Are smart contracts too smart for Supply Chain 4.0? A blockchain framework to mitigate challenges

PurposeSmart contracts are self-executing computer programmes that have the potential to be used in several applications instead of traditional written contracts. With the recent rise of smart systems (e.g. Internet of things) and digital platforms (e.g. blockchain), smart contracts are gaining high interest in both business and academia. In this work, a framework for smart contracts was proposed with using reputation as the system currency, and conducts currency mining through fulfilling the physical commitments that are agreed upon.Design/methodology/approachA game theory model is developed to represent the proposed system, and then a system dynamics simulator is used to check the response of the blockchain with different sizes.FindingsThe numerical results showed that the proposed system could identify the takeover attacks and protect the blockchain from being controlled by an outsider. Another important finding is that careful setting of the maximum currency amount can improve the scalability of the blockchain and prevent the currency inflation.Research limitations/implicationsThis work is proposed as a conceptual framework for supply chain 4.0. Future work will be dedicated to implement and experiment the proposed framework for other characteristics that may be encountered in the context of supply chain 4.0, such as different suppliers' tiers, different customer typologies and smart logistics applications, which may reveal other challenges and provide additional interesting insights.Practical implicationsBy using the proposed framework, smart contracts and blockchains can be implemented to handle many issues in the context of operations and supply chain 4.0, especially in times of turbulence such as the COVID-19 global pandemic crisis.Originality/valueThis work emphasizes that smart contracts are not too smart to be applied in the context of supply chain 4.0. The proposed framework of smart contracts is expected to serve supply chain 4.0 by automating the knowledge work and enabling scenario planning through the game theory model. It will also improve online transparency and order processing in real-time through secured multitier connectivity. This can be applied in global supply chain functions backed with digitization, notably during the time of the pandemic, in which e-commerce and online shopping have changed the rules of the game.

The Mythical Lines of Code Metric

Using the lines of code (LOC) metric in software project management can be a financial moral hazard to an organization. This is especially true for upper management who handles an organizational budget and strategic plan. Software project managers have their own budgets. However, if they fail to meet the budget, the organization's cash flow, rather than the project manager's personal cash flow, will suffer. This chapter will discuss the practice of software project management, the field of software metrics, game theory, and the game theory issue of moral hazard. It will demonstrate why using LOC as a metric can present a moral hazard to senior management and an organization.

A two-sided gaming model for large-scale stable matching in sharing economy based on the probabilistic linguistic term sets

Sharing economy is significant for economic development, stable matching plays an essential role in sharing economy, but the large-scale sharing platform increases the difficulties of stable matching. We proposed a two-sided gaming model based on probabilistic linguistic term sets to address the problem. Firstly, in previous studies, the mutual assessment is used to obtain the preferences of individuals in large-scale matching, but the procedure is time-consuming. We use probabilistic linguistic term sets to present the preferences based on the historical data instead of time-consuming assessment. Then, to generate the satisfaction based on the preference, we regard the similarity between the expected preferences and actual preferences as the satisfaction. Considering the distribution features of probabilistic linguistic term sets, we design a shape-distance-based method to measure the similarity. After that, the previous studies aimed to maximize the total satisfaction in matching, but the individuals’ requirements are neglected, resulting in a weak matching result. We establish the two-sided gaming matching model from the perspectives of individuals based on the game theory. Meanwhile, we also study the competition from other platforms. Meanwhile, considering the importance of the high total satisfaction, we balance the total satisfaction and the personal requirements in the matching model. We also prove the solution of the matching model is the equilibrium solution. Finally, to verify the study, we use the experiment to illustrate the advantages of our study.

Computing Effective Mixed Strategies for Protecting Targets in Large-Scale Critical Infrastructure Networks

Most critical infrastructure networks often suffer malicious attacks, which may result in network failures. Therefore, how to design more robust defense measures to minimize the loss is a great challenge. In recent years, defense strategies for enhancing the robustness of the networks are developed based on the game theory. However, the aforementioned method cannot effectively solve the defending problem on large-scale networks with a full strategy space. In this study, we achieve the purpose of protecting the infrastructure networks by allocating limited resources to monitor the targets. Based on the existing two-person zero-sum game model and the Double Oracle framework, we propose the EMSL algorithm which is an approximation algorithm based on a greedy search to compute effective mixed strategies for protecting large-scale networks. The improvement of our approximation algorithm to other algorithms is discussed. Experimental results show that our approximation algorithm can efficiently compute the mixed strategies on actual large-scale networks with a full strategy space, and the mixed defense strategies bring the highest utility to a defender on different networks when dealing with different attacks.

Analysis of risks methodology in information systems

A method of risk analysis in information systems is being developed. The ways of ensuring the efficiency of control systems in the conditions of information confrontation with the use of the game theory apparatus are investigated. The desire to ensure high efficiency of modern management information systems, minimize financial costs, provide energy and information protection of the management system, highlights the creation of a system of analysis and risk management in information systems. It is assumed that the control system can implement the following behavioral strategies in a conflict situation: the control system does not change the algorithm, but changes the class of algorithms used to achieve the maximum value of the average quality by choosing the probability Pij for a given set of countermeasures, the control system changes the algorithm operation, the class of operating algorithms used to maximize the average quality of fixed countermeasures, the control system changes the operating algorithm and the class of operating algorithms used depending on the countermeasure strategy in order to achieve maximum quality. Using the apparatus of game theory, an analysis was performed and a method for estimating the average value of the quality of the communication system with different strategies of the conflicting parties was developed. The technique of estimation of average value of an indicator of quality of functioning of a control system is developed and expressions for an estimation of average value of an indicator at various strategies of behavior are received. It is shown that the solution to the problem of improving the quality of the control system is possible through the use of a mixed strategy of system behavior and the choice of structure and parameters of the control system that increase the partial quality of its operation.

Evaluation of the enterprise strategy by the game theory method

The choice of strategy ensures the formation of a certain option that provides a detailed analysis of situations that may arise in the future. As in the game, where each of the participants plans their actions, predicting the actions of other players and the general conditions of situations that may arise as a result of these actions. You should pay attention to the probability of committing players and the probability of a certain situation. It is clear that this is a prediction of a situation that has not yet occurred, but occurred in accordance with the probability of the strategy in the implementation of the actions of each of the participants associated with the risk. The application of the principles, methods and tools of game theory will make it possible to form a complete plan of action in all situations that are expected to occur. The developed action plan of the participants (players, subjects) in accordance with the whole set of situations and possible developments in them, forms a strategy. Game theory is based on the application by each participant of a single strategy, which is a certain algorithm of actions, not a list of them. Such an algorithm, due to its branches, should reflect the possibility of occurrence and development of events and situations. The article proposes methods of selecting and evaluating enterprise strategies through the application of game theory, which will take into account the strategies of competitors (other participants in the conflict situation) or the state of "nature", which embodies the environment of enterprises. The article considers the advantages and disadvantages of using game theory methods to evaluate enterprise strategies, classifies and compares the types of these methods to clarify the peculiarities of their application in certain situations, the peculiarities of the application of strategy selection criteria in this scope.

Analysing Israel-Hamas Conflict Based on Game Theory Approach

ABSTRACT The Islamic Resistance Movement (AKA: Hamas) has taken control over Gaza Strip, Palestine, in 2007. Since then, the organization was in a continues hit-run conflict against the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The conflict is very resistant to any sort of resolution, and Hamas and Israel engage frequently in what it seems an endless cycle of resentment and violence. Despite numerous mediations by global and regional powers, this conflict appears to be further away than ever. This particular conflict can’t be addressed according to the common negotiation theories that based on rationality and hard politics, which seems not that functional. Instead, a model based on the game theory approach is presented in this study to explain this phenomenon. In this work, some facts about Israel - Hamas regional concerns are explained. Moreover, the study analyses the reasons behind Hamas enforcing calm in Gaza, even though Hamas considers Israel as its arch enemy. The presented model shows that whenever Israel and Hamas reach an agreement, both sides can collaborate in maintaining a state of calm. Moreover, results show that the proposed model is applicable to analyse a conflict in terms of actions, duration and terms of settlement. KEYWORDS: Israel; Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Hamas; Gaza strip; Game theory

Game Theory and Dealing with Water Conflict

In the last century, water conflicts have increased in many parts of the world for reasons such as a strong desire for rapid development and poor governance. The impact of these conflicts on various sectors of society such as economic, political and legal subsystems has led researchers to focus on providing solutions and practical methods to deal with water conflicts. Game theory is one of the most common methods used by researchers to manage water conflicts and water allocation in shared and transboundary river basins. Despite the special place of game theory in reductionist sciences, the application of this theory to dealing with conflicts in complex water systems faces challenges. Whereas, the critique of the effectiveness of the game theory method in water conflict management has been neglected. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to investigate and analyze the capacity to apply the game theory to deal with water conflicts. In order to achieve this purpose, while using library resources, the basics of game theory and the capacity to apply it in the management of water conflicts are analyzed. The results reveal that following the theory of rational choice and rationalism in the game theory method has led to ignore many dimensions and factors affecting the water conflict formation and the way to deal with complex water conflicts. Keywords: Water Conflicts, Game Theory, Peacebuilding, Shared and Transboundary River Basins