Gain, Fear and Glory

This paper analyses the three causes of war identified by Thucydides and his most eminent translator, Thomas Hobbes. Looking beyond the circumstantial occasions through which wars begin, the chief motives of belligerents have been to pursue material gains, to respond to fears, and to obtain glory and prestige for a doctrine. Wight calls ‘simple Thucydidean fear … the prime motive in international politics’ because it involves ‘a rational apprehension of contingent evil’, not simply ‘some unreasoning emotion’. Wight discusses how fear may be a cause of preventive war, and he labels the great difficulty of building trust between former adversaries ‘the Hobbesian predicament’. Wight defines this predicament as follows: ‘communities of honest and decent men, when they have suffered a long series of mutual injuries, and have a rational apprehension each that its own existence is at stake, and when moreover they live in inescapable juxtaposition, cannot transpose themselves into an attitude of mutual trust’. He also explores the tension between freedom and necessity: the circumstances at hand may seem to be tractable, with choices available between possible decisions and their likely consequences; yet the factors leading to war may prove inescapable.

The Causes of War

This essay focuses on the various motives of decision-makers responsible for state policy. While smaller and weaker powers often choose to capitulate to threats, states prepared to use force have been inspired by distinct combinations of motives. These have included winning independence, imposing domination, promoting allegiance to an ideology, gaining economic advantages, and resisting the rise to supremacy of a political-military competitor. Fear of the loss of security and autonomy may lead to preventive war or intervention to maintain a favourable balance of power. While leaders as prominent as Napoleon and Bismarck have referred to deterministic models of causation in some circumstances, ‘the motive of mutual fear’ may predominate. Compared to their important role in medieval litigation, irredentist wars intended to settle legal and territorial claims have become vestigial, but they may be regarded as modern versions of wars for rights.

The Strategic Obstacles Preventing Israel's Attack on Iran's Nuclear Reactors

The study analyzes the reasons that prevent "Israel" from launching a comprehensive military strike against the nuclear sites and other vital sites of a military nature in Iran, in light of the escalation of the indirect military confrontation between them in many conflicts in the Middle East. The study summarizes the "Israeli" risks to implementing "preventive war" on the Iranian scene in four obstacles, which are: the operational, the legal, the military, and the armed non-state actors. The study concluded that: despite the blockade imposed on Iran, especially with regard to the import of advanced military equipment, Iran was able to build a relative deterrent force consisting of three pillars, which rest on its ability to (1) threaten navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, (2) undertake terrorist attacks on multiple continents, and (3) conduct long-range strikes, primarily by missiles (or with rockets owned by proxies deployed in many countries of the Middle East, and its ability to target "Israel" with short and medium-range ballistic missiles. The Iranian deterrent force, or what has come to be called the Iran’s deterrence triad, was the real obstacle to Israel from launching a preventive war against Iran.

Preventive war and sovereign debt

The preventive motive for war arises because states cannot commit to limit the use of their growing power. This commitment problem can lead to war when there are not enough resources available to compensate the declining state for their expected losses. In this article, we show how capital markets affect preventive war incentives by introducing a profit-maximizing bond market to the canonical bargaining model of war. We find that the nature of the power shift and fundamentals of the market for debt interact to determine when a preventive motive is more likely to lead to war. Two main results show that (1) less probable but more extreme power shifts are most dangerous and (2) unlike the direct effect of interest rates on the cost of war, higher interest on sovereign debt makes war more likely. We present evidence for the latter effect by extending Lemke’s (2003) study of preventive war for major-power dyads between 1816 and 1992.

Alliance Dynamics in the Shadow of Shifting Power

Alliances are costly to form and to terminate, and yet alliances change frequently. Scholars typically attribute these decisions to static factors, such as the power balance, and retrospective ones, such as past power shifts. We highlight another factor: prospective changes, particularly anticipated military strength shifts. We analyze a three-country bargaining model of alliances and war that incorporates forward-looking power dynamics. The model, unlike those restricting players to set roles, flexibly allows players to ally in any arrangement. We find that alliance arrangements that are optimal when power is static are often suboptimal when power fluctuates. Maintaining prior alliances despite expected power shifts may even lead to preventive war. States thus strategically look to the future to identify optimal alliances in the present. Quantitative analyses corroborate the expectation. As the anticipated size of power shifts increases, alliance changes become more common. Accordingly, states navigate expected changes in the international landscape by rearranging current alliance commitments that can help minimize the risk of conflict. When power balances are in flux, malleable institutional arrangements may prove preferable to rigid ones.

The Great War and International Law: German Justifications of Prevention and Pre-emptive Self-Defence

Isabel V. Hull uses the German declarations of war in 1914 to examine three issues: 1) the role of customary international law (CIL) in statesmen’s decision to go to war (using Germany as an example); 2) the assumptions that state actors held a jus ad bellum; and, especially, 3) how they distinguished self-defence, prevention, pre-emption, and aggression. Hull uses not the claims of jurists, but the arguments and actions of civilian and military leaders, i.e. those who actually made the decisions for war. With this, she continues Anuschka Tischer’s and Hendrik Simon’s examination of the question whether there was a transformation of war discourses in (early) modernity that led to overcoming the need to justify war. The chapter confirms that, even as Germany began a ‘preventive war’, the European state consensus held that, on the continent, preventive war was illegal, pre-emptive war was severely restrained, and genuine self-defence – meaning both fending off armed attack against one’s territory, independence, or sovereignty, and defending the treaty-structure that guaranteed the inter-state order – was the only justification for war acceptable to the community of states.