Logics with Multiteam Semantics

Team semantics is the mathematical basis of modern logics of dependence and independence. In contrast to classical Tarski semantics, a formula is evaluated not for a single assignment of values to the free variables, but on a set of such assignments, called a team. Team semantics is appropriate for a purely logical understanding of dependency notions, where only the presence or absence of data matters, but being based on sets, it does not take into account multiple occurrences of data values. It is therefore insufficient in scenarios where such multiplicities matter, in particular for reasoning about probabilities and statistical independencies. Therefore, an extension from teams to multiteams (i.e. multisets of assignments) has been proposed by several authors. In this paper we aim at a systematic development of logics of dependence and independence based on multiteam semantics. We study atomic dependency properties of finite multiteams and discuss the appropriate meaning of logical operators to extend the atomic dependencies to full-fledged logics for reasoning about dependence properties in a multiteam setting. We explore properties and expressive power of a wide spectrum of different multiteam logics and compare them to second-order logic and to logics with team semantics. In many cases the results resemble what is known in team semantics, but there are also interesting differences. While in team semantics, the combination of inclusion and exclusion dependencies leads to a logic with the full power of both independence logic and existential second-order logic, independence properties of multiteams are not definable by any combination of properties that are downwards closed or union closed and thus are strictly more powerful than inclusion-exclusion logic. We also study the relationship of logics with multiteam semantics with existential second-order logic for a specific class of metafinite structures. It turns out that inclusion-exclusion logic can be characterised in a precise sense by the Presburger fragment of this logic, but for capturing independence, we need to go beyond it and add some form of multiplication. Finally, we also consider multiteams with weights in the reals and study the expressive power of formulae by means of topological properties.

On the Union Closed Fragment of Existential Second-Order Logic and Logics with Team Semantics

We present syntactic characterisations for the union closed fragments of existential second-order logic and of logics with team semantics. Since union closure is a semantical and undecidable property, the normal form we introduce enables the handling and provides a better understanding of this fragment. We also introduce inclusion-exclusion games that turn out to be precisely the corresponding model-checking games. These games are not only interesting in their own right, but they also are a key factor towards building a bridge between the semantic and syntactic fragments. On the level of logics with team semantics we additionally present restrictions of inclusion-exclusion logic to capture the union closed fragment. Moreover, we define a team based atom that when adding it to first-order logic also precisely captures the union closed fragment of existential second-order logic which answers an open question by Galliani and Hella.

Team Semantics for Interventionist Counterfactuals: Observations vs. Interventions

Team semantics is a highly general framework for logics which describe dependencies and independencies among variables. Typically, the (in)dependencies considered in this context are properties of sets of configurations or data records. We show how team semantics can be further generalized to support languages for the discussion of interventionist counterfactuals and causal dependencies, such as those that arise in manipulationist theories of causation (Pearl, Hitchcock, Woodward, among others). We show that the “causal teams” we introduce in the present paper can be used for modelling some classical counterfactual scenarios which are not captured by the usual causal models. We then analyse the basic properties of our counterfactual languages and discuss extensively the differences with respect to the Lewisian tradition.

Indefinites, Skolem Functions, and Arbitrary Objects

In this chapter I will look at the semantic analysis of indefinites in English, and their treatment in the framework of Dynamic Logic, choice functions (epsilon terms), and Kit Fine’s arbitrary objects. In the end I will make some comparative remarks about the latter and the account in terms of Skolem functions that Fine criticized, and propose an alternative framework (team semantics).

Polyteam semantics

Team semantics is the mathematical framework of modern logics of dependence and independence in which formulae are interpreted by sets of assignments (teams) instead of single assignments as in first-order logic. In order to deepen the fruitful interplay between team semantics and database dependency theory, we define Polyteam Semantics in which formulae are evaluated over a family of teams. We begin by defining a novel polyteam variant of dependence atoms and give a finite axiomatization for the associated implication problem. We relate polyteam semantics to team semantics and investigate in which cases logics over the former can be simulated by logics over the latter. We also characterize the expressive power of poly-dependence logic by properties of polyteams that are downwards closed and definable in existential second-order logic ($\textsf{ESO}$). The analogous result is shown to hold for poly-independence logic and all $\textsf{ESO}$-definable properties. We also relate poly-inclusion logic to greatest fixed point logic.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT GENERALIZED QUANTIFIERS IN LOGICS OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION

We analyse the two definitions of generalized quantifiers for logics of dependence and independence that have been proposed by F. Engström, comparing them with a more general, higher order definition of team quantifier. We show that Engström’s definitions (and other quantifiers from the literature) can be identified, by means of appropriate lifts, with special classes of team quantifiers. We point out that the new team quantifiers express a quantitative and a qualitative component, while Engström’s quantifiers only range over the latter. We further argue that Engström’s definitions are just embeddings of the first-order generalized quantifiers into team semantics, and fail to capture an adequate notion of team-theoretical generalized quantifier, save for the special cases in which the quantifiers are applied to flat formulas. We also raise several doubts concerning the meaningfulness of the monotone/nonmonotone distinction in this context. In the appendix we develop some proof theory for Engström’s quantifiers.