“Fat Cats on Golden Parachutes” – about an Idiom Derived from the Language of Politics and its Modifications

Due to the influence of the language of politics, the noun phrase, tłuste koty, has become established in modern Polish language. As the research material proves, the idiom fat cats has a negative connotation in the Polish language. Most often, it refers to rich people associated with business, as well as politicians and people in power, such as legislative, executive and judicial. The analysed texts provide many modifications of the expression under analysis, e.g., wypasione pisowskie tłuste koty, tłuste koty w sutannach, tłuste koty nadziane ośmiorniczkami, tłuste koty na złotych spadochronach, lejące krokodyle łzy podczas ucieczki z pogromu kociego na Wall Street, najtłustszy i wredny kot, okrąglutki, milutki, taki kotek tłuściutki. The most important function of modification is to express a critical opinion about people in the category of fatty cats. Through modifications, it is emphasized that the earnings of fatty cats are indecently high, often unreasonable and undeserved. Sharp social opposition causes financiers and politicians to avoid being responsible for their mistakes, for dishonesty. Fat cats are also accused of greed.

(AB)USE OF GOLDEN PARACHUTES IN STATE-OWNED COMPANIES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Golden parachutes represent one of the preventive defence antitakeover measures based on which contracts are concluded with the engagement of team of managers of the target company, promising them the payment of profitable compensation in case of occurrence of transactions related to takeover of control (purchase of a certain percentage of shares or direct offer to shareholders for a certain percentage of company shares). Contract rights called the golden parachutes are activated by the creation of one or more alternative events, or "triggers." (Un)intentional incorrect application of the golden parachutes may have not only significant negative consequences on the future performance of companies, but it can also deter potential investors from the decision to invest their capital in companies that have entered into such agreements with the engaged team of managers. Numerous cases of incorrect application of the golden parachutes can be found in the former socialist countries, as well as in the countries that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

Leaders’ Timely Succession: Neither Term Limits nor “Golden Parachutes,” Rather Periodic Tests of Trust Ascendance

Successful leaders tend to reach a dysfunction phase and to become conservative self-serving oligarchic. Polities and large organizations try to prevent this by term limits despite many drawbacks, while corporations use “Golden Parachutes,” a costly measure with major drawbacks as well. Despite much research, the timely succession of leaders in large organizations remains a recalcitrant problem demanding a solution. A review of current solutions points to the plausible use of intangible rewards rather than tangible ones by offering leaders possibility of multiple terms with each reelection requiring a higher majority in a proper constituency. This will reward leaders by plausible tenure prolongation, prestigious higher majority reelection, and plausible creative innovation due to long time horizon, while barring dysfunctional oligarchic continuity. Suggestions for practicing this solution and for further study of the problems it entails are offered.

Inter-Branch Analogy in the Practice of Overcoming Gaps in the Legal Regulation of "Golden Parachute" Payments

The author of the article explains the advantages of using the method of inter-branch analogy and the use of established civil-law mechanisms to govern unsettled labor relations associated with the need to exercise judicial control over the amount of compensation paid for early dismissal to chief executive officers, their deputies, chief accountants of organizations in cases when dismissal occurs in the absence of any wrongdoing on behalf of an employee due to the change of ownership of the legal entity property or individuals controlling the legal entity. The author argues that lack of clear regulatory criteria applicable to determine the limits of discretion to establish the amount of such payments, legal uncertainty with respect of prior approval necessity and possibility of subsequent challenge of "golden parachutes" agreements on behalf of the beneficiaries of the organization constitute the most significant legal gap in the field in question. Due to the fact that a high degree of similarity was established with respect of the regime of transactions and labor agreements of top managers with regard to "golden parachutes" arrangements and a significant legal similarity was revealed between "golden parachutes" and civil law compensations paid to the creditor when the debtor exercised the right to unilaterally refuse to fulfill of the obligation, the author insists on doctrinal support for the application of rules applied to challenge major transactions and (or) interested party transactions to labor "golden parachutes" agreements, as well as the application of the mechanism of judicial reduction of abusive civil-law compensation to labor disputes in question.

Golden Parachutes

After the military topples a dictator in a democratic coup, the coup makers supervise a transition process to democracy during which they remain in charge for a temporary period. After they transfer power to civilians, the coup makers’ bargaining powers are greatly reduced and their future is subject to the whims of fickle civilian politicians. Coup makers may therefore use the window of opportunity their temporary rule presents to protect their interests in the future democratic state. Militaries attempt to protect their interests using three primary methods: direct, institutional, and procedural. This chapter discusses these methods and analyzes their consequences.

A new broom

Rival management teams compete in the market for corporate control for the right to manage shareholders’ assets. The benefit that shareholders receive from this competition depends on the strength of the board of directors. The board affects the outcome directly due to its role during the takeover process and indirectly due to its role beforehand when it specifies the golden parachutes that the incumbent management team receives when a change in management occurs. This chapter uses the takeover of Anheuser-Busch by the global brewer InBev, and the sweeping changes that followed, to introduce the market for corporate control. It explains how a firm’s shareholders can benefit from performance improvements made well after they have sold their shares, as well as how they can benefit even if a takeover never takes place.