scholarly journals L'égalité selon la Cour suprême

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-710
Author(s):  
Denis Bourque

Clause 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights specifies that every person has the right to equality before the law. The purpose of this article is to analyse, on the one hand, the meaning that the judges of the Supreme Court have given to this concept of equality before the law and, on the other hand, the way in which they have applied this aforementioned principle of Clause 1(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. Four judgements are the subject of Mr. Bourque's study. He concerns himself with the Drybones, Lavell, Burnshine and Canard judgements. In the course of analysing these cases, Mr. Bourque brings out the shilly-shallying of the judges in connection with their concept of equality before the law. In spite of this beating about the bush two concepts emerge at the level of the judges of the Supreme Court, namely an equalitarian concept of equality before the law, and a concept which makes equivalent equality before the law and the rule of law. According to Mr. Bourque, the analysis of these four judgements shows that it is the concept which makes equivalent equality before the law and the rule of law, which represents, the position of the Supreme Court, at the present time.

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 567-576
Author(s):  
Henri Brun

The Miller case, decided by the Supreme Court of Canada on October 5, 1976, puts the death penalty under the light of the Canadian Bill of Rights which formulates the right to life and the right to protection against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The following comment on the case relates to the interpretation given specific clauses of the Bill of Rights by the Court on that occasion. But it stresses especially the law that flows from the case about the compelling weight of the Bill of Rights over acts of Parliament enacted after the Bill came into force. In Miller, the Supreme Court expressed itself on the subject for the first time.


2020 ◽  
pp. 174387212097533
Author(s):  
Johan van der Walt

This short article on Peter Fitzpatrick’s conception of “responsive law” analyzes the ambiguous temporality that Fitzpatrick discerned in modern law. On the one hand, law makes the claim of being fully present and therefore already and completely contained in itself. This aspect of law reflects the law’s claim to “immanence,” that is, its claim of always being able to rely strictly on its own operational terms without having to take recourse to any consideration not already contained within itself. It is this aspect of law that renders the ideal of the “rule of law” feasible. On the other hand, the law’s claim to doing justice to every unique and therefore every new case also demands that it takes leave of that which is already settled within it. This aspect of law can be called its “imminence.” The imminence of the law concerns the reality that law always finds itself on the threshold of that which has not yet been said and must still be said. The article shows how Fitzpatrick relied on Freud’s concept of the totem to explain the “wondrous” unity of its immanence and imminence.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-120
Author(s):  
Teodora Aurelia Drăghici ◽  
Gabriel Cătălin Predescu

Abstract The legal significance of the right to health care, in particular and of other fundamental rights in general, on the one hand unknown to citizens and on the other hand known, minimized or ignored by state authorities and institutions, will certainly lead to abuses of law coming from the latter, abuses that cannot be tolerated by the rule of law.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 707-713
Author(s):  
Jacquelene Mwangi

The decision of the Supreme Court of Kenya (Court) in Francis Karioko Muruatetu and Another v. Republic (Muruatetu), finding the mandatory nature of the death penalty unconstitutional, represents not only a victory for human rights in Africa but also the transformative capacity of contemporary constitutions in Africa and the growing assertiveness of African judiciaries. In the judgment, the Court held that the mandatory death penalty is “out of sync with the progressive Bill of Rights” in Kenya's 2010 Constitution (para. 64) and an affront to the rule of law. The Court also relied on global death penalty jurisprudence to find the mandatory death sentence “harsh, unjust and unfair” (para. 48). Consequently, the Court mandated that all trial courts conduct a pre-sentencing hearing to determine whether the death penalty is deserved. The Court's judgment could spell the end of the mandatory death penalty in Kenya after almost 120 years on the statute books.


Author(s):  
Anna Maria Barańska

The subject of this article is the resolution of the enlarged composition of the Supreme Court of June 5, 2018, which resolves the issue of acquiring by land easement with the content corresponding to transmission easement together with the acquisition by a state-owned company of transmission facilities developed on State Treasury properties. As a result of granting property rights to state-owned companies of state property in the early 1990s, the ownership of the transmission infrastructure and the property on which they were situated were separated.In the judicature, divergent concepts emerged regarding the solution of the issue of  further use of this land by transmission companies. According to the first one, the transfer of property rights was accompanied by the creation by law of a land easement with the content corresponding to a transmission easement. On the other hand, according to the second concept, obtaining a legal title for further use of the property was possible only through contractual acquisition or prescription of transmission easement. Powstanie z mocy prawa służebności gruntowej o treści odpowiadającej służebności przesyłu w świetle uchwały Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 5 czerwca 2018 roku, sygn. akt III CZP 50/17 Tematem artykułu jest uchwała powiększonego składu Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 5 czerwca 2018 roku, która rozstrzyga kwestię nabycia z mocy prawa służebności gruntowej o treści odpowiadającej służebności przesyłu wraz z nabyciem przez przedsiębiorstwo państwowe własności urządzeń przesyłowych posadowionych na nieruchomościach Skarbu Państwa. W wyniku uwłaszczenia mienia państwowego na początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych ubiegłego wieku doszło do rozdzielenia własności infrastruktury przesyłowej oraz nieruchomości, na której były one posadowione. W judykaturze pojawiły się rozbieżne koncepcje odnośnie do rozwiązania kwestii dalszego korzystania przez przedsiębiorstwa przesyłowe z tych gruntów. Zgodnie z pierwszą z nich przeniesieniu prawa własności towarzyszyło powstanie z mocy prawa służebności gruntowej o treści odpowiadającej służebności przesyłu. Na podstawie drugiej — uzyskanie tytułu prawnego do dalszego korzystania z nieruchomości było możliwe wyłącznie w drodze umownego nabycia albo zasiedzenia służebności przesyłu.


2018 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-95
Author(s):  
Olavo Augusto Vianna Alves Ferreira ◽  
Guilherme De Siqueira Castro

O presente artigo tem o objetivo de examinar a legitimidade ativa da Defensoria Pública no mandado de injunção coletivo. Para a consecução desta finalidade, o tema será abordado tanto do ponto de vista constitucional como do ponto de vista processual. Será estudado o vício de constitucionalidade formal da Lei 13.300/2016 no que tange a legitimidade ativa da Defensoria Pública no mandado de injunção coletivo. A necessidade de pertinência temática para a impetração e o tipo de interesse transindividual tutelado são questões que envolvem um profícuo debate constitucional que já foi objeto de exame pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal. Por derradeiro, abordaremos a possibilidade de litisconsórcio ativo no mandado de injunção envolvendo a Defensoria Pública e os demais legitimados extraordinários previsto na lei de regência da ação injuncional.   Abstract This article aims to examine the active legitimacy of the Office of the Public Defender in the collective writ of injunction. To achieve this purpose, the subject will be addressed both from a constitutional point of view and from a procedural point of view. This paper will study the formal constitutional vice of Law 13.300 / 2016 regarding the active legitimacy of the Office of the Public Defender in the collective writ of injunction. The need for thematic relevance to the filing and type of ward transindividual interest are issues involving a fruitful constitutional debate that has been the subject of examination by the Supreme Court. For last, we discuss the possibility of active joinder in the writ of injunction involving the Office of the Public Defender and the other extraordinary legitimated under the law of Regency injuncional action.


Author(s):  
Sharon Dolovich

In this chapter, Sharon Dolovich argues that the Supreme Court deploys three “canons of evasion” that undermine core constitutional principles: deference, presumption, and question substitution. The chapter shows how the Court on the one hand affirms basic constitutional principles—such as the right to counsel or the right against cruel and unusual punishment—that courts are to enforce against the state for the protection of individual penal subjects. Yet on the other hand, the doctrinal maneuvers of deference, presumption, and substitute question encourage judges in individual cases to affirm the constitutionality of state action even in the face of seemingly egregious facts. As a result, judicial review delivers almost automatic and uncritical validation of whatever state action produced the challenged conviction, sentence, or punishment. Dolovich identifies troubling questions raised by pervasive use of these canons for the legitimacy of the state’s penal power.


Author(s):  
Bell E Yosef

Abstract This article reveals an evolving judicial doctrine, in which the Supreme Court of Israel postpones, removes, dismisses, or even dismisses in limine petitions, due to the mere existence of legislative initiative with respect to the petition’s issue. The article analyzes the way the Court uses the doctrine, and offers a normative analysis of this phenomenon. The main argument is that the judicial use of the doctrine leads to deprivation of the petitioners’ rights, gives (too) much power to the state legal counsels, leans on uncertain and unforeseeable situations, and damages the fundamental principle of the rule of law. On the other hand, the judicial use of the doctrine promotes and enhances constitutional dialogue, as well as preserving judicial resources (and judicial legitimacy in particular) and the professionality of the legislation. Henceforth, the article also introduces an effort to balance between the doctrine different consequences, by presenting a set of criteria for a more reasoned, coherent, and analytical use of that doctrine.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-136
Author(s):  
Thomas Halper

Abstract Felix Frankfurter, renowned as a public intellectual fighting for justice, became as a member of the Supreme Court a figure proclaiming his devotion to the rule of law and its corollary, judicial self restraint, even when its results conflicted with his deepest beliefs. Yet an analysis of several of his leading opinions suggests that his famous balancing tests had little to do with law. In sacrificing his policy and ethical goals in the service of law, he often failed to serve the law, and in that sense, his well publicized sacrifices were for nothing.


Author(s):  
Olha Shylo ◽  
Nataliia Hlynska

One of the means of ensuring the stability and unity of judicial practice is the decision of the Supreme Court, which deviates from the conclusion on the application of the rule of law in such legal relations. The current criminal procedural legislation of Ukraine clearly regulates the procedure for such a derogation, which is generally in line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and international recommendations in this area. However, this procedure has immanent significant features that require scientific analysis of the current procedural form in this segment with regard to its adequacy to the needs of ensuring the right of everyone to a fair trial and society's expectations for reasonable predictability of court decisions. In view of this, within the framework of this study, the categories “unity” and “sustainability” of judicial practice as a subject of provision by the Supreme Court was carried out. To achieve this purpose, the authors used a set of modern general and special legal methods. The study considers the procedural order for the Supreme Court to deviate from the conclusion on the application of the rule of law in such legal relations; the legal nature of the issue of the hierarchy of legal positions of the Supreme Court is analysed. It is established that the key idea embodied by the legislator in the statutory model of the procedure for deviating from the opinion on the application of the rule of law is that the possibility of such a deviation from the opinion, depending on the composition of the court in which it was adopted and determines the "higher degree of significance" of such a conclusion and its application in further judicial practice. These areas were studied with the consideration of the recommendations of the Advisory Council of European Judges, as well as the relevant practice of the Supreme Court


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