managerial compensation
Recently Published Documents


TOTAL DOCUMENTS

235
(FIVE YEARS 28)

H-INDEX

31
(FIVE YEARS 2)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tore Ellingsen ◽  
Eirik Gaard Kristiansen

We propose a model of how the retention motive shapes managerial compensation contracts. Once employed, a risk-averse manager acquires imperfectly portable skills whose value is stochastic because of industry-wide demand shocks. The manager’s actions are uncontractible, and the perceived fairness of the compensation contract affects the manager’s motivation. If the volatility of profits is sufficiently large and outside offers are sufficiently likely, the equilibrium contract combines a salary with an own-firm stock option. The model’s predictions are consistent with empirical regularities concerning contractual shape, the magnitude of variable pay, the lack of indexation, and the prevalence of discretionary severance pay. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis.


Author(s):  
Ferdinar Bayu Setiaji Pratama ◽  
Rita Wijayanti

Financial distress is a condition in the stage of financial decline that occurs before the occurrence of bankruptcy or liquidation. This study aims to examine the factors that affect financial distress in State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN). The independent variables tested were managerial compensation, working capital, investment growth, operating cash flow, and leverage. Financial distress in this study was measured by the springate method and the grover method. This study selects the sample by purposive sampling method. With the final result as many as 58 samples for 6 years of observation. Research data for the period 2014-2019 was analyzed using multiple linear regression analysis. The results showed that the working capital and leverage variables had an influence on financial distress. Managerial compensation, investment growth, and operating cash flow have no effect on financial distress.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (13) ◽  
pp. 7341
Author(s):  
Fabián Blanes ◽  
Cristina De Fuentes ◽  
Rubén Porcuna

Ongoing regulatory efforts aim to link managerial compensation with a firm’s performance. However, little is known about whether and how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) goals are considered in the design of the managerial compensation scheme. This paper addresses this research question by analyzing a sample of Spanish listed firms for the period spanning 2013–2018. The outcomes of the regressions suggest that there is a positive relationship between CSR and the managerial compensation, but this relationship is significant only with lower levels of CSR. The study also reveals that CSR is positively associated with the proportion of equity-based compensation and, therefore, negatively associated with the proportion of cash-based compensation. In all, our results suggest that firms with lower levels of CSR, likely following social pressures, seek to improve their investments in CSR; and, in doing so, they design a managerial compensation scheme that incentivizes the manager to meet the firm’s goals related to CSR investments. Hence, since CSR is associated with an increase in the long-term firm’s value, the equity-based component of the managerial scheme is higher than in the remaining firms. However, the high proportion of cash-based compensation is far from the desirable goals promoted by the Governance Codes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 501-527
Author(s):  
Sandro Brusco ◽  
Fausto Panunzi

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shinhye Ahn ◽  
Cecile K. Cho ◽  
Theresa S. Cho

PurposeThis study investigates how a firm's regulatory focus (i.e. promotion and prevention foci) affects growth- and efficiency-oriented strategic change, highlighting the role of organizational-level regulatory focus as a cognitive frame within which to interpret performance feedback and its subsequent effects on strategic decisions.Design/methodology/approachThe authors collected longitudinal data on 98 S&P 500 manufacturing firms for a seven-year period. The panel data, which includes texts from the firms' 10-K filings, were then analyzed using a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression estimator to test the authors’ hypotheses.FindingsA firm's strategic change orientation is affected by its regulatory focus and performance feedback: a promotion focus increases the magnitude of growth-oriented strategic change, while a prevention focus favors efficiency-oriented strategic change. Furthermore, both foci moderate the effect of performance feedback on the strategic change orientation: under negative performance feedback, a promotion (prevention) focus increases (decreases) the magnitude of growth-oriented strategic change relative to that of efficiency-oriented change. The findings provide robust evidence that regulatory focus can influence how organizations learn from feedback and formulate strategic change.Research limitations/implicationsThe authors’ examination of regulatory focus and organizational learning process relied on large manufacturing firms in the USA. However, learning process could be quite different in small and/or young firms. Future work should expand to a wider range of organizational types, such as nascent entrepreneurial ventures. In addition, the authors’ measurement of regulatory focus using corporate text has inherent weakness and could be supplemented with alternative research methods, such as surveys, interviews or experiments. All in all, however, the findings of this study offer a novel behavioral perspective while demonstrating that a regulatory focus is an important antecedent of organizational learning.Practical implicationsThis study highlights the importance of motivational characteristics of the top managers in the process of organizational learning from performance feedback. Furthermore, recruitment of a new top manager should be aligned with the organizational context, values and goals. In addition, corporate governance systems such as managerial compensation schemes need to be carefully designed so as to maximize organizational resilience, especially in the context of performance downturn or environmental change. Establishing a constructive organizational culture so that strategic decisions are not overly swayed by the performance outcomes would also be crucial to the organizational learning process.Social implicationsThis study highlights the importance of understanding the motivational orientations of top managers in organizational learning. In terms of managerial compensation, for instance, an optimal incentive system should reflect the desired performance output by encouraging managerial behavior that corresponds to its objective. Furthermore, motivational orientation of new recruits should be considered in the context of the composition of the top management team members in order to achieve “optimal fit.” In addition, this study suggests that top executives' regulatory focus can be a key factor for organizations in balancing goals of different value orientations.Originality/valueThe findings of this study demonstrated that a firm-level regulatory focus has a significant effect on organizational learning and strategic change following performance feedback. The authors hope this study provides an impetus for future discussions on the microcognitive mechanisms of organizational learning by exploring the relations between organizations' regulatory foci, performance feedback and strategic change orientations.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Heqing Zhu

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the effectiveness of hedge fund activism (HFA) in preventing corporate policy deviations.Design/methodology/approachThis paper identifies HFA interventions through a hand-collected sample of Schedule 13D filings between 1994 and 2016, and uses mechanical mutual fund fire sales as the instrument variable (IV) for the likelihood of such interventions. Armed with the instrument, this paper estimates firm's distribution, managerial compensation and investment policies in response to a change in the perceived likelihood of HFA interventions.FindingsAn increase in the HFA intervention likelihood leads to increases in shareholder distribution, decreases in CEO pay and investments and increases in operating performance. Compared to the sample average, a one standard deviation increase in the intervention likelihood leads to a 9.29% increase in the firm's payout ratio, a 7.42% decrease in CEO compensation, a 2.67% decrease in capital expenditures and a 4.96% decrease in R&D expenses. These changes are consistent with the threat of intervention curbing managerial empire-building behaviors and improving firm operation. The relationships are causal, significant and robust to a variety of alternative specifications and sample divisions.Originality/valueResults of this paper suggest that as a mechanism for corporate governance, the threat of HFA is effective in preventing corporate policy deviations. They also demonstrate a stronger and broader impact of HFA on corporate policy than previously documented. By showing that HFA is an effective and viable mechanism for corporate governance, this study allows policymakers to make more informed decisions to whether increase hedge fund regulations or not.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document