Distanced self-talk increases rational self-interest

Does stepping back to evaluate a situation from a distanced perspective lead us to be selfish or fair? This question has been of philosophical interest for centuries, and, more recently, the focus of extensive empirical inquiry. Yet, extant research reveals a puzzle: some studies suggest that adopting a distanced perspective will produce more rationally self-interested behavior, whereas others suggest that it will produce more impartial behavior. Here we adjudicate between these perspectives by testing the effects of adopting a third-person perspective on decision making in a task that pits rational self-interest against impartiality: the dictator game. Aggregating across three experiments (N = 774), participants who used third-person (i.e., distanced) vs. first-person (i.e., immersed) self-talk during the dictator game kept more money for themselves. We discuss these results in light of prior research showing that psychological distance can promote cooperation and fairmindedness and how the effect of psychological distance on moral decision-making may be sensitive to social context.

Mine or ours? Unintended framing effects in dictator games

This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small and typically unreported differences in standard instructions induce different perceptions regarding entitlement and ownership of the money to be distributed, and that these perceptions influence behaviour. Less is given when the task is described as a task of generosity and more when the task is a task of distribution (average 35 % vs. 52 %). The results can contribute to explaining the large variation in dictator game giving reported in the literature and show that even small and unreported differences in instructions change how the game is perceived. JEL codes: C70; C91; D63

In-Organization Ethics Power-Allocation Mechanisms and Members’ Decision-Making Behavior

This study examines experimental evidence showing how ethics power allocation mechanisms affect an individual’s in-organization resource division and ethical behavior. We used two two-stage lab experiments to explore power seeking and usage; the experiments contained two stages of power contending and power usage. Stage one used two different power-seeking mechanisms in the honesty game. Stage two was based on the dictator game and the ultimatum game to measure an individual’s power usage. The results show that the decisions taken by power-holders could influence the optimization of collective resources, and power-holders who gain power with unethical methods could result in collective resource allocation inequities. With more balanced in-organization power, members tend to be more honest. Subjects also adjust their unethical behavior to adapt to the environment, which could cause the diffusion of unethical behavior. This paper re-designed the dictator game and the ultimatum game by adding an ethically vulnerable power acquisition mechanism. For organizations to prevent the disproportionate dispersion of resources and achieve more public benefits, it is meaningful for managers to create a proper in-organization ethical power allocation mechanism.

Competing social identities and intergroup discrimination: Evidence from a framed field experiment with high school students in Vietnam

We conducted a framed field experiment to explore a situation where individuals have potentially competing social identities to understand how group identification and socialisation affect in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination. The Dictator Game and the Trust Game were conducted in Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh City on two groups of high school students with different backgrounds, i.e., French bilingual and monolingual (Vietnamese) students. We find strong evidence for the presence of these two phenomena: our micro-analysis of within- and between-school effects show that bilingual students exhibit higher discriminatory behaviour toward non-bilinguals within the same school than toward other bilinguals from a different school, implying that group identity is a key factor in the explanation of intergroup cooperation and competition.

Sharing Money With Humans Versus Computers: On the Role of Honesty-Humility and (Non-)Social Preferences

Does giving behavior in economic games reflect true prosocial preferences or is it due to confusion? Research showing that trait Honesty-Humility accounts for giving behavior suggests the former, whereas research showing that participants give money to a computer might suggest the latter. In three preregistered, well-powered studies, we examined the relation of Honesty-Humility with behavior in the Dictator Game (Study 1, N = 468) and Public Goods Game (Studies 2 and 3, each N = 313), while participants interacted either with humans (“social game”) or with a computer (“non-social game”). We found that (a) decisions in the non-social game predicted decisions in the social game, supporting the confusion hypothesis; (b) the effect of Honesty-Humility differed within and between games; and (b) participants who gave money to the computer reported acting as if they were playing with humans. Overall, the studies suggest that both prosocial preferences and confusion underlie giving behavior.

A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games

We consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data are used to estimate the parameters of a Stone–Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn–Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.

Empathy concerns enhance prosociality and modulate frontal theta oscillatory activity in young adults

Decision making is a process that can be strongly affected by social factors. Profuse evidence has shown how people deviate from traditional rational-choice predictions under different levels of social interactions. The emergence of prosocial decision making, defined as any action that is addressed to benefit another individual even at the expense of personal benefits, has been reported as an important example of such social influence. Furthermore, brain evidence has shown the involvement of structures such the prefrontal cortex, anterior insula and midcingulate cortex during decision settings in which a decision maker interacts with others under physical pain or distress or while being observed by others. Using a slightly modified version of the dictator game, we tested the hypothesis that the inclusion of another person into the decision setting increases prosocial decisions in young adults and that this increase is higher when the other person is associated with others in need. At the brain level, we hypothesized that the increase in prosocial decisions correlates with frontal theta activity as a marker of empathy saliency. The results showed that the inclusion of another person into the decision setting increased prosocial behavior only when this presence was associated with someone in need and that this was associated with an increase in frontocentral theta-oscillatory activity. These results suggest that the presence of someone in need enhances both empathy concerns and norm compliance, raising the participants’ prosocial decision making.

Role of the prefrontal cortex in prosocial and self-maximization motivations: an rTMS study

More than a decade of neuroimaging and brain stimulation studies point to a crucial role for the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) in prosocial behavior. The intuitive prosociality model postulates that the rDLPFC controls intuitive prosocial behavior, whereas the reflective model assumes that the rDLPFC controls selfish impulses during prosocial behavior. The intuitive prosociality model implies that the transient disruption of the rDLPFC should increase voluntary transfers in both dictator and generosity games. In contrast, the reflective model suggests that the transient disruption of the rDLPFC should decrease transfers in the dictator game, without affecting voluntary transfers in the generosity game, in which selfish motives are minimized. The aim of this paper was to compare predictions of the intuitive and reflective models using the classic dictator game and generosity game and continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS). In this study, two groups of healthy participants (dictators) received either cTBS over the rDLPFC or right extrastriate visual areas. As shown by the results, the transient disruption of the rDLPFC significantly promoted prosocial motives in the dictator game only, particularly in the trials with the lowest dictator’s costs. These findings partially support the notion that the rDLPFC controls intuitive prosocial behavior.