Dramatising Solidarity and Unification in Divided Palestine: The Chorus and the Ghost in Kamel EL-Basha’s Following the Footsteps of Hamlet (2013)

This essay explores how Kamel EL-Basha’s theatre production Following the Footsteps of Hamlet (2013) preaches unity and resistance in a post-2006 divided Palestine. After giving a brief historical account of the causes of the internal Palestinian political divisions that distract Palestinians from achieving liberation, the article traces how El-Basha uses theatrical devices such as the chorus and the ghost to materialise a sense of unification in the theatrical space. The analysis draws on other international theatrical practices like Einar Schleef’s (1980) ‘Choric Theatre’ and cites critical works such as Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy (1872) to locate El-Basha’s theatrical practice in a broader context regarding the significance of the chorus in dramatising unity. The essay also traces how the performance of traditional Palestinian songs, ululation, dances like dabke and other rituals in the play, help foster Palestinian identity and shape their sumud (steadfastness) in facing the occupation. Finally, the essay focuses on the role of the ghost in evoking nostalgia in the audience for the days of unity and collective resistance promoted by the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat before his death.

Framing the First Palestinian General Elections by Malaysia’s New Straits Times

The main focus of this study is the coverage of New Straits Times (NST) of the first Palestinian General Elections for two presidential candidates namely, Yasser Arafat and Samiha Khalil. This study aimed to explore if any of Entman’s 1993 framing functions was used in the coverage of this issue and to explore whether the tone of NST coverage was negative, positive, balanced or neutral. Toachieve the aims of this study, qualitative content analysis of elections stories from NST has been adopted. The number of news stories was eight, and the time frame started from 19th January to 13th February 1996, where three of these stories were published on the same day of 22nd January,two days after holding the elections on 20th January. Defining problems and diagnosing causes werethe most prominent of Entman’s four framing functions presented in all the articles. The moral judgment function was included in four news stories, and suggesting remedies was included in two news stories out of eight. The findings revealed that Yasser Arafat received 50% balanced coverage, followed by 37.5% positive coverage, and only 12.5% negative coverage, while Samiha Khalilreceived 67% balanced coverage, compared to 33% positive coverage.

The Palestinian Military: Two Militaries, Not One

The considerable variation in the way national security agencies are structured is a function of two basic factors: the state’s political and social heterogeneity and the possibility of allying with a strong external state, usually the United States. The problem, however, with fragmenting the military and security forces to achieve “coup-proofing” is that a tradeoff exists between fragmentation and assuring internal security on the one hand, and ensuring offensive capabilities to ward off external enemies, on the other. According to this model, centralized homogenous entities enjoying U.S. protection will tend to fragment their security systems most. States that duplicate their security forces least are plural societies that cannot command U.S. interest and commitment to meet their external security threats. The Palestinian Authority (PA) under Yasser Arafat was emblematic of political entities that were homogenous and enjoyed the protection of the United States and Israel, and it could therefore fragment its security forces into 12 or more security agencies compared to Eritrea, which achieved independence a year before the establishment of the PA, and maintained a very unified security apparatus to meet the threat of a vastly larger enemy—Ethiopia. As long as Israel (and the United States and its allies) supported the PA, Arafat made do with a fragmented inefficient security structure that was nevertheless efficient enough, with Israeli security backing, to meet the major external threat—Hamas and the Jihad al-Islami in both the West Bank/Judea and Samaria and Gaza. Israel’s decision to withdraw from Gaza in December 2003 and to complete its withdrawal from Gaza by September 2005 forced the fragmented PA to face these enemies alone, leading to the loss of Gaza to Hamas. By contrast, in the West Bank/Judea and Samaria, the more fragmented PA security structure prevailed as a result of considerable security cooperation with Israel. Hamas, bereft of a close external ally, challenges a superior Israeli military and therefore has a unified security structure much like Eritrea in the 1990s.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1917–88

The early history of the Zionist-Israeli conflict, from 1917 to the 1980s, is discussed. The early Zionist leaders recognized that the Palestinians had understandable reasons to resist Zionism but concluded that the need for a Jewish state outweighed the Palestinian case, leaving the Zionists no choice but to militarily defeat the Palestinians by the “iron wall” strategy. The Peel Commission and UN partition plans are explored, accepted by the Zionists only tactically until they were strong enough to expel most Palestinians from the land allotted to a Jewish state, so as to create an 80 percent Jewish majority. The rise of the PLO under Yasser Arafat is examined, along with its gradual transformation from an extremist terrorist group to its acceptance in 1988 and ever since as a proponent of a two-state compromise peace settlement. Israel’s refusal to reach such a settlement, especially before and after the 1948 and 1967 wars, is discussed.

Arafat and Abbas

This landmark volume presents vivid and intimate portraits of Palestinian Presidents Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, revealing the impact these different personalities have had on the struggle for national self-determination. Arafat and Abbas lived in Palestine as young children. Uprooted by the 1948 war, they returned in 1994 to serve as the first and second presidents of the Palestinian Authority, the establishment of which has been the Palestine Liberation Organization’s greatest step towards self-determination for the Palestinian nation. Both Arafat and Abbas were shaped by earlier careers in the PLO, and each adopted their own controversial leadership methods and decision-making styles. Drawing on primary sources in Arabic, Hebrew and English, Klein gives special attention to the lesser-known Abbas: his beliefs and his disagreements with Israeli and American counterparts. The book uncovers new details about Abbas’ peace talks and US foreign policy towards Palestine, and analyses the political evolution of Hamas and Abbas’ succession struggle. Klein also highlights the tension between the ageing leader and his society. Arafat and Abbas offers a comprehensive and balanced account of the Palestinian Authority’s achievements and failures over its twenty-five years of existence. What emerges is a Palestinian nationalism that refuses to disappear.

1983: A Pivotal Year

This chapter deals with the beginning of the decline of Peace Now. The leaders of the movement locate the turning point in 2000, with two significant events: the collapse in the summer of the Camp David negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat, and the outbreak of the second Intifada in September, which led to the deaths of over a thousand Israelis. This interpretation, interesting as it may be, is not entirely faithful to the historical facts. Although 2000 was undoubtedly a significant year in the life of the peace movement, analysis of Peace Now's trajectory shows that its decline actually began in 1983, with the ending of the Lebanon War and Menachem Begin's withdrawal from political life. 1983 was the pivotal year, the date during which the movement appears to have reached its peak, and the moment at which its slow but steady decline began. The number and size of its demonstrations began to decrease.

12. The Arab–Israeli Conflict

This chapter discusses different aspects of the Arab–Israeli conflict over time — military, political, and economic. The first two decades of the Arab–Israeli conflict, often marked by armed hostilities, were notable for Arab refusal to recognize Israel's existence. Since the 1967 war, Arab states, specifically Syria and Saudi Arabia, have displayed willingness to recognize Israel, and two, Egypt and Jordan, have signed peace treaties; Yasser Arafat recognized Israel's right to exist in the 1993 Oslo agreement. In this regard, most Arab states have adopted a realist approach to the Arab–Israeli conflict, seeking coexistence based in part on acceptance of Israel's military supremacy. In contrast, Israel appears to insist on security through regional domination, coupled with retention of the West Bank as Greater Israel.