A guaranteed immediate payout reduces impatience of financially constrained individuals

A large stream of literature found that individuals who experience financial strain are particularly concerned about their present needs—that is, they are more likely to choose smaller immediate payoffs over larger future payoffs. In contrast, some recent findings suggest that financially constrained individuals may be more concerned about future needs instead (e.g., they are relatively more likely to invest in long-lived durables than in short-lived experiences). We propose that the use of traditional intertemporal choice tasks has made prior studies overly sensitive to the myopia-inducing effects of financial constraint. These tasks typically offer a choice between receiving a smaller payoff in the present versus a larger payoff in the future. Across three studies, we observe that, as long as some immediate payout is guaranteed, financially constrained individuals are as likely as nonconstrained individuals to accept a delay for a larger payoff. These findings qualify prior demonstrations of the myopic effects of financial constraint and suggest that the traditionally used choice paradigm might not accurately capture time preferences, particularly for financially constrained individuals. Furthermore, they provide possible interventions for those interested in reducing the myopia of financially constrained individuals who are facing all now versus all later decisions.

Examining the Effect of Short-Term Affect on Farmers’ Risk and Time Preferences in Financial Decision-Making

Farmers regularly make intertemporal decisions under risk or uncertainty. To improve how farmers behave when faced with decisions that have financial consequences, there is a need for a deeper understanding of farmers’ risk and time preferences. While the relationship between individual components of affect and risk preferences is well documented, the same cannot be said for holistic measures of affect on one hand, and for affect and time preferences on the other hand. The data analysed in this paper is the 2014–2015 Indonesian Family Life Survey Wave 5. The survey included experimental measures designed to elicit both risk and time preferences from the same subjects. We analysed the data using limited dependent variable regression models. Our findings strengthen what is known about the affect infusion model. With increased pleasant affect, farmers’ willingness to take risks increases significantly. The results also suggest that pleasant affect is associated with increased odds that farmers will choose future rewards in the long horizon but had no statistically significant effect on the short horizon. The practical implications are that an experience of pleasant affect before decision-making may cause the decision-maker (DM) to perceive a prospect as having high benefits and low risks. Pleasant affect may also induce lower sensitivity towards losses and play the role of a buffer which reduces the immediate negative impact of information that otherwise would prevent the DM from focusing on the long-term. JEL Classifications: C93, D81, D91

Generalisations of Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting

<p>This paper proposes several time preference specifications that generalise quasi-hyperbolic discounting, while retaining its analytical tractability. We define their discount functions and provide a recursive formulation of the implied lifetime payoffs. A calibration exercise demonstrates that these specifications deliver better approximations to true hyperbolic discounting. We characterise the Markov-perfect equilibrium of a general intra-personal game of agents with various time preferences. When applied to specific economic examples, our proposals yield policies that are close to those of true hyperbolic discounters. Furthermore, these approximations can be used in settings where an exact solution for hyperbolic agents is not available. Finally, we suggest further generalisations which would provide an even better fit.</p>

Generalisations of Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting

<p>This paper proposes several time preference specifications that generalise quasi-hyperbolic discounting, while retaining its analytical tractability. We define their discount functions and provide a recursive formulation of the implied lifetime payoffs. A calibration exercise demonstrates that these specifications deliver better approximations to true hyperbolic discounting. We characterise the Markov-perfect equilibrium of a general intra-personal game of agents with various time preferences. When applied to specific economic examples, our proposals yield policies that are close to those of true hyperbolic discounters. Furthermore, these approximations can be used in settings where an exact solution for hyperbolic agents is not available. Finally, we suggest further generalisations which would provide an even better fit.</p>

Mind training, stress and behaviour—A randomised experiment

In this paper, we evaluate the effects of a psychological training, called Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) on stress and risk and time preferences. MBSR is a well-known psychological technique, which is believed to improve self-control and reduce stress. We conduct the experiment with 139 participants, half of whom receive the MBSR training, while the other half are asked to watch a documentary series, both over 4 consecutive weeks. Using a range of self-reported and physiological measures (such as cortisol measures), we find evidence that mindfulness training reduces perceived stress, but we only find weak evidence of effects on risk and inter-temporal attitudes.

Like principal, like agent? Managerial preferences in employee-owned firms

The relationship between firms’ owners and managers is a quintessential example of costly principal–agent interaction. Optimal design of monetary incentives and supervision mechanisms are the two traditional ways of reducing agency costs in this relationship. In this paper, we show evidence which is consistent with a third mechanism: firms have managers whose economic preferences are aligned with owners' interests. We uncover differences in economic preferences between managers employed in firms controlled by two distinct classes of ‘patrons’: employee-owned firms (worker cooperatives) and conventional investor-owned firms. In a high-stakes lab-in-the-field experiment, we find that co-op managers are less risk-loving and more altruistic than their conventional counterparts. We do not observe differences between the two groups in terms of time preferences, reciprocity, and trust. Our findings are consistent with existing evidence on worker cooperatives, such as their tendency to self-select into less risky industries and their compressed compensation structures.