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2022 ◽  
pp. 44-55
Author(s):  
SANTOSHI SHRITHA PYDA

The paper aims to provide an insight into the famous and revolutionary Sabarimala Judgement - Indian Young Lawyers Association and Ors. v. The State of Kerala and Ors.2 The paper throws light on the background of the case and closely analyses the judgement so pronounced and its consequences. Since the practices of the temple were seen as exclusionary in nature, the implications of a judgement so grave have serious consequences on the immediate category of people directly affected and the society at large. The primary issues addressed in the case; whether or not the said practice is discriminatory and so a violation of Article 17, and whether or not the practice violates the right to equality by lacking an intelligible differential and a reasonable nexus (pertaining to Article 14) have been further deconstructed to paint a better understanding of the interpretation of the Constitution of India.Furthermore, an attempt has been made to establish the judiciary’s primary objective, whether it is to strike a balance between the conflict of liberty, equality, public interest and affected groups of people has been fulfilled in this judgement or not. The main task of the judgement was to figure out whether the exclusionary practice is essential for the religion so as to deem it to be violative of the fundamental right to religion, as granted to the citizens of the country by the Constitution. One of the striking features of this judgement is the dissenting opinion of Justice Indu Malhotra, who, reasoning through constitutional morality: the harmonisation of fundamental rights of every individual citizen, religious denomination to practise their faith in accordance with the tenets of their religion irrespective of it being rational or logical has concluded that the practice is neither exclusionary, nor discriminatory in nature. The paper delves into this dissenting opinion, and proposes a possible approach to balancing public interests and rights of the affected categories.


Author(s):  
Philippa Spoel ◽  
Naomi Lacelle ◽  
Alexandra Millar

The COVID-19 pandemic has augmented discourses of individual citizen responsibility for collective health. This article explores how British Columbia, Canada’s widely praised COVID-19 communication participates in the development of neo-communitarian “active citizenship” governmentalities focused on the civic duty of voluntarily taking responsibility for the health of one’s community. We do so by investigating how public health updates from BC’s acclaimed Provincial Health Officer Dr. Bonnie Henry articulate this civic imperative through the rhetorical constitution of the “good covid citizen.” Our rhetorical analysis shows how this pro-social communication interpellates citizens within a discourse of behavioral, epistemic, and ethical responsibilisation. The communal ethos constituted through this public health communication significantly increases the burden of personal responsibility for health beyond norms of self-care. Making the protection of community health primarily the responsibility of individual citizens also presumes a privileged identity of empowered, active agency and implicitly excludes citizens who lack the means to successfully fulfill the expectations of good covid citizenship.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Seinimili Tu'I'Onetoa Fonua

<p>Parliament in its exclusive cognizance can legislate for anything it sees fit. However this paper finds that the New Zealand Parliament had the opportunity in Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh¹ to balance political needs and respect for individual rights rather than to adopt a reactionary attitude in enacting the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.  It would be appropriate for Parliament to closely examine the efficacy of the “necessity test” in Leigh in the light of the implication of the codification of the definition of “proceedings in parliament” on the scope of parliamentary privilege as the experiences by the Australian jurisdictions showed. On the other hand, the court’s obligations under the Bill of Rights Act, 1990 might result in the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 being interpreted in ways that the lawmakers might not have intended.  This paper examines the public/private dichotomy between the public interest justification for parliamentary immunity and the individual’s right to have access to remedy, in the context of the underpinning features of the “necessity” test that give precedence to basic individual rights. The test being; any claim for absolute privilege for an occasion that occurs outside absolutely privileged spheres (Parliament and its committees) that could result in depriving citizens of their basic rights, had to be necessary as in the sense of “essential” for the proper functioning of the core roles of the House.  In conclusion, this paper finds that the contentious issues revolve around comity. It then attempts to address the interests of the three stakeholders in the Leigh decision; the individual citizen, the judiciary and the legislature by recommending a number of comity “best practice” reforms to the House’s Standing Orders and the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.  ¹ Attorney-General v Leigh [2011] NZSC 106, [2012] 2 NZLR 713, (Leigh).</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Seinimili Tu'I'Onetoa Fonua

<p>Parliament in its exclusive cognizance can legislate for anything it sees fit. However this paper finds that the New Zealand Parliament had the opportunity in Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh¹ to balance political needs and respect for individual rights rather than to adopt a reactionary attitude in enacting the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.  It would be appropriate for Parliament to closely examine the efficacy of the “necessity test” in Leigh in the light of the implication of the codification of the definition of “proceedings in parliament” on the scope of parliamentary privilege as the experiences by the Australian jurisdictions showed. On the other hand, the court’s obligations under the Bill of Rights Act, 1990 might result in the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 being interpreted in ways that the lawmakers might not have intended.  This paper examines the public/private dichotomy between the public interest justification for parliamentary immunity and the individual’s right to have access to remedy, in the context of the underpinning features of the “necessity” test that give precedence to basic individual rights. The test being; any claim for absolute privilege for an occasion that occurs outside absolutely privileged spheres (Parliament and its committees) that could result in depriving citizens of their basic rights, had to be necessary as in the sense of “essential” for the proper functioning of the core roles of the House.  In conclusion, this paper finds that the contentious issues revolve around comity. It then attempts to address the interests of the three stakeholders in the Leigh decision; the individual citizen, the judiciary and the legislature by recommending a number of comity “best practice” reforms to the House’s Standing Orders and the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.  ¹ Attorney-General v Leigh [2011] NZSC 106, [2012] 2 NZLR 713, (Leigh).</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Seinimili Tu'i'onetoa Fonua

<p>Parliament in its exclusive cognizance can legislate for anything it sees fit. However this paper finds that the New Zealand Parliament had the opportunity in Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh to balance political needs and respect for individual rights rather than to adopt a reactionary attitude in enacting the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014. It would be appropriate for Parliament to closely examine the efficacy of the “necessity test” in Leigh in the light of the implication of the codification of the definition of “proceedings in parliament” on the scope of parliamentary privilege as the experiences by the Australian jurisdictions showed. On the other hand, the court’s obligations under the Bill of Rights Act, 1990 might result in the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 being interpreted in ways that the lawmakers might not have intended. This paper examines the public/private dichotomy between the public interest justification for parliamentary immunity and the individual’s right to have access to remedy, in the context of the underpinning features of the “necessity” test that give precedence to basic individual rights. The test being; any claim for absolute privilege for an occasion that occurs outside absolutely privileged spheres (Parliament and its committees) that could result in depriving citizens of their basic rights, had to be necessary as in the sense of “essential” for the proper functioning of the core roles of the House. In conclusion, this paper finds that the contentious issues revolve around comity. It then attempts to address the interests of the three stakeholders in the Leigh decision; the individual citizen, the judiciary and the legislature by recommending a number of comity “best practice” reforms to the House’s Standing Orders and the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Seinimili Tu'i'onetoa Fonua

<p>Parliament in its exclusive cognizance can legislate for anything it sees fit. However this paper finds that the New Zealand Parliament had the opportunity in Attorney-General and Gow v Leigh to balance political needs and respect for individual rights rather than to adopt a reactionary attitude in enacting the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014. It would be appropriate for Parliament to closely examine the efficacy of the “necessity test” in Leigh in the light of the implication of the codification of the definition of “proceedings in parliament” on the scope of parliamentary privilege as the experiences by the Australian jurisdictions showed. On the other hand, the court’s obligations under the Bill of Rights Act, 1990 might result in the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014 being interpreted in ways that the lawmakers might not have intended. This paper examines the public/private dichotomy between the public interest justification for parliamentary immunity and the individual’s right to have access to remedy, in the context of the underpinning features of the “necessity” test that give precedence to basic individual rights. The test being; any claim for absolute privilege for an occasion that occurs outside absolutely privileged spheres (Parliament and its committees) that could result in depriving citizens of their basic rights, had to be necessary as in the sense of “essential” for the proper functioning of the core roles of the House. In conclusion, this paper finds that the contentious issues revolve around comity. It then attempts to address the interests of the three stakeholders in the Leigh decision; the individual citizen, the judiciary and the legislature by recommending a number of comity “best practice” reforms to the House’s Standing Orders and the Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Daniel Paul Neazor

<p>Direct review by the Courts (e. g . by prerogative writs) of Executive acts and decisions generally provides the individual citizen with a means of overcoming for the future the adverse effects of such decisions and actions, but it does not provide any means of compensating him for detriments to his interests already caused . Such detriments will generally be those which have accrued in full by the time the decision is reviewed but may in some cases be of a continuing nature, e. g . where, because of refusal of a licence, a business opportunity is lost. Tort actions against the State on the other hand, will allow the Courts not only to examine the actions of State servants, and determine whether they conform with the Courts' view of the proper behaviour of officials but also, and principally, to compensate the individual citizen whose interests have been affected by State action. Such actions may thus furnish an indirect means of control of the Executive as well as a means of compensation for injury.</p>


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Daniel Paul Neazor

<p>Direct review by the Courts (e. g . by prerogative writs) of Executive acts and decisions generally provides the individual citizen with a means of overcoming for the future the adverse effects of such decisions and actions, but it does not provide any means of compensating him for detriments to his interests already caused . Such detriments will generally be those which have accrued in full by the time the decision is reviewed but may in some cases be of a continuing nature, e. g . where, because of refusal of a licence, a business opportunity is lost. Tort actions against the State on the other hand, will allow the Courts not only to examine the actions of State servants, and determine whether they conform with the Courts' view of the proper behaviour of officials but also, and principally, to compensate the individual citizen whose interests have been affected by State action. Such actions may thus furnish an indirect means of control of the Executive as well as a means of compensation for injury.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 127-128
Author(s):  
Yu. I. Logvinov ◽  
I. A. Gerken

The high need of modern healthcare for qualified specialists and a significant level of responsibility of medical and pharmaceutical workers to an individual citizen and society as a whole now dictate the need for continuous improvement of professional knowledge and skills.


Author(s):  
Roman Fedorov ◽  
Nashaat Nashed

The article considers the question of the reality of reflecting the will of the people and their interests in the state legislation, as well as in the process of implementing legal norms. In the light of John Austin’s theory of the legal power of the sovereign’s (people’s) command, the role and place of an individual citizen in the process of lawmaking in a modern constitutional state is analyzed. It is concluded that modeling the sovereignty of the people based on the Austin concept leads to the denial of the distinction between the rule of law and the rule of people.


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