Innovation to zero emissions: nuclear energy trough nonproliferation and environment protection- Romanian experience for GEN 4

The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (NY 2019) has concluded that nations must move more swiftly to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, and other greenhouse gases to avoid the most devastating effects of global warming. The paper presents nuclear energy as part of the solution. Due to the fact that the population is concerned about nuclear proliferation, plant safety and radiation protection, the paper presents the Romanian experience regarding the reduction of the risk of proliferation as well as the project of the 4th generation reactor ALFRED. One of the most important steps in assessing the candidate materials for Generation IV reactors is the material performance under neutron irradiation. In this respect, the paper also presents the results of the evaluations on some potential materials to be used in fast lead cooled reactors.

Radioactive Fission Waste from Molybdenum-99 Production and Proliferation Risks

Molybdenum-99 (99Mo) is a parent radioisotope of Technetium-99m (99mTc) widely used in nuclear diagnostics. The production of this radioisotope by PT. INUKI generated radioactive fission waste (RFW) that theoretically contains239Pu and235U, posing a nuclear proliferation risk. This paper discusses the determination of radionuclides inventory in the RFW and the proposed strategy for its management. The radionuclides inventory in the RFW was calculated using ORIGEN 2.1 code. The input parameters were obtained from one batch of 99Mo production using high enriched uranium in PT. INUKI. The result showed that the RFW contained activation products, actinides, and fission products, including239Pu and235U. This result was then used for consideration of the management of the RFW. The concentration of 235U was reduced by a down-blending method. The proposed strategy to further manage the down-blended RFW was converting it to U3O8 solid form, placed in a canister, and eventually stored in the interim storage for high-level waste located in The Radioactive Waste Technology Center.

Perceptions and purpose of the bomb: Explaining India's nuclear restraint against China

Much of the literature on India's nuclear programme assumes that China's nuclear capability drove New Delhi, the strategically weaker actor, to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. China's nuclear tests not only rendered New Delhi militarily insecure and dented its claim for the leadership of the Third World but they also polarized the domestic debate over the utility of the bomb. In the global scheme of nuclear proliferation, therefore, India was just another fallen nuclear domino. Marshalling recently declassified documents, this article revisits India's nuclear behaviour during the crucial decade between 1964 and 1974. By focusing on threat assessments made at the highest levels and internal deliberations of the Indian Government, this article shows how, contrary to the claims made in the literature, Indian decision-makers did not make much of the Chinese nuclear threat. This conviction emanated out of their distinct reading of the purpose of nuclear weapons in China's foreign and military policy; their perceptions of how India could achieve nuclear deterrence against China by using the bipolar international politics of the Cold War; and, finally, their understanding of the political costs of developing an indigenous nuclear response to China's nuclear threat. New Delhi's nuclear restraint resulted from its perceptions of Chinese nuclear intentions and its beliefs about the purpose of the bomb in Sino-Indian relations. India's perceptions of China as a nuclear adversary and its decision-makers’ views on the purpose of nuclear weapons in this rivalry were fundamentally different from the expectations set out by the domino theory of nuclear proliferation.

Non Conformity to Norms: Why Do States Proliferate in Opposition to Well Established and Powerful Non-Proliferation Norms

<p>Nine countries currently have nuclear weapons and of these only three have acquired them in the past 40 years. The primary reason for this has been the establishment of a powerful nuclear non-proliferation regime and its associated norms. The powerful influence of both the regime and the resulting norms on state behaviour is unquestionable. However a limited amount of state proliferation continues and some states’ behaviour suggests that they either reject, or believe that they are outside of the influence of the regime and its norms. My study is looking at the problem of non-conformity to the non-proliferation norm to see why it occurs. The issue is specifically a nuclear one however non-conformity to norms has wider implications in the study of international relations (IR). Regimes and norms clearly do not exist in a vacuum but operate within an international social environment. This nuclear issue remains a central consideration for state foreign policy and hence has justified extensive examination in the field of IR. The intellectually and ethically complex issues that surround access to this technology were acknowledged from its devastating baptism in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. International regulation was seen as the most appropriate form of control of nuclear weapons. This was in part due to the potential consequence of the misuse and the impact of accidents transcending national boundaries. This ultimate destructive capability has only been in the hands of a few states and the dissemination and control of this capability has been contentious from the day it was first used. Initially its power came from its potential to completely dominate militarily. As soon as the second country gained the same capability it became a lot more complicated. The destructive capability of nuclear weapons is such that any future war that saw their use could result in the annihilation of the human species. The Cold War and its extreme vertical nuclear proliferation actualised this fear. Nuclear technologies dual purpose functionality, of both peaceful power generation and the creation of a military nuclear capability make for a complex situation. There is an obvious power imbalance between the nuclear haves and have-nots and a self protective desire to stop or at least limit the number of countries attempting to join the ‘nuclear club’. Both realism and neo-liberal institutionalism are able to explain, in part, conformity and non conformity to regimes and their associated norms within today’s social environment. In this study I will use a social constructivist approach, which is based on the outcomes of persuasion, identification and social conformity, to see if it can add to the current explanations of state nuclear proliferation.</p>