scholarly journals Heidegger o la metódica "destrucción" dentro de la fenomenología husserliana

Author(s):  
Juan Velázquez González

Es dentro del marco de la fenomenología de Husserl donde Heidegger lleva a cabo su propuesta filosófica, que implica una “destrucción” o “desmontaje” de los conceptos de la tradición, comenzando por los de la fenomenología de su maestro, y una construcción de su propio proyecto filosófico, basado en una analítica de la existencia.La “destrucción” es prácticamente elevada por Heidegger al rango de método filosófico, en paralelo pero en sentido contrario a la epoché, el método fenomenológico de Husserl. Esta diferencia de método, respecto a una común consideración de la intencionalidad de la conciencia, separa los proyectos fenomenológicos del Husserl de Ideen I y del Heidegger de Sein und Zeit: eidético u ontológico. A partir de su método destructivo Heidegger radicalizará las nociones de la fenomenología de Husserl.Within the framework of the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger carries out a double philosophical proposal: the “destruction” or “dismantling” of the concepts from the tradition, beginning with those ones of the phenomenology of his teacher, and the construction of his own philosophical project, based on an analysis of the existence.The “destruction” is practically considered by Heidegger as a philosophical method, which is developed in parallel but in a contrary direction to the phenomenological method of Husserl: the epoché. This methodological difference, applied to the intentionality of the consciousness, that the two philosophers consider, separates the phenomenological projects of Husserl in Ideen I and Heidegger in Sein und Zeit: eidetic or ontological. So and from his destructive method Heidegger is going to radicalize the main notions of the phenomenology of Husserl.

Problemata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 30-58
Author(s):  
Lucas Nascimento Machado ◽  
Luiz Filipe da Silva Oliveira

In our paper, we make a brief presentation and contextualization of Schulze's text, of which we present here a translation, “Aphorisms about the absolute”. In this text, Schulze develops, in an ironic style — or, in the words of Vieweg, pseudo-ironic —, his critique of the philosophies of identity Schelling and Hegel. In our exposition, we aim to point out, first, how, before the publication of the Aphorisms, Schelling and Hegel understood skepticism in general and evaluated Schulze’s skepticism in particular. Next, we shall see how Schulze responded to Schelling and Hegel’s objections with his Aphorisms, and how the reception of this text by Schelling and Hegel was quite different — so different, in fact, that their disagreements about philosophy and the philosophical method begin to surface, where they were hidden before in favor of their adherence to a similar philosophical project in its more general lines. In the next step, we examine what are the conceptual elements discussed in Schulze's text that would be central to the understanding of this philosophical and methodological divergence between Schelling and Hegel, and which will culminate in their definitive rupture with the publication of the Phenomenology of Spirit. These conceptual elements we believe to be found, particularly, in the treatment of the concepts of form, matter (or content) and determination. Or, more specifically: in the objection, raised by Schulze, that any conception of the absolute based on the concepts of form and content could only be a relative conception, since not only the distinction between content and form is merely formal, but also any content, thought in its distinction and opposition to form, can only be relative and, therefore, formal content. We shall, then, conclude this criticism will be decisive for the way in which Hegel will come to think of the absolute not only as a substance, but also as a subject.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 109
Author(s):  
Jalilah Ahmad ◽  
Rosmimah Mohd. Roslin ◽  
Mohd Ali Bahari Abdul Kadir

The global Halal industry is large and continues to grow as the global Muslim population increases in size and dispersion. There are 1.84 billion Muslims today spread over 200 countries and is expected to increase to 2.2 billion by 2030. The industry will be worth USD6.4 trillion by the end of 2018 with more non-traditional players and emergent markets. The stakes are high with pressures to generate novel and sustainable practices. This goes beyond systems and hard skills as it needs to cut into the self – the person of virtues in virtuous acts, not because they “have to” but because it is the purpose of humankind or his telos - to be “living well” and “acting well” or eudaimonia. This study seek to explore Halal executives’ lived experience of “eudaimonia.”. Using Giorgi’s descriptive psychological phenomenological method for data analysis, the study elicits two distinct invariant structures – ‘disequilibrium in status quo’ and ‘divinity salience’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52
Author(s):  
Timothy C. Lord

Collingwood’s An Essay on Philosophical Method provides an insightful critique of Russell’s analysis and metaphysics of logical atomism, proposing an unduly neglected neo-idealist alternative to Russell’s philosophical method. I summarize Collingwood’s critique of analysis and sympathetically outline the philosophical methodology of Collingwood’s post-Hegelian dialectical method: his scale of forms methodology, grounded on the overlap of philosophical classes. I then delineate Collingwood’s critique of the metaphysics of logical atomism, demonstrating how the scale of forms methodology is opposed to Russell’s logical atomism. Finally, I reflect on the reasons Collingwood’s Essay aroused little interest upon publication and the importance of continually rethinking the history of philosophy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hussein SALEM MUBARAK BARABWD ◽  
Mohammad YUSOFF BIN MOHD NOR ◽  
Noriah Mohd Ishak

The aim of the current study is to examine the intrinsic and extrinsic motivations of the gifted students from Hadhramout Gifted Center HGC in Yemen, and to investigate the impact of these intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on their giftedness development. A qualitative approach was adopted; data has been collected through an open- ended questionnaire that was prepared by the researcher and distributed among a sample of gifted students who were chosen purposively from HGC. The interpretative phenomenological method has been used to analyze the data using, Atlas ti. The results indicate that the majority of the participants consider it interesting to explore new things, and experience curiosity and desire to achieve their goals as their intrinsic motivations. Whereas, the minority consider preference to serve the community, competition preference and self-confidence as their intrinsic motivations. On the other hand, half of the participants consider rewards as their extrinsic motivation, whereas 40 % of them consider exams scores, verbal praise, parents and environment as their extrinsic motivations. Regarding the impact of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations on the development of giftedness, the majority of the participants believe that intrinsic and extrinsic motivations affect positively the development of their giftedness development. Finally, based on the findings, some recommendations were provided. 


Author(s):  
Jan Westerhoff

The chapter begins by presenting a general overview of the rise of the Mahāyāna and its relation to the main schools of Buddhist philosophy associated with it, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. This is followed by an introduction to the Madhyamaka school proper, focusing on the life and works of its founder, Nāgārjuna. The third section of the chapter examines the foundational sūtras of the Madhyamaka school, the Prajñāpāramitā or Perfection of Wisdom texts, focusing on their criticism of the Abhidharma philosophical project, their comprehensive illusionism, and their prima facie acceptance of contradictions. This is followed by an account of how these themes play a key role in the Madhyamaka system as set out by Nāgārjuna. The chapter then turns to examining the philosophical contributions of major Madhyamaka thinkers such as Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla. The chapter concludes by a discussion of the relation between Madhyamaka and Nyāya.


Dreyfus argues that there is a basic methodological difference between the natural sciences and the social sciences, a difference that derives from the different goals and practices of each. He goes on to argue that being a realist about natural entities is compatible with pluralism or, as he calls it, “plural realism.” If intelligibility is always grounded in our practices, Dreyfus points out, then there is no point of view from which one can ask about or provide an answer to the one true nature of ultimate reality. But that is consistent with believing that the natural sciences can still reveal the way the world is independent of our theories and practices.


Author(s):  
Johannes Zachhuber

It has rarely been recognized that the Christian writers of the first millennium pursued an ambitious and exciting philosophical project alongside their engagement in the doctrinal controversies of their age. This book offers for the first time a full analysis of this Patristic philosophy. It shows how it took its distinctive shape in the late fourth century and gives an account of its subsequent development until the time of John of Damascus. The book falls into three main parts. The first of them starts from an analysis of the philosophical project underlying the teaching of the Cappadocian fathers, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus. This philosophy, arguably the first distinctively Christian theory of being, soon becomes near-universally shared in Eastern Christianity. A few decades after the Cappadocians, all sides in the early Christological controversy take its fundamental tenets for granted. Its application to the Christological problem thus appeared inevitable. Yet it created substantial conceptual problems. Parts II and III of the book describe in detail how these problems led to a series of increasingly radical modifications of the Cappadocian philosophy. The chapters of Part II are dedicated to the miaphysite opponents of the Council of Chalcedon, while Part III discusses the defenders of the Council from the early sixth to the eighth centuries. Through this overview, the book reveals this period as one of remarkable philosophical creativity, fecundity, and innovation.


Author(s):  
Catherine Rowett

The chapter starts by telling a narrative to explain how and why the author came to reject the mistaken assumptions with which the research began, and how these initial assumptions had assumed false dichotomies familiar from existing work in the field. The chapter thereby explains why the results presented in Chapters 1–12 might seem unexpected. It draws together the chief philosophical lessons of those chapters, highlighting the fact that Plato is right about (i) how conceptual knowledge differs from both propositional knowledge and recognition of tokens, (ii) the different sense of ‘being’ involved in knowing ‘what it is’, about a type, (iii) the value of images and icons in the philosophical method, and (iv) the irrelevance of Socratic definitions and other bogus criteria for knowledge. Finally, it sketches some possible ways in which a further volume might apply the results to other dialogues.


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