Evolutionary game analysis of environmental pollution control under the government regulation

This paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.

Research on Cooperative Behavior of Green Technology Innovation in Construction Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game

The dynamic evolution game model is built by using evolutionary game theory, and the evolutionarily stable strategy is analyzed by matlab2018b software in this paper. The cooperation willingness, sharing level, income distribution, and punishment mechanism are comprehensively considered in this model, and numerical simulations of the influence of various influencing factors on the cooperation strategy selection of green technology innovation for construction enterprises are carried out. Then, countermeasures and suggestions are put forward. The results of evolutionary game analysis show that the cooperation willingness, sharing level, income distribution, and punishment mechanism have a significant impact on the cooperative evolution direction of green technology innovation for construction enterprises, separately. Stronger cooperation willingness or higher relative value of positive spillover, or reasonable income distribution can promote partners to adopt active cooperative strategies, while appropriately increasing punishment intensity can prevent opportunistic behaviors and improve the probability of success of cooperative innovation.

How to Alleviate Rent-Seeking Behaviour in Performance Appraisal of Government-Paid PPP Projects? Tripartite Evolutionary Game Approach

Performance appraisal is a key link in the performance payment mechanism of government-paid Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. As the performance appraisal of PPP projects is highly professional and complex, it is usually necessary to introduce a third-party performance appraisal institution to evaluate the project outputs of the private investor. However, driven by economic rent, the private investor has the incentive to seek rent from the third party in the performance appraisal process, leading to the low overall performance level of PPP projects and the inability to achieve the PPP performance appraisal goal effectively. To explore how to avoid rent-seeking in performance appraisal and improve the overall performance of government-paid PPP projects, a tripartite evolutionary game model between the behaviour, third party, and the public sector has been constructed. Based on the evolutionary game model, this study analyses the evolutionary stability of each player's strategy, discusses the influence of various factors on the strategy selection of the three-party, and further analyses the stability of the equilibrium point of the three-party game system. The findings reveal that the public sector can slow down the rent-seeking behaviour of the private sector by setting up a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism. The design of a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism must meet the following conditions: (1) the sum of the reward and punishment of all parties is greater than the speculative income; (2) the amount of performance fee withheld for the private investor is greater than the difference between the project operating cost saved and the speculation cost. The research provides technical support for the design of the performance appraisal mechanism of government-paid PPP projects.

Tripartite Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Coal Mining Safe Production Supervision under the Chinese Central Government’s Reward and Punishment Mechanism

In recent years, although coal mine accidents in China have decreased, they still occur frequently. Most previous studies on the evolutionary game of safety mining are limited to a focus on system dynamics and two-party game problems and lack a spatial graphic analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of coal mining enterprises, local governments, and central governments. As our method, a payment matrix of participants and replicated dynamic equations is established, and we also implement parameter simulation in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in safe coal mining. Specifically, (1) intensifying rewards and penalties for coal mining enterprises and local governments will help encourage coal mining enterprises to implement safe production measures and local governments to implement central government safety supervision policies. However, increased rewards will reduce central government’s willingness to adopt incentive strategies. (2) The central government’s reward for coal mining enterprises’ safe production must be greater than the increased cost of safe production to encourage enterprises to implement such production. Economic incentives for local governments must be greater than the benefits of rent-seeking; only then will local governments choose to strictly implement supervision policies. (3) Increasing sales revenue and rent-seeking costs of coal mining enterprises can also encourage them to implement safe production. Therefore, a well-designed reward and punishment mechanism will change the behaviour of coal enterprises and improve the probability of safe production. The research presented in this paper further works on improving safe coal mining production and designing reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms.

Coregulation Supervision Strategy of Drug Enterprises under the Government Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Considering the government reward and punishment mechanism and the collusion behavior between third-party testing agencies and drug enterprises, based on the coregulation information platform, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of coregulation supervision, which involves the participation of local government, drug enterprises, and third-party testing agencies. The stable equilibrium points of each participant’s strategic choices are solved. The stability of the strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov’s first method, and MATLAB 2020b is used for simulation analysis to verify the influence of each decision variable on different players’ strategic choices. The results show that, firstly, the government-increased awards and penalties will promote the integrity of drug enterprises and noncollusion of third-party testing agencies, but it is not conducive to strict performance of regulatory responsibilities by the local government. Secondly, the provision of real drug test reports by third-party testing agencies to the coregulation information platform can supervise drug enterprises and restrict local government to perform its duty. Thirdly, the central government’s punishment to the local government’s dereliction of duty is significant to enhancing the robustness of drug enterprises’ integrity operation. Furthermore, reasonably setting rewards and punishments and perfecting the coregulation information platform will help form a coregulation pattern of government supervision, self-discipline of drug enterprises, and social supervision. Finally, drug quality is highly related to whether drug enterprises operate with integrity. Standardizing coregulation supervision of drug enterprises’ integrity operation is the key to ensuring the safety of the source of drug quality. Therefore, this paper enriches and expands the theoretical basis of the coregulation supervision of drug enterprises’ integrity operation and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.

Research on the Pollutant Emission Reduction Strategy and Simulation of Paper-Making Enterprises under the Reward and Punishment Mechanism

Environmental pollution has become an important obstacle on the path of ecological civilization construction, and it is urgent to control environmental pollution. By establishing an evolutionary game model, this thesis focuses on analyzing how paper-making enterprises choose their own emission reduction strategies under the reward and punishment mechanism. It further analyzes how social welfare changes under the reward and punishment mechanism, and finally through simulation research, this thesis analyzes the evolutionary paths of paper-making enterprises’ pollution emission strategies under the reward and punishment mechanism. The results of the reward and punishment mechanism are as follows: under the static reward and punishment mechanism, the game system will repeatedly oscillate around a point. There is no stable equilibrium point at this time. However, under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism, the game system will tend to a stable equilibrium point. The results of social welfare analysis show that high-intensity rewards will reduce the amount of pollution discharged by paper-making enterprises, thereby maximizing social welfare. On the contrary, when paper-making enterprises discharge a large amount of pollution, they will be subject to high-intensity penalties. When facing high-intensity punishments, paper-making enterprises will tend to not to discharge. So social welfare is also maximized. The simulation research results show that reasonable punishment strategies are more effective than reward ones. Based on this, the author proposes countermeasures, such as establishing a reasonable reward and punishment mechanism, reasonably determining the reward and punishment intensity for polluting enterprises. The emission reduction strategies of paper-making enterprises will be affected by the government’s reward and punishment mechanism. A deep study of its internal mechanism is not only of great significance for pollution control but also of great significance for the development of a green economy.

ETHERST: Ethereum-Based Public Key Infrastructure Identity Management with a Reward-and-Punishment Mechanism

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the fundamental of secure digital communications. It provides a secure means to authenticate identities over the Internet. Symmetric or asymmetric encryption schemes are widely used in identity authentication in any kind of PKI. The conventional PKI has several drawbacks due to the centralized and non-transparent design. Several recent research works utilize blockchain technology to overcome the limitations of conventional implementations of PKI. Blockchain-based PKI integrates blockchain technology with PKI to form a new type of decentralized PKI (DPKI). Several works utilize the currency property in blockchains to implement the reward-and-punishment mechanism. In this paper, we propose a smart contract-based PKI which utilizes the Ethereum smart contract to build a new type of blockchain-based PKI with the reward-and-punishment mechanism using ERC-20 tokens. It has several advantages over previous implementations of similar research that use Ethereum’s main currency—Ether.

Research on the Collaborative Application of BIM in EPC Projects: The Perspective of Cooperation between Owners and General Contractors

As an effective way to reduce costs and increase efficiency of EPC projects, BIM technology has drawn a lot of attention in numerous countries. Existing studies have failed to reveal the BIM decision-making mechanisms of owners and general contractors in EPC projects in a dynamic method. This study investigates the underlying logic of the collaboration application of BIM by analyzing the dynamic behaviors of owners and general contractors based on evolutionary game model. The results show that the most effective suggestions to promote the BIM collaboration application in EPC projects are “increasing the proportion of BIM application initially strategies,” “increasing incremental revenue of BIM collaborative application,” “reducing costs of BIM collaboration application,” “avoiding excessive hitchhiking,” and “establishing reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.” On the basis of numerical simulation to illustrate the influence of the different initial strategies and parameters on the final decision in different situations, five solutions were proposed for the effective BIM collaboration application between owners and general contractors. This article can facilitate researchers pondering the dynamics of collaboration among stakeholders in projects, and it can also facilitate participants picking up proper strategies for improved collaboration.

Study on Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game of Emergency Management of Public Health Emergencies Based on Dynamic Rewards and Punishments

In the context of public health emergency management, it is worth studying ways to mobilize the enthusiasm of government, community, and residents. This paper adopts the method of combining evolutionary game and system dynamics to conduct a theoretical modeling and simulation analysis on the interactions of the behavioral strategies of the three participants. In response to opportunistic behavior and inadequate supervision in the static reward and punishment mechanism, we introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism that considers changes in the social environment and the situation of epidemic prevention and control. This paper proves that the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can effectively suppress the fluctuation problem in the evolutionary game process under static scenarios and achieve better supervision results through scenario analysis and simulation experiments.