Global Externalities, Local Policies, and Firm Selection

How to fight global problems with local tools? When only firms know what externality-producing activities can be relocated, policies shape the location distribution of firm types with different social values. We find that, because of this selection effect, the optimal local policies confront firms’ mobility with elevated corrective externality prices, in contrast with the common remedies for the relocation risk. Our mechanism incentivizes also moving firms to limit the externality, and it influences strategically the distribution of moving firms that comply with policies elsewhere. The magnitude of these effects is illustrated by a quantification for the key sectors in the EU emissions trading system.

Notching R&D Investment with Corporate Income Tax Cuts in China

We study a Chinese policy that awards substantial tax cuts to firms with R&D investment over a threshold or “notch.” Quasi-experimental variation and administrative tax data show a significant increase in reported R&D that is partly driven by firms relabeling expenses as R&D. Structural estimates show relabeling accounts for 24.2 percent of reported R&D and that doubling R&D would increase productivity by 9 percent. Policy simulations show that firm selection and relabeling determine the cost-effectiveness of stimulating R&D, that notch-based policies are more effective than tax credits when relabeling is prevalent, and that modest spillovers justify the program from a welfare perspective. (JEL D22, D24, H25, O14, O32, P31, P35)

Foreign direct investment along the Belt and Road: A political economy perspective

In 2013, China launched its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a large portfolio of infrastructure projects across 71 countries intended to link Eurasian markets by rail and sea. The state-led nature of the Initiative combined with its transformative geopolitical implications have conditioned the type of engagement that many governments and firms in host and third countries are willing to take in Chinese-funded BRI projects. Building on two theoretical streams that have originated in international political economy but have received growing attention in international business, varieties of capitalism and geopolitics, this perspective shows how a greater understanding of the institutional and geopolitical context surrounding BRI helps decipher the selection of host-country firms and third-country MNEs in Chinese-funded BRI projects. We portray firm selection in a BRI project as the outcome of a one-tier bargaining game between China and a host country. We show how institutions and geopolitics influence both the legitimacy gap of Chinese SOEs in a host country and the host country’s relative bargaining power, affecting the likelihood that host firms and third-country MNEs are selected in BRI projects. We also discuss the geopolitical jockeying strategies that these firms can adopt to influence the outcome of the bargaining game.

The Aggregate Implications of Mergers and Acquisitions

This paper develops a search and matching model of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and uses it to evaluate the implications of merger activity for aggregate economic outcomes. The theory is consistent with a rich set of facts on US M&A, including sorting among merging firms, a substantial merger premium and serial acquisition. It provides a sharp link between these facts and the nature of merger gains. At the micro-level, both complementarities between merging firms and productivity improvements of target firms are important in generating gains. At the macro-level, the model suggests a significant beneficial impact of M&A on aggregate outcomes – the contribution to steady state output is 14% and 4% for consumption – which occurs through the reallocation of resources across firms and equilibrium effects on firm selection and new entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, the economy is not efficient, suggesting a scope for policy improvements – a simple flat tax on M&A can raise steady state consumption as much as 2% relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium. In short, the boundaries of the firm can matter for macroeconomic outcomes.