Moral Foundations Theory Among Autistic and Neurotypical Children

Morality can help guide behavior and facilitate relationships. Although moral judgments by autistic people are similar to neurotypical individuals, many researchers argue that subtle differences signify deficits in autistic individuals. Moral foundation theory describes moral judgments in terms of differences rather than deficits. The current research, aimed at assessing autistic individuals’ moral inclinations using Haidt’s framework, was co-designed with autistic community members. Our aim was to describe autistic moral thinking from a strengths-based perspective while acknowledging differences that may pose interpersonal challenges among autistic youth. We assessed 25 autistic and 23 neurotypical children’s moral judgments using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire for Kids. We used semi-structured interviews and qualitative analysis with a subset of participants to describe children’s moral reasoning. Analyses suggested that autistic and neurotypical children make similar judgments about moral transgressions across all five moral foundations. General linear mixed modeling showed that the greatest predictor of recommending punishment was how bad children deemed moral transgressions to be. We also found a trend that autistic children were more likely to recommend punishment for harmless norms violations than were neurotypical children. Future research could use longitudinal methods to understand the development of moral judgments among autistic and neurotypical children.

Cultural Differences in Children’s Recommended Punishment of Moral Transgressions

The purpose of this research was to examine the severity of punishment recommended by children for moral transgressions. Using Hofstede’s (1980) distinction between individualism and collectivism, we examined the severity of punishment recommended by eight to twelve year old children for moral transgressions that violated a cultural value. Participants were children of various nationalities enrolled in a summer camp on the island of Mallorca, Spain. The children were classified as either individualist or collectivist using the Children’s Self-Construal Scale (Lewis et al. 2000). Each child reacted to nine moral transgressions, two of which were universal and seven of which reflected transgressions of either individualist or collectivist values. The results indicated that children classified as collectivists recommended harsher punishments for transgressions of collectivist values, whereas individualists did not vary in their recommended level of punishment for transgressions against both collectivist and individualist values. Keywords: individualism, collectivism, moral judgments, cultural orientation, moral transgressions

Rationalizing (Vernünfteln)

Kant was a keen psychological observer and theorist of the forms, mechanisms and sources of self-deception. In this Element, the author discusses the role of rationalizing/Vernünfteln for Kant's moral psychology, normative ethics and philosophical methodology. By drawing on the full breadth of examples of rationalizing Kant discusses, the author shows how rationalizing can extend to general features of morality and corrupt rational agents thoroughly (albeit not completely and not irreversibly). Furthermore, the author explains the often-overlooked roles common human reason, empirical practical reason and even pure practical reason play for rationalizing. Kant is aware that rationality is a double-edged sword; reason is the source of morality and of our dignity, but it also enables us to seemingly justify moral transgressions to ourselves, and it creates an interest in this justification in the first place. Finally, this Element discusses whether Kant's ethical theory itself can be criticised as a product of rationalizing.

Moral wrongs, indigeneity and the enactment of farmer-herder conflicts violence in South-Eastern Nigeria

Existing studies of the farmer-herder conflicts (FHCs) in Nigeria have not explored the political ecology of the conflict in South-Eastern Nigeria (SEN). Using the political ecology framework (PEF), the paper examines the nature of the FHCs in Nimbo and Awgu areas in SEN. Data were collected through field observations and in-depth interviews. The paper shows that resource scarcity or reduced farming and grazing spaces did not engender violent FHCs in the study area. Instead, actions of the actors that are perceived to be morally wrong are critical. Allegations of moral transgression such as rape, kidnapping by herders and claims that a herder was used as a sacrifice by villagers triggered the violent episode. The pastoralists are discriminated against on the ground of indigenous belonging only after being alleged to have morally transgressed by kidnapping and raping women. However, on the ground that a herder was allegedly used as a sacrifice, they felt also wronged. While the herders are discriminated against based on their non-belonging in the community because they are not indigenous, they have mount resistance by emphasising their citizenship rights and using force to maintain access to grazing spaces, thereby amplifying the farmer-herder tensions. Thus, while identity has contributed to the FHCs violence, moral wrongs enacted and amplified it. The paper contributes to the literature by arguing that while what triggers FHCs may be moral wrongs, moral transgressions can heighten identity constructions that get implicated in practices of exclusion.

Outrage Fatigue? Cognitive Costs and Decisions to Blame

Across nine studies (N=1,672), we assessed the link between cognitive costs and the choice to express outrage by blaming. We developed the Blame Selection Task, a binary free-choice paradigm that examines the propensity to blame transgressors (versus an alternative choice)—either before or after reading vignettes and viewing images of moral transgressions. We hypothesized that participants’ choice to blame wrongdoers would negatively relate to how cognitively inefficacious, effortful, and aversive blaming feels (compared to the alternative choice). With vignettes, participants approached blaming and reported that blaming felt more efficacious. With images, participants avoided blaming and reported that blaming felt more inefficacious, effortful, and aversive. Blame choice was greater for vignette-based transgressions than image-based transgressions. Blame choice was positively related to moral personality constructs, blame-related social-norms, and perceived efficacy of blaming, and inversely related to perceived effort and aversiveness of blaming. The BST is a valid behavioral index of blame propensity, and choosing to blame is linked to its cognitive costs.

What is good is beautiful (and what isn’t, isn’t): How moral character affects perceived facial attractiveness

A well-documented “beauty-is-good” stereotype is expressed in the expectation that physically attractive people have more positive characteristics. Recent evidence also finds that unattractive faces are associated with negative character inferences. Is what is good (bad) also beautiful (ugly)? Whether this conflation of aesthetic and moral values is bidirectional is not known. This study tested the hypothesis that complementary “good-is-beautiful” and “bad-is-ugly” stereotypes bias aesthetic judgments. Using highly controlled face stimuli, this pre-registered study examined whether moral character influences perceptions of attractiveness for different ages and sexes of faces. Compared to faces paired with non-moral vignettes, those paired with prosocial vignettes were rated significantly more attractive, confident, and friendlier. The opposite pattern characterized faces paired with antisocial vignettes. A significant interaction between vignette type and the age of the face was detected for attractiveness. Moral transgressions affected attractiveness more negatively for younger than older faces. Sex-related differences were not detected. These results suggest information about moral character affects our judgments about facial attractiveness. Better people are considered more attractive. These findings suggest that beliefs about moral goodness and physical beauty influence each other bidirectionally.

The Effects of Politician’s Moral Violations on Voters' Moral Emotions

Existing empirical research on voters’ responses to individual politicians’ moral transgressions pays limited attention to moral emotions, although moral emotions are an integral part of voters’ moral judgment. This study looks at U.S. voters’ discrete moral emotional responses to politician’s moral violations and examines how these discrete moral emotional responses are dependent on voters’ own moral principles and the extent to which they identify with a political party. We report on a 5 × 3 between-subjects experiment where 2026 U.S. respondents reacted to politicians’ violations of one of five moral foundations defined by Moral Foundations Theory. We randomly vary which moral foundation is violated and the partisanship of the politician. While voters’ own moral principles somewhat condition moral emotional responses, we find that voters’ moral emotional responses mostly depend on partisan identification. When voters share party identity with a politician committing a moral violation, they respond with less anger, contempt, disgust and shame than when they do not share party identity. The effect is greater among strong partisans. However, we find limited evidence that specific moral emotions are activated by violations of particular moral foundations, thereby challenging Moral Foundations Theory.

Young Children's Understanding of Restorative Justice

The present study investigated how young children understand the sophisticated concept of restorative justice in unintentional moral transgressions. A sex-balanced sample of 5-year-old (M = 5.67, SD = 0.34, 49.3% girls) and 8-year-old (M = 7.86, SD = 0.29, 46.0% girls) Chinese children (N = 193) participated in the study. In designing the materials, we distilled the multidimensional meanings of restorative justice into two stories, one addressing the theme of property violation and the other physical harm; both stories were set in an animal community. We then engaged the children in joint reading and an interview, during which they showed preference for the given treatments for the transgressor (two restorative treatments vs. two retributive treatments) and ranked two further sets of restorative vs. retributive treatments at the community level. The results indicated that most children favored restorative treatments over retributive treatments for a transgressor, and the 8-year-olds viewed psychological restoration more favorably and behavioral punishment less favorably than the 5-year-olds. The children also tended to endorse restorative treatments at the community level, revealing an understanding of the needs, and obligations of all parties concerned. Notably, more 8- than 5-year-olds showed a consistency in restorative orientation at this level. Interpreting our data through the lens of the Representational Redescription model, we attained a more refined account of young children's levels of understanding regarding restorative justice. These results provide insights for the early cultivation of restorative justice among young children, which is a cornerstone for its successful practice in any society.

The Evaluation of Harm and Purity Transgressions in Africans: A Paradigmatic Replication of Rottman and Young (2019)

Improving the generalizability of psychology findings to a culture requires sampling participants in that culture. Yet few psychology studies sample Africans. We believe we can expand the capacity of African psychology researchers by giving them freely available, cutting-edge research tools and workflows. We used a training method developed by the Collaborative Replication and Education Project (CREP) to support and train 23 African collaborators to conduct a paradigmatic replication of the psychology of moral transgressions (Rottman & Young, 2019) in 6 African countries (Egypt, Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania). We completed extensive preparatory work, including developing training materials in African languages, assessing our collaborators’ current research capacity, and conducting a re-analysis of Rottman and Young’s original data. This project has the potential to improve research capacity in Africa and provide empirical evidence on Africans' moral judgment of purity transgressions.