justice and development party
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World Affairs ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 004382002110635
Author(s):  
Azad Deewanee

This article explores the construction of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the People's Protection Units (YPG) in Turkish official discourse. In the article, I employ critical discourse analysis (CDA) to analyze written texts produced during the years 2014–2019 that reflect the position of the Turkish authorities. The article sets out the main narratives that construct the PYD and YPG as terrorist organizations and posits them as a threat to both Turkey and the international community. The analysis reveals that these narratives serve the purpose of delegitimizing the PYD and YPG and legitimizing Turkish military operations and violations against Syrian Kurds. It highlights that the Turkish official position regarding the PYD and YPG is driven by two ideological factors: first, the influence of Kurdish autonomy in Syria on the action of Kurds in Turkey, and second, the barrier that the PYD and YPG have created against the Islamist agenda of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Syria.


Significance Meanwhile, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), which has headed the government since 2011, suffered a humiliating defeat. Changes in the electoral system had been widely expected to disadvantage the PJD, but not to this extent. Impacts King Mohammed’s already strong personal position will be further strengthened. As it moves into opposition, the PJD will face ongoing decline. The new government faces the immediate challenge of dealing with a crisis in relations with Algeria.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 188-208
Author(s):  
László Szerencsés

Turkey is a prime example of the growing importance of diaspora related policies in countries with emerging power status. Based on reports, observations, and interviews with Turkish and Kosovar citizens in Pristina in February 2019, this article examines how Turkey since 2002 has created societal influence in Kosovo—a new and insecure country with which Turkey established relations since its inception—by using, among other things, the Presidency for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) for its diaspora policies. Looking at how the inclusive and repressive tactics of Turkish diaspora-building feed into each other, I argue that Ankara has expanded the boundaries of the Turkish state’s reach by harnessing religion (Islam) in addition to existing ethnic bonds (Turkishness), thereby allowing Turkey to create a diaspora out of a much larger group of people including non-Turkish Muslims. As a result, certain segments among the Sunni-Muslim Albanians in Kosovo have developed close relations with Turkey that may be employed when needed to police elements of the diaspora that are seen as oppositional. While Turkey’s “domestic abroad” has expanded considerably due to the initial inclusive outreach, it has also become more fragmented, more contested, and more unruly, delivering continuously diminishing returns in terms of regime security at home. Although the repression of disloyal diaspora members by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is aimed at stabilizing rule at home, it creates divisions in the diaspora and risks Turkey’s relations with the countries in which it asserts its authority.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Gizem Kaftan

Abstract This article explains how the Turkish nation’s composition has changed under Justice and Development Party rule. Turkish nationalism and Turkish national identity have dramatically changed since 2010, when the Kurdish Opening process was started by former prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The Syrian refugee crisis and the influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey created another change in Turkish national identity. Increasing religiosity in Turkey and the use of Islam by the Justice and Development Party created a flexible nation, where all Sunni Muslims can be considered members even though they are not ethnically Turkish. The author uses primary sources, such as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s speeches since 2010, to show how his discourse became more embracing of non-Turkish Muslim groups and created a dynastic understanding of nationalism based on religion rather than the idea of an ethnically homogenous, secular Turkish nation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 175069802110333
Author(s):  
Meral Ugur-Cinar ◽  
Berat Uygar Altınok

This article focuses on how political actors appropriate the past by utilizing collective traumas for their populist cause. We demonstrate how the Ulucanlar Prison Museum in Turkey and the oppression of military interventions, for which it served as a backyard, became a tool for the AKP’s (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-Justice and Development Party) populist agenda. Through a particular narration of history embedded in the museum, the AKP aimed to forge an internal frontier within the society between an envisioned homogenous body of people on the one hand and the elite on the other. Situating itself as the people’s authentic voice against this elite, the AKP tried to further its popular appeal and legitimize its extension of power. What appeared as coming to terms with the past was instead the instrumentalization of the past for a singular political agenda, eager to remove the complexities and pluralism of the past for the sake of telling a politically useful story.


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