Hate: toward a Four-Types Model

Drawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental history and intentional structure of hate, I obtain two variables: the replaceability/irreplaceability of the target and the determinacy/indeterminacy of the focus of concern. The combination of these variables generates the four-types model of hate, according to which hate comes in the following kinds: normative, ideological, retributive, and malicious.

When the World Breaks Down: A 3-Stage Existential Model of Nihilism in Schizophrenia

The existential crisis of nihilism in schizophrenia has been reported since the early days of psychiatry. Taking first-person accounts concerning nihilistic experiences of both the self and the world as vantage point, we aim to develop a dynamic existential model of the pathological development of existential nihilism. Since the phenomenology of such a crisis is intrinsically subjective, we especially take the immediate and pre-reflective first-person perspective’s (FPP) experience (instead of objectified symptoms and diagnoses) of schizophrenia into consideration. The hereby developed existential model consists of 3 conceptualized stages that are nested into each other, which defines what we mean by existential. At the same time, the model intrinsically converges with the phenomenological concept of the self-world structure notable inside our existential framework. Regarding the 3 individual stages, we suggest that the onset or first stage of nihilistic pathogenesis is reflected by phenomenological solipsism, that is, a general disruption of the FPP experience. Paradigmatically, this initial disruption contains the well-known crisis of common sense in schizophrenia. The following second stage of epistemological solipsism negatively affects all possible perspectives of experience, that is, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of subjectivity. Therefore, within the second stage, solipsism expands from a disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience (first stage) to a disruption of reflective experience and principal knowledge (second stage), as mirrored in abnormal epistemological limitations of principal knowledge. Finally, the experience of the annihilation of healthy self-consciousness into the ultimate collapse of the individual’s existence defines the third stage. The schizophrenic individual consequently loses her/his vital experience since the intentional structure of consciousness including any sense of reality breaks down. Such a descriptive-interpretative existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia may ultimately serve as input for future psychopathological investigations of nihilism in general, including, for instance, its manifestation in depression.

Category of compositions in the prayer

Linguistics of the turn of the XX – XXI centuries actively studies the religious functional style, which became possible due to changes in Russia’s sociopolitical situation. The subject of this research is the language of religious communication, individual religious genres, and stylistic system. The goal of this article lies in description of the compositional structure of the previously unstudied prayers, as well as in development of their classification. The research was conducted on 120 texts of prayers of the New Apostolic Christians created in the non-liturgical communicative situation. The specificity of creating prayers in this religious community consists in the fact that although each time the texts are written anew, thee are based on the canonical “Lord’s Prayer” , which corresponds to the constructive principle of religious style — proto-textuality. The method of categorical-textual analysis allows establishing that each of the created prayers has compositional structure, containing from one to three compositional blocks in its main part, which correlate with the three key intentions of the prayer — request, gratitude, and praise. The article offers a classification of the prayers based on the number of intentions included in the text, mono-intentional, bi-intentional, and poly-intentional compositional structures of the prayer text. It is determined that the basic compositional structure in the texts of the New Apostolic Christians is the bi-intentional structure, which contains the intentions of gratitude and requests in a strict order. The acquired results can be used in further research of the prayer texts in both, liturgical and non-liturgical communicative situations.

Modeling Long-Term Intentions and Narratives in Autonomous Agents

Across various fields it is argued that the self in part consists of an autobiographical self-narrative and that the self-narrative has an impact on agential behavior. Similarly, within action theory, it is claimed that the intentional structure of coherent long-term action is divided into a hierarchy of distal, proximal, and motor intentions. However, the concrete mechanisms for how narratives and distal intentions are generated and impact action is rarely fleshed out concretely. We here demonstrate how narratives and distal intentions can be generated within cognitive agents and how they can impact agential behavior over long time scales. We integrate narratives and distal intentions into the LIDA model, and demonstrate how they can guide agential action in a manner that is consistent with the Global Workspace Theory of consciousness. This paper serves both as an addition to the LIDA cognitive architecture and an elucidation of how narratives and distal intention emerge and play their role in cognition and action

A Systematic Reconstruction of Brentano’s Theory of Consciousness

In recent years, Brentano’s theory of consciousness has been systematically reassessed. The reconstruction that has received the most attention is the so-called identity reconstruction. It says that secondary consciousness and the mental phenomenon it is about are one and the same. Crucially, it has been claimed that this thesis is the only one which can make Brentano’s theory immune to what he considers the main threat to it, namely, the duplication of the primary object. In this paper, I argue that the identity reconstruction is untenable, and I defend an alternative, which I name the unity reconstruction. According to the unity reconstruction, secondary consciousness is a real part of the mental phenomenon it is about, and hence is distinct from it. I contend that this thesis does not in itself lead to the duplication of the primary object, and that what should be blamed is rather a controversial thesis about the intentional structure of secondary consciousness—a thesis which Brentano ultimately abandoned.

As Formas da Simpatia e o seu Papel na Compreensão das Vivências Alheias em Scheler

The objective is to describe the main features of the sympathy phenomenon from Max Scheler's phenomenology. The central problem is to show how sympathy shows itself as a privileged "place" for understanding the experiences of others, because it implies a psychic-affective unification with whom one sympathizes or welcomes. However, compassion and co-rejoicing cannot be understood as the apprehension of psychic contents unrelated to the reproduction of the feelings of the other, mistakenly equating sympathizing with affective contagion. Thus, first, some reasons and ways of transformations of anthropologies and historical consolidation of the modern ratio that led to such mistake are outlined. Then, after distinguishing the plural forms of sympathy, showing its law of internal reasoning, it is discussed in what sense sympathy is to suffer and to rejoice by spelling out its intentional structure. To know the other, however, is not only to unite affectionately with others, but the free decision, proper of a spiritual being, to take part in the opening of the personal being of others, to participate in their intentional acts. It follows, then, that sympathizing presupposes the supreme form of love. Palavras-chave : Feelings; sympathy; love; knowledge of each other.

Grundelemente einer Phänomenologie des Übersetzens

Although Husserl’s phenomenology constitutes one of the major sources of inspiration for modern hermeneutics and involves a vast and important philosophy of language, rigorous phenomenological approaches are rare within translation studies. In this paper, I attempt to carry out such phenomenological analysis. I base this analysis on Husserl’s phenomenology of language and its basic concepts. I shall then examine the fundamental mechanisms involved in what I call “translation consciousness” and I shall try to describe its intentional structure.

Ego Between Ethics and Cybernetics

The article attempts to clarify the problem of defining an action through ethical optics. Ethics is understood as a system of principles relevant to action. As Agamben has shown, the rules permit objectifying the ego and neutralizing the flow of life as forma vitae. From this perspective, the pragmatics of the subject is not merely a set of practices for self-management, where the most important task is complete control; it is instead strategies for the self-organization of a form of life through a rule which makes sustainability the main goal. The main difficulty in the pragmatics of the subject in this connection is dealing with akrasia. Akrasia is understood not as weakness of will but as heterogeneity in it, a lacuna or violation of the intentional structure of action in which the subject can both want and not want to act, or want to act in several directions at the same time in the sense introduced by Jon Elster. The article argues that the adaptation model of subject pragmatics, understood as a system of auto-references mediated by a rule is very similar to a cybernetic approach. If we compare Gregory Bateson’s The Cybernetics of “Self”: A Theory of Alcoholism and René Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, an unexpected convergence appears. Bateson explains the effectiveness and sustainability of self-management in Alcoholics Anonymous groups by their use of the cybernetic principles of feedback, complementarity, and communication with the external. The rules for guiding the mind that Descartes introduces in his Meditations can be seen as principles for the subject’s self-government that enable escape from akrasia between doubt and faith not as modes of thought but as modes of will. Cartesian deduction and justification of rules follow the path outlined by Bateson: complementarity, feedback, and establishing a relationship with the external. The concept of akrasia can elucidate the way in which self-management and Descartes’ cogito ethics in a sense anticipate cybernetic governance models. This connection also explains why the ethics of the cogito and the pragmatics of the subject have been the most enduring features in the theory of the subject and are still standing after the onslaught of intense criticism from its opponents.

ВПЛИВ СИТУАЦІЇ СПІЛЬНОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ НА МОВЛЕННЄВУ КОМУНІКАЦІЮ ДІТЕЙ

The article highlights the results of research on the problem of children's speech communication, which occurs in the process of interpersonal interaction: role-playing, sports games, productive and creative activities. It is concluded that the success of practical interaction and communication depends on the child's ability to express their own intentions in speech and understand the intentions of the partner. It was found that the initial and common element is the intentional aspect of the content of speech, the manifestation of the child's positive or negative intentional orientation. It is assumed that the study of the intentional structure of dialogues in the process of performing a common task will help to identify the intentional state of children, their current intentions, will reveal the interdependence of speech and practical actions of participants in joint activities.