certificate revocation
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2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Shi ◽  
Shouqian Shi ◽  
Minmei Wang ◽  
Jonne Kaunisto ◽  
Chen Qian

2021 ◽  
Vol 104 ◽  
pp. 102209
Author(s):  
Yves Christian Elloh Adja ◽  
Badis Hammi ◽  
Ahmed Serhrouchni ◽  
Sherali Zeadally

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 2549
Author(s):  
Shahid Mahmood ◽  
Moneeb Gohar ◽  
Jin-Ghoo Choi ◽  
Seok-Joo Koh ◽  
Hani Alquhayz ◽  
...  

Smart Grid (SG) infrastructure is an energy network connected with computer networks for communication over the internet and intranets. The revolution of SGs has also introduced new avenues of security threats. Although Digital Certificates provide countermeasures, however, one of the issues that exist, is how to efficiently distribute certificate revocation information among Edge devices. The conventional mechanisms, including certificate revocation list (CRL) and online certificate status protocol (OCSP), are subjected to some limitations in energy efficient environments like SG infrastructure. To address the aforementioned challenges, this paper proposes a scheme incorporating the advantages and strengths of the fog computing. The fog node can be used for this purpose with much better resources closer to the edge. Keeping the resources closer to the edge strengthen the security aspect of smart grid networks. Similarly, a fog node can act as an intermediate Certification Authority (CA) (i.e., Fog Node as an Intermediate Certification Authority (FONICA)). Further, the proposed scheme has reduced storage, communication, processing overhead, and latency for certificate verification at edge devices. Furthermore, the proposed scheme reduces the attack surface, even if the attacker becomes a part of the network.


Author(s):  
Guillaume Bour ◽  
Karin Bernsmed ◽  
Ravishankar Borgaonkar ◽  
Per Håkon Meland

AbstractMaritime shipping is currently undergoing rapid digitalization, but with increasing exposure to cyber threats, there is a need to improve the security of the ship communication technology used during operations across international waters, as well as close to local shores and in ports. To this aid, there are ongoing standardization efforts for an international maritime Public Key Infrastructure, but the inherent properties of limited connectivity and bandwidth make certificate revocation a problematic affair compared to traditional Internet systems. The main contribution of this paper is an analysis of certificate revocation techniques based on how they fulfil fundamental maritime requirements and simulated usage over time. Our results identify CRLs (with Delta CRLs) and CRLite as the two most promising candidates. Finally, we outline the pros and cons with these two different solutions.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-4
Author(s):  
Carlisle Adams

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