Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets

Budgets play a significant role in ad markets that implement sequential auctions such as those hosted by internet companies. In “Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets,” the authors look at pacing in an ad marketplace using the lens of game theory. The goal is understanding how bids must be shaded to maximize advertiser welfare, at equilibrium. Motivated by the real-world auction mechanism, they construct a game where advertisers in the auctions choose a multiplicative factor not larger than 1 to possibly reduce their bids and best respond to the other advertisers. The article studies the theoretical properties of the game such as existence and uniqueness of equilibria, offers an exact algorithm to compute them, connects the game to well-known abstractions such as Fisher markets, and performs a computational study with real-world-inspired instances. The main insights are that the solutions to the studied game can be used to improve the outcomes achieved by a closer-to-reality dynamic pacing algorithm and that buyers do not have an incentive to misreport bids or budgets when there are enough participants in the auction.

Analisis Fatwa DSN-MUI No. 25/DSN-MUI/2002 Tentang Pelelangan Barang di Pegadaian Syariah

In Islam, pawning is known as Ar-rahn, which is to make an item as collateral for debt, provided that if there is difficulty in payment, the debt can be paid from the sale of the goods used as collateral. In sharia pawnshops, the auction system applies to customers, if the customer is unable to redeem the pawned goods and pay their debts after maturity. An auction is an attempt to repay loans that cannot be repaid to a certain extent. Auctions according to sharia must also be accountable for Islamic law, which is free from elements of gharar, maisir, usury and falsehood. The auction mechanism in sharia pawnshops is regulated in the second part of the General Provisions for Fatwa DSN No.25 / DSN-MUI / 2002, point 5 concerning auction. The purpose of this research is to find out whether the sharia auction mechanism is in accordance with the fatwa or not. The method used in this writing is qualitative descriptive. The result of this research is that the sharia embedding mechanism is in accordance with the DSN-MUI Fatwa No. 25 / DSN-MUI / 2002 concerning Auctions.

A Two-Stage Auction Mechanism for 3PL Supplier Selection under Risk Aversion

The third party logistics (3PL) suppliers selection is a key issue in sustainable operation of fourth party logistics (4PL). A two-stage auction mechanism is designed for the selection of 3PL suppliers. Different from previous studies, the paper considers risk preference of 4PL integrators during the auction and uses the prospect theory to establish the auction scoring function of 4PL integrators. First, a first score sealed auction (FSSA) mechanism is used to solve the selection problem. However, the results show that FSSA is not an ideal method. Hence, the English auction (EA) mechanism is combined with the FSSA mechanism to form a two-stage auction. The FSSA is taken as the first stage auction, and the EA is taken as the second stage auction, and the two-stage auction mechanism is constructed. The two-stage auction can improve the utility of the 4PL integrator and the auction efficiency. In addition, for the degree of disclosure of attribute weights in the scoring function, two states, complete information and incomplete information is designed. In case analysis, the validity of the designed two-stage auction mechanism is verified. The 4PL integrator can obtain higher utility under the risk-neutral auction than the risk-averse auction. The complete information auction does not make the 4PL integrator obtain higher utility than the incomplete information auction.

Emerging Methods of Auction Design in Social Networks

In recent years, a new branch of auction models called diffusion auction has extended the traditional auction into social network scenarios. The diffusion auction models the auction as a networked market whose nodes are potential customers and whose edges are the relations between these customers. The diffusion auction mechanism can incentivize buyers to not only submit a truthful bid, but also further invite their surrounding neighbors to participate into the auction. It can convene more participants than traditional auction mechanisms, which leads to better optimizations of different key aspects, such as social welfare, seller’s revenue, amount of redistributed money and so on. The diffusion auctions have recently attracted a discrete interest in the algorithmic game theory and market design communities. This survey summarizes the current progress of diffusion auctions.

A Mobile-assisted Edge Computing Framework for Emerging IoT Applications

Edge computing (EC) is a promising paradigm for providing ultra-low latency experience for IoT applications at the network edge, through pre-caching required services in fixed edge nodes. However, the supply-demand mismatch can arise while meeting the peak period of some specific service requests. The mismatch between capacity provision and user demands can be fatal to the delay-sensitive user requests of emerging IoT applications and will be further exacerbated due to the long service provisioning cycle. To tackle this problem, we propose the mobile-assisted edge computing framework to improve the QoS of fixed edge nodes by exploiting mobile edge nodes. Furthermore, we devise a CRI (Credible, Reciprocal, and Incentive) auction mechanism to stimulate mobile edge nodes to participate in the services for user requests. The advantages of our mobile-assisted edge computing framework include higher task completion rate, profit maximization, and computational efficiency. Meanwhile, the theoretical analysis and experimental results guarantee the desirable economic properties of our CRI auction mechanism.