The domination monoid in o-minimal theories

We study the monoid of global invariant types modulo domination-equivalence in the context of o-minimal theories. We reduce its computation to the problem of proving that it is generated by classes of [Formula: see text]-types. We show this to hold in Real Closed Fields, where generators of this monoid correspond to invariant convex subrings of the monster model. Combined with [C. Ealy, D. Haskell and J. Maríková, Residue field domination in real closed valued fields, Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 60(3) (2019) 333–351], this allows us to compute the domination monoid in the weakly o-minimal theory of Real Closed Valued Fields.

Minimal theory of massive gravity and constraints on the graviton mass

The Minimal theory of Massive Gravity (MTMG) is endowed non-linearly with only two tensor modes in the gravity sector which acquire a non-zero mass. On a homogeneous and isotropic background the theory is known to possess two branches: the self-accelerating branch with a phenomenology in cosmology which, except for the mass of the tensor modes, exactly matches the one of ΛCDM; and the normal branch which instead shows deviation from General Relativity in terms of both background and linear perturbations dynamics. For the latter branch we study using several early and late times data sets the constraints on today's value of the graviton mass μ0, finding that (μ0/H 0)2 = 0.119-0.098 +0.12 at 68% CL, which in turn gives an upper bound at 95% CL as μ0 < 8.4 × 10-34 eV. This corresponds to the strongest bound on the mass of the graviton for the normal branch of MTMG.

Minimal Theory of Causation and Causal Distinctions

The Minimal Theory of Causation, presented in Graßhoff and May, 2001, aspires to be a version of a regularity analysis of causation able to correctly predict our causal intuitions. In my article, I will argue that it is unsuccessful in this respect. The second aim of the paper will be to defend Hitchcock’s proposal concerning divisions of causal relations (presented in Hitchcock, 2001) against criticism made, in Jakob, 2006 on the basis of the Minimal Theory of Causation.

A Minimal Theory of Creative Ability

Despite decades of extensive research on creativity, the field still combats psychometric problems when measuring individual differences in creative ability and people’s potential to achieve real-world outcomes that are both original and useful. We think these seemingly technical issues have a conceptual origin. We therefore propose a minimal theory of creative ability (MTCA) to create a consistent conceptual theory to guide investigations of individual differences in creative ability. Building on robust theories and findings in creativity and individual differences research, our theory argues that creative ability, at a minimum, must include two facets: intelligence and expertise. So, the MTCA simply claims that whenever we do something creative, we use most of our cognitive abilities combined with relevant expertise to be creative. MTCA has important implications for creativity theory, measurement, and practice. However, the MTCA isn’t necessarily true; it is a minimal theory. We discuss and reject several objections to the MTCA.