The evolution of moral rules in a model of indirect reciprocity with private assessment

Moral rules allow humans to cooperate by indirect reciprocity. Yet, it is not clear which moral rules best implement indirect reciprocity and are favoured by natural selection. Previous studies either considered only public assessment, where individuals are deemed good or bad by all others, or compared a subset of possible strategies. Here we fill this gap by identifying which rules are evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) among all possible moral rules while considering private assessment. We develop an analytical model describing the frequency of long-term cooperation, determining when a strategy can be invaded by another. We show that there are numerous ESSs in absence of errors, which however cease to exist when errors are present. We identify the underlying properties of cooperative ESSs. Overall, this paper provides a first exhaustive evolutionary invasion analysis of moral rules considering private assessment. Moreover, this model is extendable to incorporate higher-order rules and other processes.

Introduction

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics features new work in normative ethical theory. This 11th volume includes chapters on the following topics: the significance of appreciation; the objective/subjective debate over wrongness; requests as a kind of wrong; the puzzle of taking comfort in the travails of others; finding meaning in one’s life; the boundaries of morality in light of the legitimacy of non-moral partialist pursuits; the value of moral testimony to those who testify; the category of “ordinary” wrongs that are not blameworthy; the practical role of Kant’s Categorical Imperative; the possibility of non-moral blame; reasons to reject the category of subjective obligation; how to understand the point of ethical theory; and the justification of social moral rules....

Kantian Ethics and Utopian Thinking

Is Kantian ethics guilty of utopian thinking? Good and bad uses of utopian ideals are distinguished, an apparent path is traced from Rousseau’s unworkable political ideal to Kant’s ethical ideal, and three versions of Kant’s Categorical Imperative (and counterparts in common moral discourse) are examined briefly with special attention on the kingdom of ends formulation. Following summary of previous development of this central idea, several objections suggesting that this idea encourages bad utopian thinking are briefly addressed: that we cannot count on everyone to follow ideal rules, that even conscientious people disagree in their moral judgments, and that theories that allow exceptions to familiar moral rules create a “slippery slope” to consequentialism.

Diversity and Self-Organized Complexity

Part II of the volume takes up Hayek’s second unsettling thesis: that the Open Society is too complex for the practice of moral justification. To begin to analyze this unsettling thesis, it first considers the nature of the Open Society, and why it is characterized by extreme diversity and complexity. Thus the first section of this essay seeks to distinguish Millian and other liberalisms from the far more deeply diverse Open Society. It then argues that the Open Society is characterized by a process of autocatalytic diversity, which leads to ever-increasing complexity. This second essay concludes with an account of how the constitutive moral rules of the Open Society can be justified. It endorses Hayek’s criticism of social contract theory, proposing in its stead a self-organization model of moral justification.

Morality of the Heart: Heart Rate Variability and Moral Rule Adherence in Men

Moral rules are a cornerstone of many societies. Most moral rules are concerned with the welfare of other individuals, reflecting individuals’ innate aversion against harming other individuals. Harming others is associated with aversive experiences, implying that individuals who are sensitive to the aversiveness of these experiences are more likely to follow moral rules than individuals who are insensitive to the aversiveness of these experiences. Individuals’ sensitivity for aversive experiences depends on individuals’ ability to integrate the underlying neural and physiological processes: Individuals who are more efficient in integrating these processes are more sensitive to the aversiveness that is associated with moral rule violations than individuals who are less efficient in integrating these processes. Individuals who differ in their ability to integrate these processes may, thus, also differ in their inclination to follow moral rules. We tested this assumption in a sample of healthy individuals (67 males) who completed measures of moral rule adherence and integration abilities. Moral rule adherence was assessed with self-report measure and integration abilities were assessed with a resting state measure of heart rate variability (HRV), which reflects prefrontal–(para-)limbic engagement during the integration of physical and neural processes. We found a positive association between individuals’ HRV and individuals’ moral rule adherence, implying that individuals with efficient integration abilities were more inclined to follow moral rules than individuals with inefficient integration abilities. Our findings support the assumption that individuals with different integration abilities also differ in moral rule adherence, presumably because of differences in aversiveness sensitivity.

Social evolution as moral truth tracking in natural law

Morality can be adaptive or maladaptive. From this fact come polarizing disputes on the meta-ethical status of moral adaptation. The realist tracking account of morality claims that it is possible to track objective moral truths and that these truths correspond to moral rules that are adaptive. In contrast, evolutionary anti-realism rejects the existence of moral objectivity and thus asserts that adaptive moral rules cannot represent objective moral truths, since those truths do not exist. This article develops a novel evolutionary view of natural law to defend the realist tracking account. It argues that we can identify objective moral truths through cultural group selection and that adaptive moral rules are likely to reflect such truths.

Social Evolution as Moral Truth Tracking in Natural Law

Morality can be adaptive or maladaptive. From this fact come polarising disputes on the meta-ethical status of moral adaptation. The realist tracking account of morality claims that it is possible to track objective moral truths and that these truths correspond to moral rules that are adaptive. In contrast, evolutionary anti-realism rejects the existence of moral objectivity and thus asserts that adaptive moral rules cannot represent objective moral truths, since those truths do not exist. This article develops a novel evolutionary view of natural law to defend the realist tracking account. It argues that we can identify objective moral truths via cultural group selection and that adaptive moral rules are likely to reflect such truths.

MULHER E RELIGIÃO

Através da história, a religião tem sido uma força catalisadora para muitas das transformações mais marcantes em todas as sociedades. Como elemento de aculturação, a religião serviu como muleta psicológica e emocional para os espantos e medos que o homem experimentou pela sua incapacidade em entender as transformações do seu envolvimento. O divino emergiu com naturalidade na forma como o homem procurou entender o mundo. A mulher, raramente entrou no encontro do humano com a sua transcendência. Através dos tempos, o papel da mulher foi secundarizado, seja pelas suas particularidades biológicas, seja pelos papeis sociais que lhe estavam cometidos. Para essa segregação social da mulher a religião deu expressivo contributo. Hoje, a luta da mulher ainda passa, em algumas sociedades, pela assunção dos seus direitos fundamentais sonegados pelas regras morais intrínsecas a algumas religiões. Palavras-Chave: Religião. Mulher. História. Abstract Throughout history, religion has been a catalyst for many of the most striking transformations in all societies. As an element of acculturation, religion served as a psychological and emotional crutch for the astonishment and fears that human kind suffered due to his inability to understand the changes in his involvement. The divine emerged naturally in the way man understood the world. The woman rarely entered the human encounter with his transcendence. Throughout the ages, the role of women has become secondary, either because of their biological particularities or because of the social roles that were committed to them. Religion has made a significant contribution to this social segregation of women. Today, the struggle of women still involves, in some societies, the assumption of their fundamental rights withheld by the moral rules intrinsic to some religions. Keyword: Religion. Woman. History.