America's Energy Gamble

How can America get back to an energy transition that's good for the economy and the environment? That's the question at the heart of this eye-opening and richly informative dissection of the Trump administration's energy policy. The policy was ardently pro-fossil fuel and ferociously anti-regulation, implemented by manipulating science and economic analysis, putting oil and gas insiders at the helm of environmental agencies, and hacking away at democratic norms that once enjoyed bipartisan support. The impacts on the nation's health, economy, and environment were - as this book carefully demonstrates - dire. But the damage can be reversed. Ordinary Americans, civil society groups, environmental professionals, and politicians at every level all have parts to play in making sure the needed energy transition leaves no one behind. This compelling book will appeal to course instructors and students, government and industry officials, activists and journalists, and everyone concerned about the nation's future.

The Demand Side of Democratic Backsliding: How Divergent Understandings of Democracy Shape Political Choice

Why do citizens in democracies fail to punish political candidates who openly violate democratic standards at the ballot box? The bulk of existing research assumes that a common understanding of democracy underpins citizens’ evaluations of different candidates, resulting in a trade-off between undemocratic practices and partisan or economic considerations. We shed doubt on this assumption by showing that divergent understandings of democracy coexist among citizens and affect vote choice. We leverage a novel approach to estimate individual-level citizen commitment to democracy by means of a candidate choice conjoint experiment in Poland, a country experiencing democratic backsliding in a context of deep polarization. We find support for our claim that respondents with less clear-cut liberal democratic attitudes not only tolerate democratic violations more readily, but do so irrespective of a given candidate’s partisan affiliation. Thus, we contend that a lack of attitudinal consolidation around liberal democratic norms explains continued voter support for authoritarian-leaning leaders.

The microdynamics shaping the relationship between democracy and corruption

Physics has a long tradition of laying rigorous quantitative foundations for social phenomena. Here, we up the ante for physics' forays into the territory of social sciences by (i) empirically documenting a tipping point in the relationship between democratic norms and corruption suppression, and then (ii) demonstrating how such a tipping point emerges from a micro-scale mechanistic model of spin dynamics in a complex network. Specifically, the tipping point in the relationship between democratic norms and corruption suppression is such that democratization has little effect on suppressing corruption below a critical threshold, but a large effect above the threshold. The micro-scale model of spin dynamics underpins this phenomenon by reinterpreting spins in terms of unbiased (i.e. altruistic) and biased (i.e. parochial) other-regarding behaviour, as well as the corresponding voting preferences. Under weak democratic norms, dense social connections of parochialists enable coercing enough opportunist voters to vote in favour of perpetuating parochial in-group bias. Society may, however, strengthen democratic norms in a rapid turn of events during which opportunists adopt altruism and vote to subdue bias. The emerging model outcome at the societal scale thus mirrors the data, implying that democracy either perpetuates or suppresses corruption depending on the prevailing democratic norms.

Emigration and Political Contestation

How does migration affect global patterns of political violence and protest? While political scientists have examined the links between trade and conflict, less attention has been paid to the links between migration and conflict. In this paper, we show that greater emigration reduces domestic political violence by providing exit opportunities for aggrieved citizens and economic benefits to those who remain. Emigration also reduces non-violent forms of political contestation, including protests and strikes, implying that high emigration rates can produce relatively quiescent populations. However, larger flows of emigrants to democracies can increase non-violent protest in autocracies, as exposure to freer countries spreads democratic norms and the tools of peaceful opposition. We use instrumental variables analysis to account for the endogeneity of migration flows and find robust results for a range of indicators of civil violence and protest from 1960 to 2010.

DERIVING FROM THE BASIC LEGAL AND DEMOCRATIC RULE OF THE STATE AND THE RIGHT OF THE PERSON IN PRINCIPLE TO CARRY OUT MATERIAL-LEGAL CLAIMS ONLY IN PART AS AN EXPRESSION OF A LEGAL AND DEMOCRATIC STATE

In the article, the author looks at the origin of the principle of the private autonomy from the point of view of the basic normal theory, stating that the basic legal and democratic norms of the country are derived from the rule of law. Moreover, the private autonomy also includes, in principle, the right of a person to exercise the right to carry out material legal claims, even in part, if the person so wishes.

Democracy Through Darkness

Chapter 8 reviews the focus of this book—how and why people keep their politics a secret—based on observations of CWG and the survey data. This chapter argues that the existence of political secrecy says that the democracy in the United States is dark. That the fear laid bare in the women’s experiences and the sizeable number of people who engage in secret political expression are evidence that liberal democratic norms are being threatened. But it also considers how political secrecy might tell us that democracy is alive. That people continue in the face of opposition and that secrecy can be a tool to help people engage in politics when they feel it is risky. Finally, this chapter addresses the implications for practitioners, asking them to consider the ways in which they privilege public expression, and encouraging them to consider this an inaccurate picture of the public itself.

COVID-19 related anxieties do not decrease support for liberal democracy

Studies carried out at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic confirmed that under the impression of fear individuals were more willing to tolerate violations of liberal-democratic norms, and supported discriminatory policies to preserve public safety. But what are the potential consequences of the pandemic on citizens’ attitudes beyond its peak? We conducted an original experiment in which we manipulate individuals’ cognitive accessibility of their fears related to COVID-19 one and a half years after the onset of the pandemic. We fielded the experiment in Hungary and Romania–two cases most likely to see such attitudes amplify under the condition of fear. Our intervention was successful in elevating respondents’ levels of worry, anxiety, and fear when thinking about infectious diseases like COVID-19. However, these emotions did not affect individuals’ levels of rightwing authoritarianism, nationalism, or outgroup hostility, or their preferences for specific discriminatory policies aimed to fight a potential resurgence of COVID-19.

Legal gaslighting

Suppose that an authoritarian regime wants to make changes to legal norms or institutions to consolidate its hold on political power. Suppose further that the regime in question cannot simply ignore the domestic or international costs of doing so, and that it has an interest in responding to critiques of these changes based on liberal democratic norms and the rule of law. How can it do so? One possible approach is to sow confusion and undermine the normative standards themselves – in effect, to ‘gaslight’ the domestic or international audience (or both). To that end, a regime might assert that the change it proposes resembles a ‘best practice’ from one or more other jurisdictions. Such emulation need not be thorough, or even sincere; it may suffice simply to assert that a proposed change resembles that in a jurisdiction with ironclad rule-of-law credentials. The changes being adopted may bear no real resemblance to the ‘comparators’ on closer examination. Alternatively, the measures being adopted may be similar on their face, but operate in such a different context that they end up serving a very different function to the function they perform in the comparator jurisdiction. Such gaslighting need not succeed in deceiving outsiders or subjects; undermining the standards by which legal reforms are measured, sowing confusion, or providing a superficial pretext for inaction may be sufficient.

Are Populists Politically Intolerant? Citizens’ Populist Attitudes and Tolerance of Various Political Antagonists

Political tolerance—the willingness to extend civil rights to political antagonists—is a key democratic norm. We argue that because voters with populist attitudes have an ambiguous relationship with democracy and keep a narrow definition of the people, they are more likely to be politically intolerant. We study the Netherlands, a less likely case to find political intolerance. Using data from a representative household panel survey ( n = 1999), we investigate the extent to which populist attitudes translate into general intolerant attitudes and specific intolerance toward political antagonists. Our analyses show that voters with stronger populist attitudes are less supportive of democratic norms, more intolerant of opposing views online, and of specific political opponents. However, they are not explicitly intolerant by limiting individual civil rights or supporting intolerant measures toward political antagonists. These findings show that even in a system engrained with compromise, populist citizens show signs of political intolerance.

The Subversion Dilemma: Why Voters Who Cherish Democracy Vote it Away

Around the world, would-be authoritarian leaders have convinced their supporters to vote away the democracies they claim to cherish. How is this possible? We argue that simply fearing that opposing partisans support democratic backsliding can lead individuals to support it themselves. Would-be authoritarians may then be able to start a self-reinforcing dynamic of democratic backsliding by fostering these fears, which then generate exaggerated fears on the other. Using observational and experimental studies (N=4,400), we present four findings consistent with this account: Republicans and Democrats (1) overestimate opposing partisan willingness to break democratic norms; (2) will support their party breaking democratic norms themselves to the extent that they overestimate willingness by the other side; (3) that experimentally correcting this overestimation reduces support for breaking norms, and (4) increases the likelihood of voting for candidates that uphold democratic norms. Our findings suggest that we can foster democratic stability even in a highly polarized society using interventions that simply correct misperceptions about opposing partisans’ commitment to democratic norms