Moral Value and Commercial Gain

This paper presents three theoretical accounts developed to assess the moral value and legal status of acts designed to promote commercial gain in the thought of major classical Muslim scholars. There has been an increased interest in Islamic commercial law and ethics in recent years. Much of the recent scholarship consists of practically inclined studies that tend to lump the Islamic tradition of evaluation of commerce under the principles of social justice and avoidance of harm. Our study of three selected scholars will reveal distinct approaches that are characteristic of classical Islamic ethical discussions: anchoring moral value in this world, attributing moral goodness to salvation in the next world, and finding a balance between these two approaches. Counterintuitively, we will see that the naturalistic view that ascribes moral values to things and actions was the most restrictive, whereas the dualistic model that focuses on salvation in the next world was markedly more permissive of commercial transactions.

Silence, Satire and Empathy: Reading Appupen’s Topoi in His Wordless Graphic Narratives

The projection of the incongruities of contemporary times through the frame of satire is a powerful instrument in the genre of comics and graphic narratives and in Indian graphic literature as well. Mendiburo-Seguel and Heintz (2020) explain eight Comic Style Markers (CSM) in Latin-American cultures, and satire, a “darker style”, is one of them. The paper aims to conceptualise how Appupen’s wordless graphic narratives Moonward: Stories from Halahala (2009), Legends of Halahala (2013), Aspyrus: A Dream of Halahala (2014) and The Snake and the Lotus: A Halahala Adventure (2018) register black satire against society, politics, religion, industrialization, consumerism, advertisement and so on and how they prove to play the role of “corrective humour” (Ruch and Heintz, 2016). This paper attempts to explore how the “author-artist’s” (Aldama, 2010) fantastical and dystopic graphic narratives, excoriate social and political issues to create a unique aesthetic of thoughtful critical writing in graphic mode, thereby collectively contributing to the interdisciplinary studies of fantasy and dystopia and helping to proliferate the genre of Indian Comics and graphic narratives as well. Moreover, as “satire had a moral goodness that was lacking in sarcasm and cynicism” (Ruch, Heintz, Platt, Wagner, and Proyer, 2018), this essay argues what kind of empathic feeling, perspective sharing and cognitive overlap Appupen cultivates in these four narratives and develops their moral, aesthetic and humane tenacity. The article discusses Appupen’s satire as a vehicle by which he prudently moulds empathy with the reader to convey the intrinsic values of the texts.

Neural Responses to Facial Attractiveness in the Judgments of Moral Goodness and Moral Beauty

The judgments of moral goodness and moral beauty objectively refer to the perception and evaluation of moral traits, which are generally influenced by facial attractiveness. For centuries, people have equated beauty with the possession of positive qualities, but it is not clear whether the association between beauty and positive qualities exerts a similarly implicit influence on people`s responses to moral goodness and moral beauty, how it affects those responses, and what is the neural basis for such an effect. The present study is the first to examine the neural responses to facial attractiveness in the judgments of moral goodness and moral beauty. We found that beautiful faces in both moral judgments activated the left ventral occipitotemporal cortices sensitive to the geometric configuration of the faces, demonstrating that both moral goodness and moral beauty required the automatic visual analysis of geometrical configuration of attractive faces. In addition, compared to beautiful faces during moral goodness judgment, beautiful faces during moral beauty judgment induced unique activity in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex and midline cortical structures involved in the emotional-valenced information about attractive faces. The opposite comparison elicited specific activity in the left superior temporal cortex and premotor area, which play a critical role in the recognition of facial identity. Our results demonstrated that the neural responses to facial attractiveness in the process of higher order moral decision-makings exhibits both task-general and task-specific characteristics. Our findings contribute to the understanding of the essence of the relationship between morality and aesthetics.

What is good is beautiful (and what isn’t, isn’t): How moral character affects perceived facial attractiveness

A well-documented “beauty-is-good” stereotype is expressed in the expectation that physically attractive people have more positive characteristics. Recent evidence also finds that unattractive faces are associated with negative character inferences. Is what is good (bad) also beautiful (ugly)? Whether this conflation of aesthetic and moral values is bidirectional is not known. This study tested the hypothesis that complementary “good-is-beautiful” and “bad-is-ugly” stereotypes bias aesthetic judgments. Using highly controlled face stimuli, this pre-registered study examined whether moral character influences perceptions of attractiveness for different ages and sexes of faces. Compared to faces paired with non-moral vignettes, those paired with prosocial vignettes were rated significantly more attractive, confident, and friendlier. The opposite pattern characterized faces paired with antisocial vignettes. A significant interaction between vignette type and the age of the face was detected for attractiveness. Moral transgressions affected attractiveness more negatively for younger than older faces. Sex-related differences were not detected. These results suggest information about moral character affects our judgments about facial attractiveness. Better people are considered more attractive. These findings suggest that beliefs about moral goodness and physical beauty influence each other bidirectionally.

The Effect of Incentives: The Value of Reputation

It is useful to model the temptation to act wrongly using the prisoner’s dilemma, one of the most important games in game theory. The prisoner’s dilemma appears to show that the pursuit of self-interest can paradoxically lead to situations in which everyone makes choices they know will undermine their self-interest. However, introducing the possibility of repeated, self-sorting prisoner’s dilemmas with reputation effects reveals something important about the connection between self-interest and morality: We have strong incentives not to cheat because in the long run, we do best by developing the reputation for being honest. However, unfortunately, this also introduces an incentive to exaggerate our moral goodness and to engage in moral grandstanding.

The moral judgment of unconditional honesty

Four main experiments (and six supplementary experiments, total N = 6970) document a preference for unconditional honesty: people believe it is more ethical for communicators to tell the truth without finding out the social consequences of doing so than to find out how their honesty affects others before communicating. However, people also believe that communicators should condition their decisions on the social consequences of truth-telling (and lie when truth-telling causes harm) when the consequences of truth-telling are known. We suggest that these seemingly inconsistent preferences are driven by the belief that moral actors should strive to avoid moral error more than they should strive to optimize moral goodness. This research deepens our understanding of people’s preferences for moral principles, sheds light on how information acquisition influences moral judgments, and explains how people can genuinely believe that honesty is the best policy, while also recognizing that lying is often ethical.

God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all.

God, Suffering, and the Value of Free Will

This book focuses on arguments from suffering against the existence of God and on a variety of issues concerning agency and value that they bring out. The central aim is to show the extent and power of arguments from evil. The book provides a close investigation of an under-defended claim at the heart of the major free-will-based responses to such arguments, namely that free will is sufficiently valuable to serve as the good, or to serve prominently among the goods, that provides a God-justifying reason for permitting evil in our world. Offering a fresh examination of traditional theodicies, it also develops an alternative line the author calls a divine intimacy theodicy. It makes an extended case for rejection of the position of skeptical theism. The book expands upon an argument from evil concerning a traditional doctrine of hell, which reveals a number of interesting issues concerning fault, agency, and blameworthiness. In response to recent work contending that the problem of evil is defanged since God’s baseline attitude toward human beings is indifference, the book defends the essential perfect moral goodness of God. Finally it takes up the question of whether or not it makes sense to live a religious life as an agnostic or as an atheist.