Factors influencing the update of beliefs regarding controversial political issues

When updating beliefs in light of new information, people preferentially integrate information that is consistent with their prior beliefs and helps them construe a coherent view of the world. Such a selective integration of new information likely contributes to belief polarisation and compromises public discourse. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the factors that underlie biased belief updating. To this end, I conducted three pre-registered experiments covering different controversial political issues (i.e., Experiment 1: climate change, Experiment 2: speed limit on highways, Experiment 3: immigration in relation to violent crime). The main hypothesis was that negative reappraisal of new information (referred to as “cognitive immunisation”) hinders belief updating. Support for this hypothesis was found only in Experiment 2. In all experiments, the magnitude of the prediction error (i.e., the discrepancy between prior beliefs and new information) was strongly related to belief updating. Across experiments, participants’ general attitudes regarding the respective issue influenced the strength of beliefs, but not their update. The present findings provide some indication that the engagement in cognitive immunisation can lead to the maintenance of beliefs despite disconfirming information. However, by far the largest association with belief updating was with the magnitude of the prediction error.

No Evidence for the Involvement of Cognitive Immunisation in Updating Beliefs About the Self in Three Non-Clinical Samples

Background Cognitive immunisation against disconfirmatory evidence (i.e., devaluing expectation-disconfirming information through cognitive mechanisms) has recently been discussed as an obstacle to the revision of dysfunctional beliefs in mental disorders such as depression. Yet, it is unclear whether cognitive immunisation is also involved in belief updating in non-clinical samples. Methods Using a three-group modulation protocol (promotion vs. inhibition of cognitive immunisation vs. control group), we examined how cognitive immunisation influences belief updating in response to performance feedback in three non-clinical samples. In Experiments 1 (N = 99) and 2 (N = 93), participants received unexpectedly negative feedback, whereas participants from Experiment 3 (N = 118) received unexpectedly positive feedback. Depressive symptoms and dispositional optimism were examined as additional predictors of belief updating. Results In all experiments, participants adjusted their expectations in line with the feedback received, but this effect was not influenced by the cognitive immunisation manipulation. In Experiment 3, expectation change remained stable over 2 weeks. Depressive symptoms were associated with a reduced integration of positive feedback, but not with an increased sensitivity to negative feedback. Conclusions Whereas previous research has shown that cognitive immunisation contributes to persistent beliefs in clinical populations, the present findings suggest that it does not affect belief updating in non-clinical samples.

How the Discrepancy Between Prior Expectations and New Information Influences Expectation Updating in Depression—The Greater, the Better?

Previous research on expectation updating in relation to psychopathology used to treat expectation-confirming information and expectation-disconfirming information as binary concepts. Here, we varied the extent to which new information deviates from prior expectations and examined its influence on expectation adjustment in both a false-feedback task (Study 1; N = 379) and a social-interaction task (Study 2; N = 292). Unlike traditional learning models, we hypothesized a tipping point in which the discrepancy between expectation and outcome becomes so large that new information is perceived as lacking credibility, thus entailing little updating of expectations. Consistent with the hypothesized tipping point, new information was deemed most valid if it was moderately positive. Moreover, descriptively, expectation update was largest for moderate expectation violations, but this effect was small (Study 2) or even nonsignificant (Study 1). The findings question the assumption of traditional learning models that the larger the prediction error, the larger the update.

How the positivity of new information influences belief updating in depression - The more, the better?

Aberrant belief updating has been linked to psychopathology, e.g., depressive symptoms. While previous research used to treat belief-confirming vs. -disconfirming information as binary concepts, the present research varied the extent to which new information deviates from prior beliefs and examined its influence on belief updating. In a false feedback task (Study 1; N = 379) and a social interaction task (Study 2; N = 292), participants received slightly positive, moderately positive or extremely positive information in relation to their prior beliefs. In both studies, new information was deemed most reliable if it was moderately positive. Yet, differences in the positivity of new information had only small effects on belief updating. In Study 1, depressive symptoms were related to difficulties in generalizing positive new learning experiences. The findings suggest that, contrary to traditional learning models, the larger the differences between prior beliefs and new information, the more beliefs are not updated.

EXPRESS: Schizotypy is associated with difficulty maintaining multiple hypotheses

Amongst neurocognitive accounts of delusions, there is a growing consensus that it is the certainty with which delusions are held, rather than their content, that defines some beliefs as delusional. On a continuum model of psychosis this inappropriate certainty ought to be present (albeit in an attenuated form) in healthy adults who score highly in schizotypy. It was hypothesized that this might be most evident in circumstances where the environment provides incomplete or probabilistic information, which thereby forces the participant to hold two imperfectly-supported, concurrent hypotheses in mind. A cued visual search task was used to measure people’s capacity to use partially predictive information (i.e. a cue that predicted the target may occur in one of two locations) to facilitate speeded responding. As hypothesized, people’s performance on the trials that required holding two hypotheses in mind concurrently was significantly and specifically associated with the positive components of schizotypy. This finding is consistent with a hyperfocusing of attention in schizophrenia, and may help explain why delusion-prone individuals have a tendency to ‘jump to conclusions’ or be resistant to disconfirming information when faced with multiple, partially supported hypotheses.

Learning to predict pain: differences in people with persistent neck pain and pain-free controls

Background Learning to predict threatening events enables an organism to engage in protective behavior and prevent harm. Failure to differentiate between cues that truly predict danger and those that do not, however, may lead to indiscriminate fear and avoidance behaviors, which in turn may contribute to disability in people with persistent pain. We aimed to test whether people with persistent neck pain exhibit contingency learning deficits in predicting pain relative to pain-free, gender-and age-matched controls. Method We developed a differential predictive learning task with a neck pain-relevant scenario. During the acquisition phase, images displaying two distinct neck positions were presented and participants were asked to predict whether these neck positions would lead to pain in a fictive patient with persistent neck pain (see fictive patient scenario details in Appendix A). After participants gave their pain-expectancy judgment in the hypothetical scenario, the verbal outcome (PAIN or NO PAIN) was shown on the screen. One image (CS+) was followed by the outcome “PAIN”, while another image (CS−) was followed by the outcome “NO PAIN”. During the generalization phase, novel but related images depicting neck positions along a continuum between the CS+ and CS− images (generalization stimuli; GSs) were introduced to assess the generalization of acquired predictive learning to the novel images; the GSs were always followed by the verbal outcome “NOTES UNREADABLE” to prevent extinction learning. Finally, an extinction phase was included in which all images were followed by “NO PAIN” assessing the persistence of pain-expectancy judgments following disconfirming information. Results Differential pain-expectancy learning was reduced in people with neck pain relative to controls, resulting from patients giving significantly lower pain-expectancy judgments for the CS+, and significantly higher pain-expectancy judgments for the CS−. People with neck pain also demonstrated flatter generalization gradients relative to controls. No differences in extinction were noted. Discussion The results support the hypothesis that people with persistent neck pain exhibit reduced differential pain-expectancy learning and flatter generalization gradients, reflecting deficits in predictive learning. Contrary to our hypothesis, no differences in extinction were found. These findings may be relevant to understanding behavioral aspects of chronic pain.

Primacy, Congruence and Confidence in Diagnostic Decision-Making

Some heuristics and biases are assumed to be universal for human decision-making, and may thus be expected to appear consistently and need to be considered when planning for real-life decision-making. Yet results are mixed when exploring the biases in applied settings, and few studies have attempted to robustly measure the combined impact of various biases during a decision-making process. We performed three pre-registered classroom experiments in which trained medical students read case descriptions and explored follow-up information in order to reach and adjust mental health diagnoses (∑N = 224). We tested whether the order of presenting the symptoms led to a primacy effect, whether there was a congruence bias in selecting follow-up questions, and whether confidence increased during the decision process. Our results showed increased confidence for participants that did not change their decision or sought disconfirming information. There was some indication of a weak congruence bias in selecting follow-up questions. There was no indication of a stronger congruence bias when confidence was high, and there was no support for a primacy effect of the order of symptom presentation. We conclude that the biases are difficult to demonstrate in pre-registered analyses of complex decision-making processes in applied settings.

The openness of religious beliefs to the influence of external information

Religious beliefs have important and wide-reaching impacts on society. They also tend to be viewed as impervious to the influence of information external to a religious setting. Eight focus groups were held with attendees of two United Church of Christ congregations. Participants were asked about their core religious beliefs, and transcripts were qualitatively coded for the interplay of belief and information. Analysis found that beliefs that were focused on people, processes and events external to the congregation showed the characteristics of being more open to external information. Specifically, the breadth of these external beliefs allowed for a wider set of external information to be considered relevant; these beliefs were less biased, allowing participants to be more open to disconfirming information from outside the congregation; and these beliefs were held with less certainty, making it more likely that this disconfirming information would be attended to. This study provides suggestions for religious practitioners wishing to make the information behaviour of their organisations more open.