y razón científica, de modo tal de evitar la sustitución de la realidad social por las idealidades y abstraccio-nes creadas por la ciencia.The question of conceptual priority of the life-world in relation to any abstract scientific speculation is a recurrent topic in Alfred Schutz´s early writings. There, the reflection on the life- world is constituted as the basis and the foundation for the posterior formation of concepts in social sciences. In particular, we will try to regain something that we could name “an epistemic claim” of a sociology of the life-world. This claim is part of Schutz’s project of phenomenological foundation of social sciences, which origins can be found in discussions among the members of Austrian School of Economics. The reconstruction of this debate has enabled us to think the link between the life-world and the scientific reason, in order to avoid the substitution of social reality by idealizations and abstractions created by the science.

Phainomenon ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-96
Author(s):  
João Carlos Correia

Abstract Throughout about three decades of incessant research, the Austrian phenomenologist Alfred Schutz tried to specify the concept of meaning presented in an insufficient way by Max Weber in his famous definition of subjective action. Quickly, Schutz exceeded the methodological questions related with the foundation of Social Sciences, developing an elaborated reflection on the relations between Communication and Society. Along this text, are presented some particularly significant moments of this intellectual journey, such as the schtuzian reflection on intersubjectivity; the question of communication as condition of possibility of the life-world, and, finally, the analysis of appresentational reference and the set of linguistic artefacts (marks, indications, signs and symbols) that allows man to deal with the experience of transcendence.


1972 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 117
Author(s):  
William Rosensohn ◽  
Maurice Natanson

Phainomenon ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-24
Author(s):  
Lester Embree

Abstract Alfred Schutz emphasizes the methods of interpretative social sciences. Thomas Seebohm emphasizes the interpretation of texts and traces essential to the historical sciences. There their accounts are, in the main, mutually complementary, and together they advance the constitutive phenomenological theory of the generically cultural sciences.


2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexis Emanuel Gros

AbstractAlfred Schutz is, without a doubt, one of the phenomenologists that contributed the most to the reflection on how to apply insights from phenomenological philosophy to the, empirical and theoretical, human and social sciences. However, his work tends to be neglected by many of the current advocates of phenomenology within these disciplines. In the present paper, I intend to remedy this situation. In order to do so, I will systematically revisit his mundane and social-scientifically oriented account of phenomenology, which, as I shall show, emerges from a theoretical confrontation with the Husserlian distinction between transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology.


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