THE EFFECT OF EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES ON TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION OF DECLINING ENTERPRISES – THE MODERATING EFFECT OF DECLINE DEGREE AND ORGANISATIONAL SLACK

We examine the effects of different types of executive incentives on technological innovation of declining firms and the moderating effects of the degree of decline and organisational slack on executive incentives and enterprise technological innovation. We also assess the synergetic effects of different types of executive incentives on technological innovation of declining enterprises. We find the following: first, executive compensation incentive, equity incentive and control incentives are beneficial to promote technological innovation in declining enterprises. Second, the degree of decline negatively moderates the relationship between equity incentive and technological innovation. Third, organisational slack positively moderates the relationship between equity incentive and technological innovation, as well as the relationship between control incentives and technological innovation, especially for severely declining enterprises. Fourth, there are synergistic effects between executive control incentive and compensation incentive, control incentives and equity incentive on technological innovation. The contributions are as follows: first, taking declining enterprises as sample, we suggest that to increase the role of compensation incentive and equity incentive in promoting technological innovation in declining enterprises, the control incentives should be strengthened. Second, organisational slack should be fully exploited for severely declining enterprises so that executives should have the motivation and conditions to carry out technological innovation and further help declining enterprises to turnaround successfully.

The Impact Of Performance Expectation Gap On Corporate Strategic Change—Evidence from Listed Companies in the IT Industry

Based on the panel data of Chinese listed companies in the information technology industry from 2007 to 2018, this paper uses a fixed-effect model to study the relationship between corporate performance expectation gap and strategic change and analyzes the moderating effect of private benefits of management control and equity incentive. It is found that the greater the gap between corporate performance expectations is, the lower the frequency of corporate mergers and acquisitions is, and the higher the frequency of corporate asset divestment is. Further research finds that private benefits of management control weaken the positive correlation between corporate performance expectation gap and asset stripping frequency. Equity incentive strengthens the negative correlation between corporate performance expectation gap and corporate mergers and acquisitions frequency, and the positive correlation between corporate performance expectation gap and corporate asset stripping frequency. Based on this, when enterprises carry out strategic change, enterprises should choose the direction of strategic change according to the degree of performance expectation gap, and promote the effective realization of strategic change by improving the governance of the board of directors and optimizing the management incentive mechanism.

An Empirical Study of Equity Incentive on the Stock Valuation of Tobacco Companies

Objectives: Since the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentives of Listed Companies, the equity incentives of A-share listed companies have become normalized, the discussion of the effect of the implementation of equity incentives on stock valuation can provide a reference for investors whether to choose listed companies with equity incentives for stock valuation. This paper uses python tool to select 30 A-share listed companies that formally started to implement equity incentives in 2018 and the proportion of equity incentives is between 4% and 6% as the sample, and uses cross-sectional data model for empirical analysis. The empirical results show that: first, the implementation of equity incentive in Chinese listed companies has a positive impact on stock valuation, and the impact of equity incentive on stock valuation is significantly better than that before implementation, and the incentive stocks have more investment value; Second, the conclusion is also suitable for Chinese tobacco related companies, which has important reference value for tobacco preference investors.

Could Executive Compensation Incentive Enhance the Efficiency of Enterprise Resource Allocation? An Empirical Study from China

Corporate executives have the decision-making power of resource allocation, and efficient resource allocation is an important measure of high-quality development of enterprises. It is a focal issue whether the compensation incentive can promote the executives to make better use of the enterprise resource allocation. We investigate this question using the data of the Chinese listed companies in 2015–2019 based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and fixed effect model. The results show the following: (1) both monetary compensation incentive and equity incentive can significantly improve the efficiency of resource allocation, and the former is more significant; (2) there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between perquisite consumption incentive and resource allocation efficiency; (3) the above conclusion is still true in state-owned enterprises; (4) in private enterprises, the effect of equity incentive is more effective, but the effect of perquisite consumption incentive is less significant. The results highlight the relationship between compensation incentive and enterprise resource allocation. Our study is expected to guide the executives to formulate reasonable compensation incentives and improve the efficiency of resource allocation.

Research on influencing factors of financial performance of listed companies based on multiple linear regression and fuzzy logic system

The ultimate goal of listed companies is to maximize shareholders’ wealth. With the increasingly fierce market competition, enterprise managers are constantly exploring the key indicators that have an important impact on the financial performance (FP) of enterprises, and achieve the expected FP of shareholders by improving these key indicators. On the basis of the existing enterprise performance measurement system and index research, through expert scoring to determine the secondary indicators, this paper selects 87 small and medium-sized board listed companies which officially announced the implementation of equity incentive from 2009 to 2012 as the sample, takes the financial information disclosed in 2013 as the empirical data, and analyzes the traditional multiple linear regression analysis (MLR) When dealing with big data, especially the data with hierarchical structure, this paper proposes a partial regression coefficient calculation model based on hierarchical data, constructs a multiple nonlinear regression model, and concludes through empirical analysis that there is a nonlinear correlation between equity incentive ratio and corporate performance, and that there is an interval effect between equity incentive ratio and corporate performance. We also present Fuzzy based financial performance prediction of listed companies. Finally, we demonstrate Comparative analysis for financial prediction in term of accuracy between multiple regression model and fuzzy logic system and result deduce that fuzzy logic gives better accuracy than regression model.

The Influence of Equity Incentive on Overinvestment in enterprises: The moderating effect based on the heterogeneity of executive team

This paper empirically examines the moderating effect of executive team heterogeneity on the influence of equity incentive on overinvestment behavior by using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2014 to 2018. The results show that equity incentive can restrain the overinvestment behavior of enterprises; The greater the age heterogeneity of the senior management team, the weaker the influence of equity incentive on overinvestment will be; The greater the gender heterogeneity of the senior management team, the greater the influence of equity incentive on the overinvestment of enterprises will be. The heterogeneity of executive team education and tenure has no effect on the relationship between equity incentive and overinvestment. The conclusion of this study has some enlightenment on how to construct and optimize the senior management team of listed companies, so that the senior management team can play its role fully and make reasonable and effective investment decisions.

The Application of Blockchain Technology in Equity Incentive

With the advent of the blockchain era, employee incentives need to open up new ideas. The application of blockchain technology can promote the advantages of traditional equity incentive schemes and avoid weaknesses. Although there is still no mature ESOP on-chain solution on the market, and ESOP onchain still needs to consider a series of legal issues. The combination of equity incentives and blockchain technology is feasible. Due to the consensus mechanism of blockchain technology, grant and exercise information is recorded at each node on the chain. The implementation of the plan will be open and transparent throughout the process, avoiding the possibility of dark box operations. This is conducive to enhancing the credibility of the enterprise and enhancing employees’ trust in the enterprise, which can really play an incentive role.