The influence of international offshore jurisdictions on the pricing strategy

The article analyzes the causes of offshore jurisdictions and identifies the effects of offshore on national economies. An analysis of the implementation of export-import operations carried out by offshore companies in order to influence the pricing process. The pricing mechanism with affiliates within offshore jurisdictions was presented. It was substantiated the role of offshore banks in the implementation of the pricing mechanism. It was presented the pricing mechanisms within offshore jurisdictions. It has been made an analysis of the impact of transfer pricing within offshore jurisdictions. It was substantiated the economic mechanism of pricing. The international experience of regulation of offshore jurisdictions and the system of controlling the operations of affiliates was analyzed. It was substantiated the mechanisms of functioning of offshore zones and companies operating in offshore jurisdictions. The relationship between agreements concluded within offshore jurisdictions in the following areas is established and substantiated: the agreement is concluded between two independent companies in case of underpricing; the agreement is concluded between the companies connected with the capital relations (affiliated companies) at understatement of the price; agreements between two independent companies in case of overpricing; agreements between affiliated companies in case of overpricing. It was justified the use of the transfer pricing mechanism within offshore jurisdictions. Transfer prices allow you to withdraw capital from the country, as well as hide the profits of companies from taxation. The following ways of minimizing taxation are systematized: registration of a company that concentrates profits in a jurisdiction with lower taxation; concentration of profits in companies that are unprofitable according to management accounting; the use of front companies as sales companies in which profits are concentrated; non-payment of taxes as a result of illegal liquidation of the enterprise - the taxpayer, where the profit is concentrated. The basis of tax minimization is the use in the transaction of a price that deviates from the market.

Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms

Ridesharing platforms have radically changed the way people get around in urban areas, but there remain challenges undercutting the mission of “making transportation as reliable as running water.” A particular concern is that drivers strategize: calling riders to find out their destinations and canceling trips that are not worthwhile, declining trips and chasing surge prices in neighboring areas, and going off-line before large events will end in anticipation of a price increase. In this work, we show that such strategic behaviors are symptoms of inefficiencies in the pricing and dispatching rules governing today's platforms. We propose the Spatio-Temporal Pricing mechanism, which solves for the welfare-optimal matching of drivers to trips, and sets prices that are appropriately smooth in both space and time such that the best thing for drivers to do is accept any proposed trip dispatch. This demonstrates that ridesharing platforms can succeed in optimally orchestrating trips and providing reliable transpiration for riders, while still leaving drivers with the flexibility to decide how to work.

Gambling Strategies and Prize-Pricing Recommendation in Sports Multi-Bets

A sports multi-bet is a bet on the results of a set of N games. One type of multi-bet offered by the Israeli government is WINNER 16, where participants guess the results of a set of 16 soccer games. The prizes in WINNER 16 are determined by the accumulated profit in previous rounds, and are split among all winning forms. When the reward increases beyond a certain threshold, a profitable strategy can be devised. Here, we present a machine-learning algorithm scheme to play WINNER 16. Our proposed algorithm is marginally profitable on average in a range of hyper-parameters, indicating inefficiencies in this game. To make a better prize-pricing mechanism we suggest a generalization of the single-bet approach. We studied the expected profit and risk of WINNER 16 after applying our suggestion. Our proposal can make the game more fair and more appealing without reducing the profitability.

Task Price Prediction Based on Clustering and DNN in Crowdsensing

With the popularization of mobile devices and the development of wireless networks, crowdsensing is devoted to providing universal Internet of Things services. A reasonable task pricing mechanism can not only motivate more users to participate in the sensing task but also help the benign development of crowdsensing platform, so it has gradually become a research hotspot in the field of crowdsensing. Aiming at the common problems of insufficient analysis of task pricing rules and large deviations of pricing prediction models, a task price prediction method based on clustering and DNN is proposed. Using the real historical trade price set as the data source, natural grouping and taxonomic description of task price are realized by exploring sensing task pricing law with complex constraint relation using two-step clustering analysis. On the basis of the above, the price interval prediction model based on DNN is implemented. The experimental results show that the predicting accuracy of the pricing mechanism is higher than 82.7%.