islamic fundamentalism
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2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rongina Narzary

Mohsin Hamid, one of the powerful voices to emerge from Pakistan engages with themes that go beyond the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 and portrays contemporary issues relevant to Pakistan. In the process, Hamid consciously performs the role of the mediator and attempts to explain his country to the readers. In his two novels, Moth Smoke and The Reluctant Fundamentalist Hamid not only represents modern-day Pakistan but also offer resistance to the association of Pakistan with terrorism thereby replicating the postcolonial tendency to “write back” and reclaim one’s identity. Furthermore, he offers a nuanced understanding of the hostilities that prevail between India and Pakistan. Fictional representations of Islam and Muslim identities by writers of Pakistani origin have received increased attention, especially in the post 9/11 political climate with its attendant reductive representations of Islamic fundamentalism. The ‘war on terror’ which has had the effect of equating Islam and Muslims with terrorism has become a dominant political narrative in Europe and the US over the last decade. It is such diffused representation of Muslim identity which has evoked criticism in the ‘orient’ and Hamid shines bright in this regard.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 734-746
Author(s):  
Yuriy M. Pochta

The article deals with the present-day causes of the reproduction of Islamist terrorism. The concepts of desecularization, hybrid wars, and a system-functional approach form the methodological basis of the research. Recognizing the failure of liberal explanations of the causes of Islamist terrorism, the author criticizes the liberal methodology, which is based on an essentialist explanation of Islam and Muslim civilization and attributes a fixed set of qualities to Islam as an ontological evil, a barbarism hostile to Western civilization. The paper presents a viewpoint based on the approaches proposed by representatives of left-wing radical thought, postmodernism and neo-Marxism. It is concluded that the politicization of Islam, including its radical interpretations, is due not to the militant unchanging nature of Islam, but to the crisis of a number of Muslim societies. The Muslim worlds reaction to Western globalism is also an attempt to implement its own global political projects as a response of Islamic fundamentalism to the challenge of Western democratic fundamentalism. The author analyzes the phenomenon of hybrid wars as a form of armed violence that the Western world uses to restore order in its global empire. The connection between hybrid wars and the concept of a just war is shown, as well as the relevance of Islamist terrorism as an element of the system of hybrid wars. Islamist terrorism and counterterrorism are present in all hybrid wars waged in the Muslim world. This is manifested both in military actions on the ground, and in information warfare, as well as in virtual space. The market for terrorist and counterterrorist services inherent in hybrid wars and the place of Islamist terrorism in it are examined. Financial relations bind the participants in terrorist activities, including the customer, sponsor, mediator, organizer, informant, and performer. It is concluded that Islamist terrorism is not the activity of individual fanatics or a manifestation of the militant nature of Islam, but is produced by the conflict system of contemporary international relations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 310-320
Author(s):  
José Maurício Álvarez

Abstract The familiar face of empires is external intervention as opposed to local culture. We follow Michel Onfray's thesis about the oracular illusion when one more individual or country tries to avoid the fulfillment of a nefarious prediction, which materializes as a catastrophe. Algeria conquered in 1830 was incorporated into French territory. In 1954 the FLN rebelled, and in 1961, General Charles de Gaulle negotiated the independence of Algeria, causing the disastrous departure of 750,000 French settlers and the death of French supporters. From 1962 to 2021, the withdrawals of imperial powers from their colonies,  France from Algeria, the United States in Afghanistan, resulted in catastrophes and uncertainties. The imperial power of the United States aimed to defeat its bipolar antagonist, the USSR when it invaded Afghanistan. They conducted an inconsequential policy to beat their rival, arming and financing the Taliban's victorious resistance, the freedom fighters. The oracular illusion led the United States to support the future antagonist, Islamic fundamentalism, destined for the world caliphate. After the departure of the USSR, American power despised the Taliban, who harbored al Qaeda, leading to 9/11. In 2001 the United States invaded Afghanistan and abandoned it after 20 years of war without the precaution of obtaining plans or safeguards for the government in Kabul. After the disastrous retreat, the victorious Taliban demonstrated, like the FLN in Algeria, the fulfillment of the oracular illusion.


2021 ◽  
pp. 50-68
Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan

Today, there is a threatening divide between state and societies in Sahelian countries. Societies have become increasingly diversified and are permeated by growing divisions. In contrast, the states are relatively standardized. They are partly a legacy of the colonial legacy of the despotic state, but they also developed some original traits—for example, a very specific bureaucratic culture and a quasi-private monopolization by a business-oriented political elite. In a context of aid dependency and elite capture, Sahelian states are today confronted with widespread distrust on the part of their citizens and a serious crisis in relation to the delivery of state services. The social divide, the bias of development aid, the weakness of the political elites, and the failure of electoral democracy have paved the way for the rise of anti-Western and anti-state Islamic fundamentalism, and for politico-religious and politico-ethnic entrepreneurs.


Author(s):  
Oleksiy Khalapsis ◽  
Oleh Poplavskyi ◽  
Oleh Levin

The aim of the article is to determine the specifics of political processes related to decommunization in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan), to study the variability of the main vectors of post-Soviet transformations of the respective societies. Reforms in Kazakhstan could theoretically pave the way for civil society, but so far they are more of an imitation. Uzbekistan is distinguished by the state's struggle against Islamic fundamentalism, which gave rise to Islam Karimov to pursue a tough internal policy. Democratization shifts after his death, but the prospects and irreversibility of these reforms are now highly questionable. Kyrgyzstan is the only society in which civil protest has real force, but the presence of clan-patriarchal system, ethnic conflicts, the tendency to use force and the weakness of the central government do not allow building a civil society in this country. Turkmenistan is characterized by boundless authoritarianism, and Tajikistan is the only country that has survived a fierce civil war in which the Islamic religion is most powerful. Each of the five Central Asian states has its own unique characteristics, but none of them has built a civil and democratic society, and the transformation cause of political regimes into democracies remains at the level of rhetoric. In these countries, political alterations have affected mainly the area of institutions, without changing the semi-feudal procedures and practices, and the process of democratization itself has been limited to pseudo-reforms. Civilizational and local-cultural features make the values of civil society unattractive not only for political elites, but also for the majority of the population, thus in the near future we can hardly expect significant progress in this direction. Moreover, Central Asian countries are under the influence of three powerful regional leaders –Russia, China and Iran – whose cultural and historical values are far from Western liberal-democratic ones. The situation is further complicated by the factor of Islamic fundamentalism, which will almost certainly intensify after the Taliban's victory in Afghanistan.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 191-203
Author(s):  
Mikko Salmela ◽  
Tereza Capelos

<em>Ressentiment </em>is central for understanding the psychological foundations of reactionary politics, right-wing populism, Islamic fundamentalism, and radicalism. In this article we theorise <em>ressentiment </em>as an emotional mechanism which, reinforcing a morally superior sense of victimhood, expedites two parallel transvaluation processes: What was once desired or valued, yet unattainable, is reassessed as something undesirable and rotten, and one’s own self from being inferior, a loser, is reassessed as being noble and superior. We establish negative emotions of envy, shame, and inefficacious anger as the main triggers of <em>ressentiment</em>, with their associated feelings of inferiority and impotence, which target the vulnerable self. We identify the outcomes of <em>ressentiment </em>as other-directed negative emotions of resentment, indignation, and hatred, reinforced and validated by social sharing. We map the psychological structure of <em>ressentiment </em>in four stages, each employing idiosyncratic defences that depend on the ego-strength of the individual to deliver the transvaluation of the self and its values, and finally detail how social sharing consolidates the outcome emotions, values, and identities in <em>ressentiment</em> through shallow twinship bonds with like-minded peers. Our interdisciplinary theoretical account integrates classic philosophical scholarship of <em>ressentiment</em> and its contemporary proponents in philosophy and sociology, which highlight envy as the prime driver of <em>ressentiment</em>; it also considers the sociological approaches that focus on the repression and transmutation of shame and its social consequences, as well as the psychoanalytic scholarship on psychic defences and political psychology models on the emotionality of decision-making. We conclude the article by elaborating the political implications of <em>ressentiment</em> as the emotional mechanism of grievance politics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-114
Author(s):  
Alessandra Vitullo

Abstract Online radical Islam is a topic widely studied by scholars and notoriously discussed among non- experts as well (Awan, 2007; Von Behr et al. 2013; Gray & Head 2009). Because of its intrinsic characteristics (i.e. accessibility, anonymity, or users’ identity dissimulation), the internet has always been a useful tool for propagandists of Islamic fundamentalism (Fighel, 2007; Stenersen, 2008; Koehler, 2014). However, in the last decade, studies have questioned the real importance and magnitude of Islamic radicalization online (Gill et al., 2017). In fact, while scholars were focused on observing digital Islamic radicalization, a galaxy of new forms of extremism was growing online (Silva et al., 2017; Roversi, 2008) that no longer made Islam an exceptional case study. Today, Muslim people are one of the groups most aggressively targeted by extremist, intolerant, violent, and radical discourses (Elahi & Khan, 2017; Amnesty International, 2019). Anti-Muslim hate speech has spread online throughout Europe and the United States, reinforced by the propaganda and political discourse of populist right-wing parties (Hafez, 2014; Bakali 2016). This paper introduces some large-scale action-research projects developed in Europe and Italy in the last three years (2016–2019) and aims to reconstruct the most updated Islamophobia state of the art in terms of numbers, characteristics, and phenomenology from the offline to the online context.


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