optimal incentives
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Author(s):  
Alice Guerra ◽  
Francesco Parisi ◽  
Daniel Pi

Abstract In robot torts, robots carry out activities that are partially controlled by a human operator. Several legal and economic scholars across the world have argued for the need to rethink legal remedies as we apply them to robot torts. Yet, to date, there exists no general formulation of liability in case of robot accidents, and the proposed solutions differ across jurisdictions. We proceed in our research with a set of two companion papers. In this paper, we present the novel problems posed by robot accidents, and assess the legal challenges and institutional prospects that policymakers face in the regulation of robot torts. In the companion paper, we build on the present analysis and use an economic model to propose a new liability regime which blends negligence-based rules and strict manufacturer liability rules to create optimal incentives for robot torts.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 9-31
Author(s):  
Mustafa Akan ◽  
Natalia Konovalova

Financial crisis of 2008 and the ongoing pandemic are continuing to have a negative impact on the economies of all countries even tough interest rates have been decreased significantly. This paper attempted to view the problem from a micro point of view to suggest more effective incentives for growth. The specific objective of the study is to determine and examine the effects of these incentives on economic growth in Central European countries.


2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 04021054
Author(s):  
Kunhee Choi ◽  
Junseo Bae ◽  
Young Hoon Kwak
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Enrico Böhme ◽  
Jonas Severin Frank ◽  
Wolfgang Kerber

AbstractIn this paper, we show that a provision in antitrust law to allow patent settlements with a later market entry of generics than the date that is expected under patent litigation can increase consumer welfare. We introduce a policy parameter for determining the optimal additional period for collusion that would incentivize the challenging of weak patents and maximize consumer welfare. While in principle, later market entry leads to higher profits and lower consumer welfare, this can be more than compensated for if more patents are challenged as a result.


Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 28
Author(s):  
Roberto Sarkisian

This study focuses on the optimal incentive schemes in a multi-agent moral hazard model, where each agent has other-regarding preferences and an individual measure of output, with both being observable by the principal. In particular, the two agents display homo moralis preferences. I find that, contrary to the case with purely selfish preferences, tournaments can never be optimal when agents are risk averse, and as the degree of morality increases, positive payments are made in a larger number of output realizations. Furthermore, I extend the analysis to a dynamic setting, in which a contract is initially offered to the agents, who then repeatedly choose which level of effort to provide in each period. I show that the optimal incentive schemes in this case are similar to the ones obtained in the static setting, but for the role of intertemporal discounting.


Author(s):  
Ragan Petrie ◽  
Marco Castillo
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Ragan Petrie ◽  
Marco Castillo
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 789-828
Author(s):  
Edoardo Martino

AbstractThe market discipline of creditors on the risk-taking behaviour of borrowing banks represents a long-lasting debate. Such a debate gained new attention after the post-crisis stream of reforms concerning resolution policy: creditors should be incentivized to make an optimal effort in monitoring their borrowers and, at the same time, their interests have been aligned with the social ones. Many commentators criticized such an expectation especially in the European context, arguing that the lack of credibility and excessive complexity of the resolution mechanism impair the ability and willingness of creditors to exert a disciplining role. This article aims at taking a step forward in this scientific debate, investigating whether the ability to exert disciplining activity is inherently impaired by the design of the Directive. In other words, this research wants to assess if, assuming an ideal environment, creditors would have optimal incentives to monitor banks’ behaviour and to react accordingly. To do so, the article reviews the literature on market discipline, then carries out a legal analysis of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), focusing on those norms shaping the market for bail-inable securities. Eventually, the incentives stemming from those norms are discussed, assuming an ideal environment where a bail-in is certain and credible and the market for bail-inable securities works smoothly. The analysis highlights that the incentives of creditors toward market discipline are inherently diluted by the BRRD’s legal design because of competing policy objectives pursued by the Directive. The direct normative consequence of such a finding is that enhancing information and predictability, though desirable in principle, will never lead to an optimal monitoring effort, leaving the floor to alternative rule-based strategies.


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