THE OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEBATE BETWEEN FINNIS AND RAZ

The recent debate between John Finnis and Joseph Raz on the existence of a general prima facie moral obligation to obey positive laws is a major contribution to a classical topic in legal and political philosophy. In this paper, I argue that Raz’s normal justification thesis and Finnis’s doctrine of “determinatio,” inherited from Aquinas, complement each other, shedding light on how norms grounded in social facts can give rise to particular moral obligations independently of their content. However, I argue that this on its own does not explain the possibility of a general moral obligation to obey the law, that is, the notion that everyone has a prima facie moral obligation to obey every law that applies to them.

Favouring for No Reason

‘Favouring for No Reason’ addresses two matters. First, it argues that some favourings (i.e. pro- or contra-attitudes) may not be reason-governed. Various examples, including some from Joseph Raz, suggest that neither the guise of the good nor the guise of reason thesis is true: some of our favourings are favourings for no reasons. Being motivated is often a matter of having a set of beliefs and desires whose content appears normative to the agent, but sometimes being motivated does not involve motivating reasons but is rather a matter merely of having the right sorts of belief and desire. A second issue concerns whether fitting-attitude analysis (FA) should require that the valuable object’s properties appear in the content of the fitting pro- or contra-attitude. The so-called dual-role approach to FA analysis affirms that the properties that make an object x valuable have a dual role: on the one hand, they provide reasons for favouring x, and on the other hand, they appear in the intentional content of the favouring. It is argued that the dual-role approach is preferable to the classical form of FA analysis. However, that does not mean that the classical FA analysis is incorrect. Dual-role FA analysis should be regarded as a specification of its classical forebear. The remaining sections of this chapter consider different cases that challenge the dual-role approach.

On the Moral Impact Theory of Law

Mark Greenberg argues that legal obligations are those moral obligations created by the actions of legal institutions in the legally proper way (Moral Impact Theory of Law, MITL). Here I defend three main claims. First, I argue that, although very often misunderstood, Joseph Raz is also a defender of MITL. Secondly, I argue that while both Greenberg and Raz are committed to MITL, they disagree about the conditions under which a moral obligation can be said to be created in the legally proper way. Finally, I argue that Raz’s variant of MITL is better than Greenberg’s. It rests on a more plausible account of authority and it avoids one of the crucial defects threatening Greenberg’s view, namely, its overinclusiveness.

autoridad de la primera persona como criterio de determinación y reconocimiento de la identidad de género.

El interés principal de este artículo versa acerca de la posibilidad de justificar la autodeterminación como criterio fundamental para la determinación y el reconocimiento social de la identidad de género de un individuo. La reciente revisión de los criterios médicos abre el debate de su reemplazo por criterios de autopercepción y vivencia en primera persona. Por tanto, tomando como base la concepción de la autoridad como servicio de Joseph Raz y el fenómeno de la autoridad de la primera persona, se argumentará a favor de que los testimonios en primera persona son candidatos justificados para sustituir a los actuales criterios. The focus of this paper is the possibility of justifying self-determination as the fundamental criterion for social determination and recognition of the individuals’ sexual identity. The recent review of medical criteria has started a debate about their replacement by criteria based on self-perception and first-person experience. Therefore, taking as a basis Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority and the first-person authority phenomenon, it will be argued that first-person statements are justifiable substitutes for the current criteria.

An Answer to Joseph Raz

This chapter contains a reply to Joseph Raz’s critique of Alexy’s defence of non-positivism. The starting point is that the distinction between positivism and non-positivism is, contrary to Raz, still of fundamental significance. It will never become insignificant. Raz agrees with the author that law raises something like a claim to correctness, but he argues that this claim is not necessarily connected with morality. The response presented here is that it is. This implies a necessary connection between law and morality, which thereby yields non-positivism. The practical significance of this is illustrated by the Radbruch Formula and the role principles play in legal argumentation.

Un debate inacabado: el no-positivismo inclusivo de Robert Alexy

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo general examinar los elementos que conforman el no-positivismo inclusivo; postura epistemológica y filosófica desarrollada a través de los años por Robert Alexy. Los métodos empleados son el deductivo, analítico y dialéctico; la principal técnica utilizada ha sido la investigación documental. El presente documento, grosso modo, se encuentra dividido en tres apartados. Primero, son explicados los elementos que conforman el no-positivismo inclusivo de Robert Alexy. Segundo, se explican algunas críticas formuladas a los elementos constitutivos del no-positivismo inclusivo con base en las ideas de Riccardo Guastini, Juan Antonio García Amado, Joseph Raz, Eugenio Bulygin, Matthias Klatt, Carlos Bernal Pulido; entre otros autores. Por último, en tanto objetivo particular, se expone una reflexión con el propósito de indicar uno de los múltiples caminos que los estudios jurídico-científicos sobre el no-positivismo inclusivo podrían seguir en el porvenir.

Direitos humanos, o funcionalismo político e o minimalismo jurídico em John Rawls e Joseph Raz

As teorias tradicionais de direitos humanos – teorias normativas e substantivas – estabelecem critérios gerais para que valores morais possam ser normativamente universalizados, além dos motivos para que sejam impostas obrigações para seu cumprimento. Nas últimas décadas, contudo, filósofos e teóricos do direito, preocupados com o realismo global do discurso de aplicação dos direitos humanos, a maioria deles sob a influência do trabalho de John Rawls, criticaram as teorias tradicionais a partir de uma análise funcionalista dos direitos humanos. Colocando as práticas jurídicas e políticas em maior evidência, os funcionalistas políticos como Charles Beitz e Joseph Raz argumentam a falta de precisão lógica e a incoerência na proliferação excessiva de direitos atribuída às abordagens normativas e substantivas de teóricos como Jeremy Waldron e James Griffin. Neste artigo vou descrever os principais argumentos do funcionalismo político em direitos humanos, enfatizando o minimalismo jurídico comum a essa abordagem. Meu objetivo é avaliar as condições de aplicação da teoria aos problemas decorrentes da falta de uma coerente fundamentação teórica atribuída, pelos funcionalistas, aos pensadores mais ortodoxos. Minhas conclusões demonstram que sem haver maior integração entre os grupos teóricos continua muito difícil compreender corretamente a complexidade dos desafios da teoria e da prática cotidiana em direitos humanos.

Direito e razões para a ação: uma análise da teoria jusfilosófica desenvolvida por Joseph Raz

O presente artigo busca descrever e analisar a obra “Razão Prática e Normas” de Joseph Raz - um expoente contemporâneo do positivismo excludente - tendo por objetivo realizar uma investigação voltada a apontar e discutir determinados aspectos, eleitos como principais, de sua teoria do direito. O método empregado consiste na pesquisa bibliográfica dos escritos de Raz, assim como da literatura relevante às matérias tratadas. Pretende-se com este estudo traçar as linhas centrais do raciocínio estruturante dessa teoria, a fim de se estabelecer um panorama geral da mesma, evidenciando os argumentos que sustentam e justificam a existência do positivismo jurídico exclusivo, marcado pela dissociação entre direito e moral. Joseph Raz, mostrar-se-á, por meio de sua análise do exercício das razões no campo prático, firma o direito enquanto ciência e fenômeno social explicável e justificável.

On the Nature of Necessary Truths in Jurisprudence: Putting Wittgensteinian Hinges to Use

Inquiring into the fundamental nature of law has been traditionally formulated as an attempt to answer the question, “What is Law?” Such an inquiry typically proceeds by identifying the necessary features of law. Joseph Raz, for example, writes: A theory consists of necessary truths, for only necessary truths about the law reveal the nature of the law. We talk of ‘the nature of law’, or the nature of anything else, to refer to those of the law’s characteristics which are of the essence of law, which make law into what it is. That is those properties without which the law would not be law.1

The Opaqueness of Rules†

This article takes up the question of whether legal rules are reasons for action. They are commonly regarded in this way, yet are legal rules reasons for action themselves (the reflexivity thesis) or are they instead merely statements of other reasons that we may already have (the paraphrastic thesis)? I argue for a version of the paraphrastic thesis. In doing so, considerable attention is given to the neglected but important puzzle of the opaqueness of rules, which arises out of what some regard as the gap between the evaluative grounds of legal rules and what makes them into reasons for action. After examining an important articulation of the puzzle in the work of Joseph Raz, I argue that the reflexivity thesis is (i) undermined by certain features of rule making and (ii) defeated by the principle of presumptive sufficiency. The result is that it is possible for legal rules to be paraphrastic statements of reasons but, conversely, impossible for them to be reasons in themselves.