trade sanctions
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2022 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arlo Poletti ◽  
Daniela Sicurelli

European institutions have repeatedly represented the EU as an actor that can use the attractiveness of its market to promote human rights internationally. From this perspective, EU trade sanctions represent a hard power tool to push the government of states accused of major human rights violations to abide by international law. In its reaction to the Rohingya crisis in 2018, despite the European Parliament’s call for the lifting of Myanmar’s trade preferences, the Council of the EU stated that it would rather tackle the problem by taking a “constructive approach” based on dialogue. We provide a political-economy explanation of this choice, making a plausible case that the political pressures from European importers and exporters, not to jeopardise trade relations with Myanmar, prevailed over the demands of European protectionist groups and NGOs advocating a tougher position. The firms interested in maintaining preferential trade relations with Myanmar were primarily motivated by a desire to avoid a disruption of trade and investment links within global value chains (GVCs) so that they could continue competing with Chinese enterprises.


2021 ◽  
pp. 210-228
Author(s):  
Yuan-tsung Chen

In 1967, during a mutiny known as the Wuhan Incident, Zhou Enlai flexed his political muscles and pacified the insurgent commanders. Mao felt threatened. Yuan-tsung’s friend Courtier Yu, her direct link to Zhou, warned her that she had been caught in the crossfire of a huge power struggle between Zhou and Mao. Zhou wanted to reach an understanding with the West that would lead to the lifting of its trade sanctions against China. Mao, however, wanted to resuscitate the Great Leap Forward. Yuan-tsung’s best bet was Zhou. If Zhou prevailed, he would use Jack’s knowledge of English and Western culture to explain his open-door policy to the West. In return Jack and Yuan-tsung would get their exit visas. Courtier Yu arranged a meeting at a place near Badaling where Yuan-tsung could take her plea directly to Zhou.


Headline RUSSIA/UNITED STATES: New talk of trade sanctions


2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (45) ◽  
pp. e2109988118
Author(s):  
William Nordhaus

A proposal to combat free riding in international climate agreements is the establishment of a climate club—a coalition of countries in a structure to encourage high levels of participation. Empirical models of climate clubs in the early stages relied on the analysis of single-period coalition formation. The earlier results suggested that there were limits to the potential strength of clubs and that it would be difficult to have deep abatement strategies in the club framework. The current study extends the single-period approach to many periods and develops an approach analyzing “supportable policies” to analyze multiperiod clubs. The major element of the present study is the interaction between club effectiveness and rapid technological change. Neither alone will produce incentive-compatible policies that can attain the ambitious objectives of international climate policy. The trade sanctions without rapid technological decarbonization will be too costly to produce deep abatement; similarly, rapid technological decarbonization by itself will not induce deep abatement because of country free riding. However, the two together can achieve international climate objectives.


Significance The report comes as Prime Minister Scott Morrison lobbies his National Party partners in the governing coalition to back a target of net zero emissions by 2050 prior to next month’s COP26 climate conference in Glasgow. Impacts Much-needed investment in the renewables sector may not materialise without a more positive government approach to the sector. Australian businesses may face trade sanctions as a result of the government’s failure to adopt binding emission targets. Public subsidies for investment in coal and gas could lead to higher power bills for consumers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Azat Aituar

Abstract This paper analyses the effects of trade sanctions between Russia and Western countries on Kazakhstan. The nature of these sanctions is characterized by unilateral sanctions from Russia and multilateral sanctions against Russia. Although Kazakhstan refused to participate in these sanction wars, this might affect its economy significantly as it is highly integrated into the Russian economy. An empirical analysis is performed on the product level and time series techniques are used to estimate the effects of the sanctions. The paper assesses the overall effectiveness of trade sanctions through aggregating product level results into a sanction index. The derived sanction index shows that multilateral sanctions did not divert the trade flows from Western countries. On the other hand, the index indicates the existence of sanction busting activities against Russian unilateral counter-sanctions, confirming the hypothesis that unilateral sanctions are ineffective and allow for third-country effects.


2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Melody Splinter ◽  
Jeroen Klomp

AbstractThis chapter explores whether economic sanctions are able to trigger sudden economic growth collapses. The primarily aim of economic sanctions is to cause a political or behavioural change by imposing serious restrictions on important economic activities undertaken by the target country. In particular, the basic idea is that sanctions cause a large adverse and sudden shock to the target’s economy. It assumes that when this shock is severe enough, the target country is more willing to cooperate. The findings reported in this chapter clearly demonstrate that economic sanctions have a significant positive effect on the likelihood of a growth deceleration in the first three years after the first threat signals or actual imposition. It turns out that not all sanctions are equally successful in creating a sudden economic shock. In particular, trade sanctions, multilateral sanctions, and sanctions aimed at the business sector are the most harmful for the economy of the target country.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin K. W. Ip

Abstract Transnational trade is at the heart of the global economy. Trade relations often transcend both ideological divides and regime type. Trading with autocratic regimes, however, raises significant moral issues. In their recent book, On Trade Justice, Mathias Risse and Gabriel Wollner argue that trade with autocratic regimes is morally permissible only under a very limited set of circumstances. This article discusses the morally permissible trade policies that liberal democracies ought to adopt toward autocratic regimes. Liberal democracies trading with autocratic regimes have a special obligation to improve the human rights conditions in these regimes. This duty is partly based on their complicity in human rights violations and on the fact that the democracies benefit from these violations in their trading relationships. Their responsibility goes beyond the improvement of labor conditions and requires various strategies such as imposing trade sanctions and export controls, and making trade conditional on human rights performance.


Author(s):  
Driesen David M

This chapter addresses the problem of choosing environmental law instruments in international environmental law. It begins with a discussion of the various environmental protection instruments, such as environmental benefit trading, pollution taxes, subsidies, and traditional regulation. The chapter suggests that, for the most part, international environmental law has left the choice between traditional regulation and market-based instruments to nation-states. Efforts to create new international environmental law focus more upon forging agreement about goals than on how to achieve goals, since states play such a huge role in implementation and countries can achieve any given goal in a variety of ways. But some devices, which some experts treat as environmental instruments—such as subsidies, liability, and trade sanctions—more often become part of international environmental law. The chapter then discusses the extent to which the desire for international environmental benefit trading has driven a departure from the norm of leaving the choice between market mechanisms and traditional standards to implementing polities.


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