IN NOVUM RESTRICTION IN LITHUANIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW

This article examines a relatively new institute of Lithuanian civil proceedings – legal restrictions on the late submission of evidence in both first instance and appellate courts. These restrictions were first established in the new Civil Procedure Code (CPC) which was adopted by Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on 28 February 2002 (entered into force on 1 January 2003). Until then such restrictions in Lithuanian civil procedure law were not known from the time of famous Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Therefore, it seems natural that this innovation has paved the way for its real application in the courts for more than a decade. This article provides a consistent analysis of the case law (starting with the rulings of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in which the restrictions established in the law were practically denied, and up to the rulings of the last year, which already recognized the right of the courts in certain cases to refuse to accept evidence which was submitted too late). This article also reveals the aims of the CPC authors which were aimed at establishing the first instance court’s right to refuse to accept evidence which was submitted too late and system of limited appeal which establishes a general prohibition (with certain exceptions) to present evidence that was not examined in the court of first instance. One of the most important aims is the concentration of the proceedings, the prevention of abuse of procedural rights and the establishment of the first instance as the main judicial instance. The appeal procedure in the new CPC is already regarded not as a repetition or continuation of the proceedings at first instance, but as a review of the legality and validity of an existing, albeit unenforced, decision of the court of first instance. The author acknowledges that although it took a long time for the relevant provisions of the law to be actually applied in the case law, today their application is already noticeable in the daily work of courts. This leads to the conclusion that Lithuanian courts have adapted to the new CPC system and its philosophy.

Echtscheiding in de Leuvense rechtspraktijk in de nasleep van de ‘Groote Oorlog’

In order to contribute to the existing gap in the Belgian legal history, the divorce jurisprudence from 1919 to 1922 of the court of first instance in Leuven was studied. The challenges resulting from the Great War were clearly visible in the examined judgments. First, there were regular references to the war and more specifically to the German enemy and the behaviour of the women who remained on the home front. In addition, due to circumstances created by the war some Belgians were unable to go before the civil registrar to have their divorce pronounced. The suspension contained in the Royal Decree of 26 October 1914 could, contrary to its purpose and due to the uncertainty surrounding the date of the end of the war, not be applied. Finally, the judges showed a flexible attitude in the analysis of the divorce motive ‘gross insults’. In this analysis, the role soldiers played during the war clearly aroused sympathy among the judges.

Dopuszczalność orzeczenia przez sąd odwoławczy wyrokiem łącznym kary łącznej po raz pierwszy albo orzeczenia jej w zakresie innym niż orzekł sąd pierwszej instancji. Glosa do uchwały składu 7 sędziów Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 28 czerwca 2018 r. (I KZP 3/18, OSNKW 2018, nr 8, poz. 55)

<p>The commentary raises the problem of the admissibility of the issuing cumulative penalty in cumulative judgement by appeal court for the first time or issuing that penalty within the different scope of punishment, from the perspective of the power to alter decisions of a court of the first instance, the principle of two-instance court proceedings, access to court and the right of defence. By discussing the essence of the constitutional and convention provisions, the author attempts to answer the question what the scope of the appeal court’s power is to alter cumulative judgement issued in the first instance, by concluding that neither Article 176 (1) of the Polish Constitution, nor Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 2 of Protocol no. 7 to the ECHR supplementing its content, as well as Article 14 (5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in principle stand in the way of such an approach, which should be reflected in the process of interpretation of Article 437 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, in the author’s opinion, doubts arise, from the perspective discussed above, if the appellate court were to take into account, when imposing the cumulative penalty, a unit judgement unknown, for various reasons, to the court of first instance, to which a special part of the considerations and critical remarks is devoted.</p>

PECULIARITIES OF PARTICIPATION OF DEFENDER IN THE COURT PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMINAL CASE IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

Актуальность темы исследования обусловлена тем, что немаловажное значение в уголовном судопроизводстве имеет правильное толкование процессуального положения защитника в судебном разбирательстве в суде первой инстанции. В статье охарактеризована степень участия защитника на рассматриваемой стадии уголовного процесса: исследование им доказательств; заявление ходатайств; изложение суду своего мнения по существу обвинения и его доказанности; выступление в судебных прениях. The relevance of research topic lies in the fact that the correct interpretation of procedural position of a defense attorney in court proceedings in the court of first instance is of no small importance in criminal proceedings. The article describes the degree of participation of defense attorney at the considered stage of criminal process: his research of evidence; application of petitions; presenting to the court his opinion on the merits of accusation and it's proof; speech in judicial pleadings.

The Appellate Court’s Reformatory Powers in ECtHR Case Law – between the Efficiency of the Procedure and the Guarantees of the Fair Trial in Criminal Proceedings

Appeal proceedings in criminal cases are regulated in various ways by European legislators. The ECtHR case law does not impose any particular model of appeal proceedings; however, Article 6 is applicable to appeal proceedings and the manner of its application is contingent on the specific features of the proceedings in question. One of the key problems in this respect is the way the issue of the reformatory powers of appellate courts is regulated. This article seeks to reconstruct the rules worked out in the Strasbourg Court’s case law pertaining to this matter, as well as to formulate proposals as regards applying the principle of immediacy in appeal proceedings and the issue of the appellate court’s differing assessment of facts established by the court of first instance. The possible developments of case law in this area are also discussed.

Some Questions Arising in the Trial of Civil Lawsuits in the Criminal Court of First Instance

The article discusses some problems of considering a civil claim during a criminal court hearing. It is argued that settling a civil claim during criminal proceedings has a higher priority than a trial in a civil process. The author justifies the position according to which filing a lawsuit during criminal proceedings is a right and not an obligation of a person in a criminal trial. The author also believes that in filing a civil claim in a criminal process, the civil plaintiff should present proof of the incurred costs with the purpose of further recovery of the material damage; besides, the person who will pay the damage or compensate for the moral harm should be established. Based on the analysis of court practice, it is proven that the settlement of a civil claim during a special procedure of a criminal court trial is possible, however, the accused should agree not only with the accusation, but also with the size of the damage (harm). The cases in which the courts can eliminate violations of criminal procedure legislation during preliminary investigations are examined.

Re-appraising Success and Failure in the Life of the European Court of Justice

The establishment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) is often still regarded today as an unequivocal success story, especially compared to the troubles experienced by kindred institutions elsewhere. For non-specialist audiences, it would even seem that its performance has only recently been cast in a more negative light, pursuant to the pushback of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Weiss/PSPP saga. The current article aims to unpack a collection of shortcomings that have accumulated gradually and persist right up to the present, which have however not been interrogated in sufficient depth so far. It starts off with a contextual depiction of the tug-of-war between the supranational and the national judiciaries, juxtaposing the earlier confrontations with contemporary debates and controversies. Subsequently, attention is drawn to the sustained imperfections of the judicial selection and appointment process, addressing a few pervasive questions of institutional propriety. Hereafter, the article engages in a meta-analysis of ongoing discussions on the quality of the case law, testing the veracity of popular contentions pertaining to its constant variability. Lastly, it canvasses the pressures and agitations internal to the CJEU that have become increasingly manifest since the creation of the Court of First Instance. Overall, this fourfold re-appraisal aims to put back on record some of the B-sides on the sountrack of the new legal order, so as to compensate for the lack of airplay they have received hitherto.

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT* Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC)

The pursuit of access to better economic opportunities such as decent jobs has resulted in an astronomic influx of people into the inner city of Johannesburg, South Africa. As a result there is a high demand for rental housing. This presents an opportunity to make profit for those who leasepremises in order to generate an income. The demand for rental housing has arguably caused the escalation of rental prices, thereby causing a shortage of affordable rental housing in the city centre. The Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999 was enacted to resolve disputes that may arise from any unfair practice or matters affecting the relationship between the landlord and his tenants in respect of the lease contract. In particular, the Rental Housing Act seeks inter alia to “create mechanisms to promote the provision of rental-housing property; promote access to adequate housing through creating mechanisms to ensure the proper functioning of the rental-housing market [and] to lay down general principles governing conflict resolution in the rental-housing sector” (Preamble to the Rental Housing Act). In terms of the Rental Housing Act, the landlord or a tenant may approach the RentalHousing Tribunal and complain about an unfair practice (s 13 of the Rental Housing Act). The Rental Housing Act defines an unfair practice as “a practice unreasonably prejudicing the rights or interests of a tenant or a landlord” (s 1 of the Rental Housing Act). Where the Tribunal, at the conclusion of the hearing, is of the view that an unfair practice exists, it may rule that the exploitative rental be discontinued. The Tribunal may also make a determination about the amount of rental that must be paid by a tenant taking into account inter alia “the need for a realistic return on investment for investors in rental housing”. The argument presented in this case is that the applicants ought to have made up their case in the court of first instance and not at the appellate stage. The paper isdivided into nine sections. Section 2 provides an overview of the facts of the case, section 3 discusses the case before the High Court, section 4 discusses the case before the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), section 5 discusses the case in the Constitutional Court, the issues, arguments, before the court, the findings and conclusions of the court. Section 6 evaluates the parties’ submissions in light of the Rental Housing Act, the Constitution, the Gauteng Unfair Practices Regulations, and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIEA) (19 of 1998). Section 7 discusses the majority judgment. Section 8 discusses the minority judgment. Section 9 is a critique of both the minority and majority judgments. The conclusion made is that the applicants should stand or fall by the arguments contained in the founding documents.

Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review in Austria

This chapter discusses administrative procedure and judicial review in Austria. In Austria, there exists a principle of the 'exclusivity of legal sources'. Legal protection is only possible against certain administrative legal sources. In general, Article 130 B-VG pronounces judgments on complaints by the administrative courts against rulings by administrative authorities for unlawful acts; against the exercise of direct administrative power and compulsion to carry out unlawful acts; and on the grounds of breach of the duty to reach a decision by an administrative authority. In principle, the administrative court has to examine the case comprehensively; in general, there is no exclusion for specific administrative matters. It is of fundamental significance for the Austrian administrative judicial system that an administrative court of first instance generally decides on the merits of the case. Only in very exceptional cases does it set aside the contested act by the authority and refer the case back to it.