mind body problem
Recently Published Documents


TOTAL DOCUMENTS

624
(FIVE YEARS 74)

H-INDEX

19
(FIVE YEARS 1)

Author(s):  
Jon Mills

Abstract In our dialogues over the nature of archetypes, essence, psyche, and world, I further respond to Erik Goodwyn’s recent foray into establishing an ontological position that not only answers to the mind-body problem, but further locates the source of Psyche on a cosmic plane. His impressive attempt to launch a neo-Jungian metaphysics is based on the principle of cosmic panpsychism that bridges both the internal parameters of archetypal process and their emergence in consciousness and the external world conditioned by a psychic universe. Here I explore the ontology of experience, mind, matter, metaphysical realism, and critique Goodwyn’s turn to Neoplatonism. The result is a potentially compatible theory of mind and reality that grounds archetypal theory in onto-phenomenology, metaphysics, and bioscience, hence facilitating new directions in analytical psychology.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda A. W. Brakel

Given that disparate mind/body views have interfered with interdisciplinary research in psychoanalysis and neuroscience, the mind/body problem itself is explored here. Adding a philosophy of mind framework, problems for both dualists and physicalists are presented, along with essential concepts including: independent mental causation, emergence, and multiple realization. To address some of these issues in a new light, this article advances an original mind/body account—Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism (DiCoToP). Next, puzzles DiCoTop reveals, psychoanalytic problems it solves, and some empirical evidence accrued for views consistent with DiCoToP are presented. In closing, this piece challenges/appeals for neuroscience research to gain evidence for (or against) the DiCoToP view.


Author(s):  
DANIEL GIBERMAN

Abstract The problem of many-over-one asks how it can be that many properties are ever instantiated by one object. A putative solution might, for example, claim that the properties are appropriately bundled, or somehow tied to a bare particular. In this essay, the author argues that, surprisingly, an extant candidate solution to this problem is at the same time an independently developed candidate solution to the mind-body problem. Specifically, what is argued here to be the best version of the relata-specific bundle theory—the thesis that each instance of compresence has a special intrinsic nature in virtue of which it necessarily bundles its specific bundle-ees—is also a species of Russellian monism, labeled by David Chalmers as ‘constitutive Russellian panprotopsychism’. The upshot of this connection is significant for the metaphysics of the mind-body problem: a credible theory of property instantiation turns out to have a built-in account of how consciousness is grounded in certain (broadly) physical systems.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 116-127
Author(s):  
Adam Skowron ◽  
Janusz Sytnik-Czetwertyński

The mind-body problem is one of the most difficult challenges of modern science. An interesting attempt at providing a reductionist model of reality was made in the 18th century by Ruder Josip Bošković. The attractiveness of this model lies in the fact that it does not readily fit into any of the above categorizations. Although frequently associated with the third - a fact that laid it open to violent criticism, causing the philosopher serious trouble - it stands apart as an independent theory. For, according to Bošković, reality is neither material nor spiritual. Nor is it a union of both of these orders.


2021 ◽  
pp. 131-138
Author(s):  
Mariusz Stanowski

Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miklós Márton

AbstractIn this paper I give an overview of the recent developments in the phenomenalism – intentionalism debate and try to show that the proposed solutions of neither sides are satisfying. The claims and arguments of the two parties are rather vague and attribute to intentional and phenomenal properties either a too weak or a too strong relationship: too weak in the sense that they establish only mere coexistence, or too strong in the sense that they attribute some a priori conceptual connection to intentional and phenomenal properties. I also compare these theories to other theories developed for solving the mind–body problem and argue that these former are much less elaborated. In the end of the paper I try to explain that all of this is not just a contingent feature of the topic, but has deep conceptual roots: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness are two quite distinct concepts on two quite distinct levels.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document