Neuropsychological and psychological dysfunctions associated with coronavirus disease 2019: a case report

Background Patient’s account of personal experiences of having lived through coronavirus disease 2019 is important for understanding the magnitude of the debilitating impact of the infection. There is increasing recognition that the infection impedes multiple functional domains, but to date the evidence remains scarce. Moreover, to the author’s knowledge, there are no documented cases reporting on research data derived from self-reflective first-person experience. Case presentation The patient was a 59-year-old female psychologist of White self-ascribed ethnicity who had coronavirus disease 2019. She had no history of medical, neurological, or psychiatric conditions and works in a neurosurgery clinic at a large hospital as a psychologist, specializing in neuropsychology. Using the introspective method, she captured the occurrence of neuropsychological and psychological dysfunctions she experienced in the acute stage of the illness, which took place in December 2020 and lasted for 17 days. Treatment of coronavirus disease 2019 was conducted in the home environment under medical supervision and followed a standardized protocol adopted at the time in the country. Conclusions The data derived from the first-person experience indicated that among the most salient cognitive functions impacted by the disease were: executive control, working memory, attention, concentration, and processing speed. Furthermore, emotional instability; mood swings; racing, repetitive, or intrusive thoughts; uncontrolled associations; dizziness; fatigue; disbalance; and sleep disturbances featured consistently throughout the illness. The overall profile of these dysfunctions suggests disruption in the overall operation of the brain and particularly in the functioning of the frontal lobes. Although less tangible than the physical symptoms, the neuropsychological and psychological dysfunctions associated with coronavirus disease 2019 form a distinct cluster that has a highly debilitating impact on a person’s well-being.

autoridad de la primera persona como criterio de determinación y reconocimiento de la identidad de género.

El interés principal de este artículo versa acerca de la posibilidad de justificar la autodeterminación como criterio fundamental para la determinación y el reconocimiento social de la identidad de género de un individuo. La reciente revisión de los criterios médicos abre el debate de su reemplazo por criterios de autopercepción y vivencia en primera persona. Por tanto, tomando como base la concepción de la autoridad como servicio de Joseph Raz y el fenómeno de la autoridad de la primera persona, se argumentará a favor de que los testimonios en primera persona son candidatos justificados para sustituir a los actuales criterios. The focus of this paper is the possibility of justifying self-determination as the fundamental criterion for social determination and recognition of the individuals’ sexual identity. The recent review of medical criteria has started a debate about their replacement by criteria based on self-perception and first-person experience. Therefore, taking as a basis Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority and the first-person authority phenomenon, it will be argued that first-person statements are justifiable substitutes for the current criteria.

Pure first-person experience and the unfolding argument: Neo-Cartesian reasoning as a foundation for IIT and other causal structure theories ends up in dissociative epiphenomenalism

We recently put forward an argument, the Unfolding Argument (UA), that integrated information theory (IIT) and other causal structure theories are either already falsified or unfalsifiable, which provoked significant criticism. It seems that we and the critics agree that the main question in this debate is whether pure first-person experience, independent of third-person measurements, is a sufficient foundation for theories of consciousness. Here, we show, first, that the use of pure first-person experience relies on non-scientific, neo-Cartesian reasoning. Second, even if this reasoning is accepted, it leads to consciousness being entirely epiphenomenal, with absolutely no causal power. Third, consciousness would be fully detached from the content of reports about subjective experience. A human may report to perceive X but their content of consciousness is Y. Hence, IIT and other causal structure theories end up in a form of dissociative epiphenomenalism, invalidating pure first-person experience as a viable foundation.

MIND-BODY INTEGRATION IN DANCE MOVEMENT THERAPY

"Mind-body integration is a key element for a successful dance movement therapy (DMT). As the connection between mind and body is reconnected, the clients can not only express but also improve their mental state through body movement. The integration of mind and body can be viewed from to aspects, namely the first-person experience and the third-person phenomenon, both of which play a crucial role in the therapeutic process of DMT. The first-person experience transcends the mind’s neurobiological phenomenon, which is relatively more important for the clients, while the third-person observation is based on the body’s reflection of mind, often adopted by the therapists. The relationship between mind and body can be validated by the mirror neuron theory, which is one of the theoretical proofs and inspirations of DMT. Unlike the notion of mind-body differentiation in western classical philosophy, ancient Chinese thoughts had not separated them. The Chinese character “shen” is considered as the whole of flesh and soul. The abundant Chinese thoughts concerning mind-body theory can be considered as a suitable route of the exploration of mind-body integration."

Brain mechanisms underlying the subjective experience of remembering

The ability to remember events in vivid, multisensory detail is a significant part of human experience, allowing us to relive previous encounters and providing us with the store of memories that shape our identity. Recent research has sought to understand the subjective experience of remembering: what it feels like to have a memory. Such remembering involves reactivating sensory-perceptual features of an event, and the thoughts and feelings we had when the event occurred, integrating them into a conscious first-person experience. It allows us to reflect on the content of our memories, and to understand and make judgments about them, such as distinguishing events that actually occurred from those we might have imagined or been told about. In this review, we consider recent evidence from functional neuroimaging in healthy participants and studies of neurological and psychiatric conditions, which is shedding new light on how we subjectively experience remembering.

Juguemos a "Ideas" en tiempos de crisis. Una filosofía democrática para una democracia filosófica

Nos preguntamos qué puede aportarnos Ideas ante la actual crisis de la filosofía, la cual tiene que ver con el derrumbamiento de las viejas estructuras de poder en España y en Europa. Para ello, exponemos el sentido originario del proyecto tal como Husserl lo formula en el epílogo y en la introducción de la obra. Ahí nos damos cuenta de la diferencia que hay entre su ideal filosófico-fenomenológico, que es transdisciplinar, y el nuestro, que ha sido reducido a una disciplina especializada. Uno parte de la experiencia en primera persona y aspira al libre entendimiento mutuo entre expertos y profanos; el otro parte del texto como presupuesto y supone una cierta relación jerárquica entre expertos y profanos. Finalmente, partiendo de la praxis fenomenológica que el mismo Husserl lleva a cabo en numerosos pasajes de Ideas I, caracterizamos un paradigma filosófico democrático, acorde con las necesidades de nuestro tiempo.We wonder what can bring Ideas to the current crisis of philosophy, which has to do with the collapse of the old power structures in Spain and Europe. Therefore, we expose the original sense of the project as it is formulated in the epilogue and in the introduction of this book. Then, we realize the difference between the original philosophical-phenomenological ideal, which is transdisciplinary, and ours own ideal, which has been reduced to a specialized discipline. One starts from the first person experience, and aspires to a free mutual understanding between experts and lay people; the other starts from the text, and presupposes a certain hierarchy between experts and laymen. Finally, we base on the phenomenological praxis which Husserl performed in numerous passages of Ideas I, and we characterize a democratic philosophical paradigm, according to the needs of our time.

La vida y la revelación: los caminos insondables de Michel Henry

Me propongo delinear las nociones de vida y revelación tal como son descritas en la obra temprana y en la obra tardía de Michel Henry. Además, cotejaré estas descripciones con la piedra de toque de la fenomenología, a saber, la experiencia en primera persona. A partir de ella levantaré una objeción material: que la vida no se revele en mí como una fenomenalidad pura distinguida del fenómeno propia-mente dicho pone en jaque el carácter absoluto de la manifestación pues hay al menos un caso en que no se cumple. Luego mostraré que, en sus últimos años, Henry da cuenta de este tipo de experiencia a partir de las figuras del mal. Argumentaré, por último, que aunque tiene el mérito de dar cuenta de una heterogeneidad posible de la experiencia, la respuesta ofrecida allí resulta insuficiente para retirar la objeción planteada inicialmente.My aim is to delineate the notions of life and revelation as they are described in the early work and in the late work of Michel Henry. In addition, I will compare these descriptions with the touchstone of phenomenology, namely, the first-person experience. Based on it I will raise a material objection: that life does not reveal itself in me as a pure phenomenality distinguished from the phenomenon itself calls into question the absolute character of manifestation because there is at least one case in which it is not fulfilled. Then I will show that, in his latest years, Henry accounts for this type of experience as a figure of evil. Finally, I will argue that, although it has the merit of accounting for a possible heterogeneity of the experience, the answer offered there is insufficient to withdraw the objection raised initially.