Tourism Promotion and Disability

This study illustrates the preliminary results of a corpus-based analysis aimed at discovering the main linguistic features characterising the promotion of tourism for special-needs travellers. Even if accessible tourism represents an important sector in the market, not only for its social and moral importance but also for its strong economic potential, detailed research on the linguistic properties of tourism for disabled people is still rather limited and mainly tends to focus on the problems of physical access rather than considering the ways to improve its promotional strategies. Through a comparative corpus-based analysis, this paper will investigate the relevant linguistic features of a corpus of promotional materials advertising holidays and tourist services for the disabled, and relate them to the communicative strategies of two other corpora dedicated to the standard and translational language of tourism. The aim of this research is to show how mainstream tourism discourse still considers disability as a taboo topic, mostly ignoring or vaguely mentioning it in the general promotion of tourist destinations. The study will also attempt to suggest new linguistic and social attitudes aimed at stylistically improving and further including the accessible tourism sector within the overall tourism promotion.

A Global, Democratic, Institutional and Humble Cosmopolitanism? Response to Contributors in Symposium on The Humble Cosmopolitan

This article engages contributions from Cricket Keating, Natasha Behl, Fred Lee and Jaby Mathew, and Brooke Ackerly’s introduction, in a symposium on The Humble Cosmopolitan. It first notes insights taken for the development of a democratic cosmopolitanism oriented to political humility from the work of Indian Dalit-rights champion and constitutional architect B.R. Ambedkar, and from interviews conducted with globally oriented Dalit activists. It then considers Mathew’s concerns about accommodation of the moral importance of local democratic practices, and Keating’s about the book’s emphasis on advancing institutional over attitudinal changes. It addresses issues Behl raises around attention to alternate conceptions of citizenship, e.g., ones which would center Dalit women’s voices; and Lee’s concerns about whether the model can recognize the importance of subaltern nationalisms. Responses focus on ways in which the model seeks to enable individuals to challenge political arrogance from a position of co-equal citizenship in regional and global institutions.

The distinct moral importance of acting together

This review essay engages with Garrett Cullity’s argument that there is a fundamental moral norm of cooperation, as articulated in Concern, Respect, & Cooperation (2018). That is to say that there is moral reason to participatein collective endeavours that cannot be reduced to other moral reasons like promoting welfare. If this is plausible, all the better for solving collective action dilemmas like climate change. But how should we understand a reason of participation? I supplement Cullity’s own account by appealing to the notion of ‘team reasoning’ in game theory. Even if not an adequate notion of rationality, adopting the team stance—deriving individual reasonto act from what a group may together achieve—may well have distinct moral importance.

Ideas and Perspectives: Enhancing research and monitoring of carbon pools and land-to-atmosphere greenhouse gases exchange in developing countries

Carbon (C) and greenhouse gas (GHG) research has traditionally required data collection and analysis using advanced and often expensive instruments, complex and proprietary software, and skilled technicians. Partly as a result, relatively little C and GHG research has been conducted in resource-constrained developing countries. At the same time, these are the same countries and regions in which climate-change impacts will likely be strongest, and in which major science uncertainties are centred, given the importance of dryland and tropical systems to the global C cycle. Increasingly, scientific communities have adopted appropriate technology and approach (AT&A) for C and GHG research, which focuses on low-cost and low-technology instruments, open source software and data, and participatory and networking-based research approaches. Adopting AT&A can mean acquiring data with fewer technical constraints and lower economic burden and is thus a strategy for enhancing C and GHG research in developing countries. However, AT&A can be characterized by higher uncertainties; these can often be mitigated by carefully designing experiments, providing clear protocols for data collection, and monitoring and validating the quality of obtained data. For implementing this approach in developing countries, it is first necessary to recognize the scientific and moral importance of AT&A. At the same time, new AT&A techniques should be identified and further developed. All these processes should be promoted in collaboration with local researchers and through training local staff and encouraged for wide use and further innovation in developing countries.

The Consciousness of Being Alive as a Source of Knowledge

This chapter addresses the question whether our consciousness of being alive can be a source of knowledge, and if so, of what kind of knowledge. It examines this question as it is discussed by a sequence of early modern philosophers who all implicitly consider the issue. The chapter begins with a discussion of the early modern idea of consciousness, viewed as an epistemic relation. It goes on to show that interest in the notion that we are immediately aware of being alive arose in reaction to Descartes’ dualism. For example, the Cartesian Louis de La Forge attempted, but failed, to accommodate the feeling of being alive within a dualist framework. Against this background, the chapter turns to discuss Spinoza’s early attempts to appeal to our consciousness of being alive in order to refute Cartesian scepticism. It concludes that our consciousness of being alive can be considered a source of knowledge, and that, however simple this lesson appears, it may be of moral importance.

The Partiality and Moral Importance of Empathy

Paul Bloom and Jesse Prinz have argued that empathy is a poor guide to morality because it is partial, focused on individuals who are near and dear to us, present before our senses, and similar to us, etc. It is here conceded that this is true of spontaneous empathy, but that empathy can be voluntarily controlled and reflective because it consists in imagining what somebody else than ourselves at present is feeling. This means that we can counteract the partiality of our spontaneous empathy, though it is exceedingly difficult to overcome all partiality which is necessary for the kind of universal compassion envisaged by Schopenhauer. In this chapter an attempt is also made to make sense of his conception of the relation between such compassion and ascetic self-renunciation.

An Ethical Reflection on the Heritability Argument in the Germline Genetic Intervention Debate

Germline genetic intervention (GGI) has been one of the most discussed topics within the bioethics literature since 2012, when the programming of CRISPR/Cas9 for a specifically targeted gene region has become possible. While some authors are optimistic about what GGI may offer, others strongly disagree and refute the use of this technology for different reasons. This paper will aim to examine one of the most widespread arguments against GGI, namely “heritability” argument, comprehensively. Firstly, it will aim to examine the moral importance of the germline. Secondly, it will try to understand three possible assumptions of the heritability argument. Then it will try to respond to these assumptions and argue that they are neither scientifically supportable nor rationally solid for rejecting GGI altogether.International Journal of Human and Health Sciences Vol. 05 No. 04 October’21 Page: 405-411

Imperfect Duties to Oneself

This chapter covers both the imperfect duties of natural and moral self-perfection and the positive duties of conscience and moral self-scrutiny—these latter duties partly constitutive of the duty of moral self-perfection. Regarding the duty of conscience, the following questions are addressed: 1. What is conscience—its nature and role in moral life? 2. How is conscience experienced? 3. Can it be mistaken? 4. What are the duties of conscience and how are they justified? 5. What is the connection between conscience and blameworthiness? The duty of moral self-scrutiny foregrounds the moral importance of sincerity and impartiality in assessing one’s moral character. The chapter also explores the fundamental duty of moral self-perfection and Kant’s puzzling claim that it is both narrow and perfect yet also wide and imperfect. Also discussed are Kant’s views on the ethical treatment of animals, concluding with remarks on Kant’s moral teleology.

‘Good, Rich, or Secure?’. Spanish Scholasticism and Law’s Development of Virtue

In this paper, I argue that the work of Vitoria, Soto, and Suárez presents a sustained tradition arguing that the proper end of civil law is formation in true virtue of the citizens, making citizens capable of achieving natural happiness. Although this development in virtue may prepare citizens to obtain the supernatural happiness made possible ultimately by God’s grace, it still contains its own integrity and moral importance.

Personal Identity and Impersonal Ethics

On the Reductionist View, the fact of a person’s existence and that of her identity over time just consist in the holding of certain more particular facts about physical and mental events and the relations between these events. These more particular facts are impersonal—they do not presuppose or entail the existence of any person or mental subject. In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit claims that if the Reductionist View is true, then ‘it is … more plausible to focus, not on persons, but on experiences, and to claim that what matters morally is the nature of these experiences’. But why think that the Reductionist View has this implication? As critics such as Robert Adams, David Brink, Mark Johnston, Christine Korsgaard, and Susan Wolf have suggested, it is not clear why the Reductionist View should have any implications regarding the moral importance of persons. This chapter argues that in contrast to Non-reductionist views, Psychological Reductionism, a version of the Reductionist View that assumes a psychological criterion of personal identity, supports the kind of impersonal moral outlook that Parfit describes.