The «Сaucasian Guestion» in Iran’s Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the XVII Century

The article examines the Caucasian vector of Iran’s foreign policy at the beginning of the XVII century. as one of the most priority directions of the Shah’s foreign policy, Iranian-Russian diplomatic cooperation and interaction, as well as as the most important factor in ensuring the security of the Safavid state in the face of the threat of Ottoman expansion. During the XVI-XVII centuries, certain territories of the Caucasus were in the sphere of political influence of Safavid Iran, which managed to systematically establish control over Eastern Georgia, Eastern Armenia, Azerbaijan and part of Dagestan. A comprehensive study of the Caucasian policy of Safavid Iran during its military and political domination in the region allows us to identify historical patterns and trends of modern socio-political processes in the Caucasus and the Middle East. The study of the problem of delineating the spheres of political influence of regional powers in the context of the foreign policy strategy of Safavid Iran at the beginning of the XVII century. It requires a scientifically based analysis and objective assessment, since Iran traditionally demonstrates its activity in the region, develops cooperation with regional actors in the political, diplomatic, trade, economic and cultural spheres. The purpose of the study is to study the Caucasian policy of Safavid Iran, as well as methods and means of its implementation at the beginning of the XVII century. The scientific novelty of this research is determined by the introduction into scientific circulation of a wide range of diverse historical sources and literature necessary for rethinking and generalizing the content of existing theoretical, methodological and scientific approaches, comparative analysis of domestic and foreign concepts on this issue, as well as a systematic study of geostrategy and the Caucasian vector of Iran’s foreign policy in the period under review.

Looking East? An Analysis of Kazakhstan’s Geopolitical Code after Participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Kazakhstan’s geopolitical landscape plays a decisive role in framing its multi-vector foreign policy. Not only is the country landlocked by five states, but it is also enclosed between two regional powers, China and Russia. When joining the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Kazakhstan made firm commitments to China, potentially putting its multi‑vectorism at risk. The paper adopts geopolitical codes as a theoretical framework to account for changes in the country’s geopolitical considerations. It presents a qualitative discourse analysis on the presidential ‘State of the Nation Addresses’. The research contributes to the literature on Kazakhstan’s multi-vectorism by conducting a data-driven analysis that maintains geography at the core.

New Stage in the Geopolitical Struggle around the Caspian Sea after 1991

For almost three centuries, starting with the campaign of Peter the Great in 1721-1722, Russia has traditionally played a key role in the Caspian Sea. The situation changed dramatically with the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the emergence of three new regional players-Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. For Russia, this meant a significant reduction in influence in the region and the loss of control over most of the water area and the sea and its resources. In the historiography devoted to the region, the emphasis is placed on assessing the new round of geopolitical struggle, the position and interests of Western and regional powers. The author of this article provides a critical analysis of changes in Russian policy towards the Caspian Sea over the past 30 years and assesses the effectiveness of these changes. The difficult transition from the role of a dominant player in a region closed to external competitors to an open geopolitical confrontation over resources, their transportation routes, and political influence at the first stage was not in favor of Russia. Russia could not defend the principle of a condominium for joint development of hydrocarbon resources of the sea. With the active assistance of Western competitors, Russia lost its status as a monopoly transit country for oil and gas from the region. At the same time, thanks to diplomatic efforts and increased political dialogue with its neighbors in the region, Russia managed to resolve all territorial issues at sea by 2003, maintain the closed status of the sea for the military forces of third countries, and by 2018 complete work on the Convention on the international legal status of the sea, which established the principles of cooperation in the region that are important for the Russian Federation. Thus, official Moscow managed to achieve the strategic goals adapted after the collapse of the USSR by using the traditional strengths of its foreign policy and consolidate its status as the most influential player in the region.

Engagement without accountability: The role of governments, field experts, and public intellectuals in the context of the covid-19 pandemic

The outbreak of the covid-19 pandemic represented a major shock. In their effort to adapt their responses to the crisis to their own conditions of survival, governments have tended to resort to arguments that limit accountability to the population. Despite the privileged place they are presumed to have within contemporary societies, experts have been displaced from the decision-making processes of governments and delegitimized by the anti-intellectual drift favored by the way in which arguments are presented and debated in social media. At the same time, despite being perceived as capable of offering inside-out evaluations of specific phenomena and therefore capable of distinguishing between truths and big lies (and anything in-between), the role of public intellectuals seems to have been limited. The article analyses the responses of great power governments and regional powers in terms of the discursive practices deployed in the context of the covid-19 crisis, and the capacity of the aforementioned non-institutional actors to confront these discourses. As editors-in-chief, policymakers have felt passionate about war metaphors that have allowed them to deconstruct and make complex subjects accessible, and as such, to ensure a sufficient level of attention and public approval so that the fight against the enemy could begin. In addition, they have prompted the implementation of emergency measures that, in a context of geopolitical confrontation, have allowed them to evade individual responsibilities. Rather than using their knowledge to provide constructive examination of complex issues and make them accessible, so the ones who listen to them can hopefully understand the impact of specific policy preferences and minimize their own losses in the increasingly competitive environment, experts and intellectuals have seen their room for maneuver to influence policy formulations severely limited.

Regional security cooperation against hegemonic threats: Theory and evidence from France and West Germany (1945–65)

Why do some regional powers collectively threatened by a potential hegemon eagerly cooperate to ensure their security, while others appear reluctant to do so? I argue that robust security cooperation at the regional level is less likely when an unbalanced distribution of power exists between the prospective security partners. In such situations, regional security cooperation tends to be stunted by foot-dragging and obstructionism on the part of materially inferior states wary of facilitating the strategic expansion of neighbours with larger endowments of power resources, anticipating that much of the coalition's gains in military capabilities are likely to be achieved through an expansion of the materially superior neighbour's force levels and strategic flexibility. Evidence drawn from primary material and the latest historiography of France's postwar foreign policy towards West Germany provides considerable support for this argument. My findings offer important correctives to standard accounts of the origins of Western European security cooperation and suggest the need to rethink the difficulties the United States has encountered in promoting cooperation among local allies in key global regions.

Islamists may reap some benefits from Sudan’s coup

Significance The Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition of civilian and rebel groups have rejected the deal, but Hamdok has justified it on the grounds that (among other things) it will prevent the return of the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP), apparently responding to ongoing speculation over whether NCP-era Islamists influenced Burhan’s October 25 coup. Impacts Burhan will probably limit the work of the Empowerment Removal Committee, which aims to dismantle NCP-era power structures. Any empowerment of Islamists will likely be selective, to avoid alienating regional powers or FFC figures who might be open to cooperation. A marked turn towards Islamism would undermine the chances of a peace deal with holdout rebel groups who seek a secular state.

Analysing Israel-Hamas Conflict Based on Game Theory Approach

ABSTRACT The Islamic Resistance Movement (AKA: Hamas) has taken control over Gaza Strip, Palestine, in 2007. Since then, the organization was in a continues hit-run conflict against the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The conflict is very resistant to any sort of resolution, and Hamas and Israel engage frequently in what it seems an endless cycle of resentment and violence. Despite numerous mediations by global and regional powers, this conflict appears to be further away than ever. This particular conflict can’t be addressed according to the common negotiation theories that based on rationality and hard politics, which seems not that functional. Instead, a model based on the game theory approach is presented in this study to explain this phenomenon. In this work, some facts about Israel - Hamas regional concerns are explained. Moreover, the study analyses the reasons behind Hamas enforcing calm in Gaza, even though Hamas considers Israel as its arch enemy. The presented model shows that whenever Israel and Hamas reach an agreement, both sides can collaborate in maintaining a state of calm. Moreover, results show that the proposed model is applicable to analyse a conflict in terms of actions, duration and terms of settlement. KEYWORDS: Israel; Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Hamas; Gaza strip; Game theory

As Oil Is Waning, the Times Are Changing

With the future of fossil fuels looking bleak, resource-dependent regional powers are competing for other means of securing their positions. While some are striking new alliances—even with Israel— they are also redoubling efforts to stamp out democratic voices at home and abroad.

Foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan between Russia and the United States

The relevance of the research topic is due to a number of factors. Studying the Central Asian region as a whole, as well as the individual states within it, it is necessary to take into account that this space is a place of intersection of the interests of major world political, economic players, as well as regional powers. The influence of these countries and large multinational corporations can be expressed in a variety of ways, both military and economic, which will be discussed in this article. In addition, it is necessary to take into account a number of challenges to regional (and in the future, global) security, which were either thrown in the past or remain relevant to the present. The purpose of the article is to create a descriptive description of the foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan, which is currently being implemented by the current leadership of the state, in addition, to build a forecast regarding the further steps of the Kyrgyz leadership to build a system of strategic and mutually beneficial cooperation primarily with the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

To lead or not to lead: regional powers and regional leadership

Recent trends demonstrate that states with sufficient capabilities to be granted regional power status by its peers (primarily other states within their region) can nonetheless renounce regional leadership. This article analyzes the puzzling behavior of these detached or reluctant regional powers. We argue that resorting to an approach grounded in neoclassical realism is helpful to explain why regional powers might not exercise leadership. In this article regional leadership is conceptualized as an auxiliary goal within the grand strategy of a regional power. This goal will be pursued in the absence of certain structural and domestic constraints. Great power competition determines the incentives for regional leadership at the structural level. Capacity to extract and mobilize resources for foreign policy affects the decision to pursue leadership at the domestic level. We apply the analytical framework to analyze Brazil’s detachment from South America after the Cardoso and Lula presidencies.