Harnessed Lightning: How the Chinese Military is Adopting Artificial Intelligence

This report examines nearly 350 artificial intelligence-related equipment contracts awarded by the People’s Liberation Army and state-owned defense enterprises in 2020 to assess how the Chinese military is adopting AI. The report identifies China’s key AI defense industry suppliers, highlights gaps in U.S. export control policies, and contextualizes the PLA’s AI investments within China’s broader strategy to compete militarily with the United States.

Laser Challenge of China

Chinese President Xi Jinping, at a meeting with delegates of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) during the last session of the National People's Congress (NPC), demanded the introduction of scientific discoveries and innovative technologies in the army. Xi Jinping noted that new technologies are the key to modernizing the Armed Forces. The Chinese leader discussed with the military how to achieve the goals set in the field of national defense and army development and the implementation of the 13th five-year plan for the development of the armed forces. It is safe to say that Laser Weapons (LW) are on the agenda of China/1/

Robot Hacking Games: China’s Competitions to Automate the Software Vulnerability Lifecycle

Software vulnerability discovery, patching, and exploitation—collectively known as the vulnerability lifecycle—is time consuming and labor intensive. Automating the process could significantly improve software security and offensive hacking. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Cyber Grand Challenge supported teams of researchers from 2014 to 2016 that worked to create these tools. China took notice. In 2017, China hosted its first Robot Hacking Game, seeking to automate the software vulnerability lifecycle. Since then, China has hosted seven such competitions and the People’s Liberation Army has increased its role in hosting the games.

China’s National Cybersecurity Center: A Base for Military-Civil Fusion in the Cyber Domain

China’s National Cybersecurity Center (NCC) resides on a 40 km2 plot in Wuhan. As one indication of its significance, the Chinese Communist Party’s highest-ranking members have an oversight committee for the facility. Over the next decade, the NCC will provide the talent, innovation, and indigenization of cyber capabilities that China’s Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Public Security, and People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force hacking teams lack. Though still under construction, the NCC’s first class of graduates will cross the stage in June 2022.

Introduction

Chinese diplomats play a crucial role as the face of the world’s second largest economy. They have become more assertive and even aggressive in recent years, leading some to dub them “wolf warriors.” This chapter explains how their recent behavior has deep roots in China’s political system, especially the desire of the PRC’s founding leaders to model the country’s diplomatic corps on the People’s Liberation Army. “Wolf warrior” behavior represents a recurring response to political tensions at home, which has manifested itself again and again during the history of the PRC. The chapter also introduces the book’s source base of the memoirs of more than a hundred retired diplomats and dozens of interviews.

Long-term outcomes of Boston keratoprosthesis type I: the Chinese People’s Liberation Army General Hospital experience

PurposeTo report the long-term outcomes of Boston keratoprosthesis type I (B-KPro type I) implantation in the management of severe ocular surface disorders.MethodsRetrospective case series. Patients who underwent B-KPro type I implantation at the People’s Liberation Army General Hospital were enrolled between March 2011 and September 2019. Data regarding visual acuity (VA), B-KPro type I retention and postoperative complications were recorded and analysed.ResultsA total of 103 eyes of 100 patients who underwent B-KPro type I implantation were included. The main indications were chemical burn (59.2%), ocular trauma (25.2%), herpetic keratitis (11.7%) and autoimmune diseases (3.9%). The percentage of eyes with postoperative VA of 10/200 or better was 82.7% at 6 months, 82.8% at 12 months, 77.9% at 2 years, 72.4% at 3 years, 71.1% at 4 years, 69.4% at 5 years, 58.9% at 6 years, 56.8% at 7 years and 42.9% at 8 years. Preoperatively, 8.7% eyes were diagnosed with new-onset glaucoma. Retroprosthetic membrane formation occurred in 19.4% eye. Corneal melting occurred in 18.4% eyes. Sterile vitritis was diagnosed in 4.9% eyes and infectious endophthalmitis in 2.9% eyes. Retinal detachment occurred in 0.9% eyes.ConclusionsIn a Chinese patient group, B-KPro type I is a viable option for treating severe ocular surface disorders in eyes where conventional keratoplasty would have a poor prognosis, especially in patients with chemical and thermal burns. Improved visual outcomes and high retention rate can be achieved and maintained in most cases.

Beijing Intervenes

This chapter assesses how, by the late spring of 1968, the Xuhai region stood out as particularly problematic. Uncontrolled factional warfare continued despite redoubled efforts by the Xuzhou military authorities to reconcile the warring parties. Eventually, the Xuhai problem came to the attention of central authorities, who were engaged in a concerted effort to re-establish some form of stable political order by the end of the year. They would directly intervene in the region in late May of 1968, ordering all of the principals involved to attend a Xuhai Study Class (Xuhai xuexi ban) in Beijing. The top faction leaders and military officers from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and People's Armed Department (PAD) in Xuzhou, Lianyungang, and the eight counties in Xuzhou Prefecture were summoned to the capital. However, the Beijing authorities proved especially uninterested in delving into the complicated cross-accusations of the two sides in an insignificant place like Feng County. The strategies of the two sides suggested from the outset that the Xuhai Study Class would be unlikely to resolve anything and might even have the adverse effect of stimulating a new round of factional violence. This is in fact what happened, remarkably, after a year of fruitless negotiations in the nation's capital.

Enter the Army

This chapter examines how, when the People's Armed Department (PAD) took control of Feng County, factional rivalries in the county were still ill defined, and rebels competed to be the loudest and most militant in denouncing the party secretary and other top county leaders. After the PAD deposed the county's civilian leaders, local rebels began to align themselves for and against the PAD, sharpening the tensions between Paolian and the PAD. The intervention of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops dispatched from Xuzhou sharpened and broadened the emerging factional divisions, making them even more difficult to resolve. The PLA's growing support for Paolian and formation of a “great alliance committee” brought two rebel groups of junior county cadres into an alliance while excluding the vociferously anti-Paolian cadre rebels. This drove a wedge between the two groups of county-level cadres, one that deepened when Paolian later merged with supportive cadre rebels in a large new rebel alliance under PLA protection. Senior county officials also split, with most of them forming an affiliation with either Paolian or Liansi. Whatever the personal motives for their choice of factions, it clearly had the effect of offering protection from attacks by the other mass factions. Cadres in rural communes, however, almost uniformly stood on the side of Liansi.

The Chinese Armed Forces and the Challenges of Globalization

How did the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) react to the securitization act initiated by the civilian leadership? This chapter shows that the PLA was relatively hesitant to accept a more inclusive understanding of security beyond traditional territorial defense, and therefore of a broader role for itself in China’s peacetime foreign policy. The PLA’s approach to non-traditional missions was similar to that of other countries’ armed forces, as they did not look favorably on so-called interventionist uses of force. It was in the aftermath of the 2011 Libyan crisis that the position of the PLA changed in an unequivocal way and the soldiers’ attitude towards the expansion of their peacetime portfolio became very similar to that of the civilians. While the soldiers’ natural desire to contribute to the security of the people played an important role in this process, it is important to emphasize how crucial the establishment of a causal link between non-traditional security threats and inter-state conflict was in the debate within the PLA.