Standards of fair justice and their relationship to standards of proof in criminal proceedings

The purpose of the article is to define the concept, system and content of fair justice standards and outline their relationship to standards of evidence in criminal proceedings. The purpose of the study is to reveal the content of the right to a fair trial, distinguish fair justice standards and establish its relationship with standards of evidence in criminal proceedings. The research methodology consists of comparative law, structural system methods and formal legal methods. The study found that testing standards are covered by justice standards, expanding, specifying, and clarifying their content. The content of the fair justice standards "examination of the case by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law", "adversarial procedure", "equality of the parties", "frankness of the examination of evidence", "presumption of innocence" and reveals the "motivation of judicial decisions". It is concluded that each of these concepts is a heuristic contribution to test standards. As a result of the study, the author's definition of the concept of "fair justice standards" is formulated and the concept is based on its relationship with the standards of evidence in criminal proceedings.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTUAL CAUSATION IN TORT

The article examines the moral basis and significance of causation from the standpoint of corrective justice; the division of factual and legal causation, as well as the theory of conditio sine qua non and NESS test, are critically analyzed; the problems of the former are discussed, while the preference of the latter is justified, with special attention to the torts committed by omission; the relation of factual causation as a matter of substantive law to the procedural form of its reflection is established through the discussion of issues of allocation of burden of proof and standards of proof, as well as admissibility of scientific and statistical evidence of factual causation.

MATHEMATICAL PRACTICE AND MATHEMATICAL LOGIC: TO THE HISTORY OF RELATIONSHIP

The article annuls the role of practice in the development of mathematics in the 19th century in the formation of mathematical logic. It is shown that the revolutionary transformations of mathematics of the 19th century, which led to an increase in the abstractness of mathematical theories and concepts, was accompanied by an increase in uncertainty regarding the standards of proof, which led to the universal spread of anxiety (J. Gray) as an element of mathematical practice. It is argued that this element of practice was one of the sources of the emergence of mathematical logic, which claims to give rigor and accuracy to mathematics. The article argues that the socio- epistemological analysis of the practice of mathematics and the formation of mathematical logic will clarify the specifics of the development of relations between mathematics and mathematical logic.

Proven Facts, Beliefs, and Reasoned Verdicts

Proven Facts, Beliefs and Reasoned Verdicts challenges a subjectivist conception of factfinding by tying the very concept of “proof” and the applicable proof standards and burdens to the duty of giving reasons for trial verdicts. The chapter examines the link between the Roman-Germanic and English-speaking legal traditions and concludes that evidential subjectivism still predominates in civil law countries in the name of the free evaluation of evidence. It aims to demonstrate that there is a close relationship between the concept of proof, standards of proof, and the way in which the duty of giving reasons for trial verdicts, and even the possibility of complying with this duty, are understood. Specifically, it reinforces the fact that if proof is conceptually linked to the beliefs or convictions of the trier of fact, it is impossible to sustain the idea of giving reasons as a justification of the decisions about facts.

STANDARDS OF PROOF: AID OR PITFALL?

During the course of legal proceedings, evidentiary material is analyzed and evaluated in order to make a final judgement whether the responsible party has discharged the onus of proof. The existence of a standard of proof against which the presiding officer can measure the evidence submitted consequently plays a pivotal role. This standard of proof (bewysmaatstaf) represents the standard of guilt in legal science and has also been described as a standard of conviction. The standard of proof does not pertain to the inherent qualities of evidentiary material, but rather to the degrees of conviction of the presiding officer in a particular case. The function of thestandard of proof is furthermore to provide presiding officers with a guideline/yardstick to measure the degree of conviction that the general public believe the presiding officer should have over the correctness of all the factual conclusions in the particular proceedings. In this article, the standard of proof in law will be discussed from a comparative point of view; different standards of proof from different jurisdictions will be considered and juxtaposed against similar standards used in the natural sciences.

Standard of proof in criminal proceedings: “variable” or “stepwise” ?

The article is devoted to the analysis of the issue of division of standards of proof in criminal proceedings, in particular one of the types - variable standard of proof, which is distinguished by scholars of the Anglo-Saxon legal system. The article analyzes the question of the possibility of dividing the standards of proof depending on the severity of the criminal offense. The motives and scientific arguments in favor of distinguishing a variable standard of proof in criminal proceedings are studied. Positively assessing the attempt of the appropriate scientific division of standards of proof in criminal proceedings, the authors argue that it is still impossible to agree with him to the end. In particular, according to the authors, the introduction of a variable standard of proof in criminal proceedings will not contribute to the unity of judicial practice in the process of making procedural decisions during criminal proceedings. In addition, the article argues that decisions in criminal proceedings are made on the basis of internal conviction, which determines and assigns the type and measure of punishment, and not vice versa. Therefore, it is at least surprising the position of some scholars that the sanction of a sentence that can be imposed on an accused must determine the necessary level of “persuasion” (“evidence”) for his appointment. It is argued that in some cases, the establishment of a variable standard of proof in criminal proceedings will lead to a violation of the principles of criminal proceedings, in particular equality before the law and the courts. The article presents the position of the authors on the doubtfulness of establishing the degree of proof of the circumstances of criminal proceedings depending on the severity of the criminal offense, as in criminal proceedings there is a single procedure and the same set of procedural rights.

Formation of the inadmissibility of evidence in the context of the doctrine of the «fruit of a poisoned tree»

The articles analyze the issues of standard permissible indicators, which are the established norms of criminal procedure legislation and the formation of judicial rules of practice, which create the formation of permissible indicators. The domestic legislator establishes a system of standard permissible indicators, which, on the one hand consists largely of 232 international standards of proof, which is gaining a broader understanding, and on the other hand, is widely used in judicial practice, while the history of clarification changes some of them. A significant part of the standard allowable indicators is determined by the rules of Art. 87 of the CPC of Ukraine, devoted to the grounds for recognizing in admissible indicators obtained as a result of a significant violation of human rights and freedoms. The legal model of inadmissibility provided by the CPC of Ukraine tends to its counter parts in the legislation of the Romano-Germanic legal system (CPC of Germany, France), while some features of this institution were also initiated by US and British legislation, in particular, the doctrine of trees», a certain analogue of which his provided for in Part 1 of Art. 87 of the CPC. Definite understanding of the doctrine of «fruit of the felled tree», which reveals any guilt that violates the police constitutional legal citizens, which has none, but simply an in direct connection with the process of identifying, removing and recording indicators, the severity of loss of recent legal force. This means the unconditional in admissibility of available indicators for any assignment established through the collection of indicators, regardless of their nature and degree. The article reveals a number of international standards of admissible indicators sent by the European Court of Human Rights. The range of cases for which the ECtHR in the context of the Convention provides for a response to accept able indicators and the establishment of national courts is revealed. On the basis of the conducted research the system of the international standards of admissible indicators formed in practice of the ECtHR is generalized.

Evidence, Risk, and Proof Paradoxes: Pessimism about the Epistemic Project

Why can testimony alone be enough for findings of liability? Why statistical evidence alone can't? These questions underpin the ‘Proof Paradox’. Many epistemologists have attempted to explain this paradox from a purely epistemic perspective. I call it the ‘Epistemic Project’. In this paper, I take a step back from this recent trend. Stemming from considerations about the nature and role of standards of proof, I define three requirements that any successful account in line with the Epistemic Project should meet. I then consider three recent epistemic accounts on which the standard is met when the evidence rules out modal risk (Pritchard 2018), normic risk (Ebert et al., 2020), or relevant alternatives (Gardiner 2019 2020). I argue that none of these accounts meets all the requirements. Finally, I offer reasons to be pessimistic about the prospects of having a successful epistemic explanation of the paradox. I suggest the discussion on the proof paradox would benefit from undergoing a ‘value-turn’.

The Weight of Evidence

Courts of law must weigh evidence to determine the likelihood of competing interpretations of past events, and different legal contexts require different standards of proof, but this falls short of a quantification of probability. Bayes’s theorem and the associated formula provide a way of combining multiple elements of evidence and using them to refine prior assessments of probability. The prosecutor’s fallacy involves an incorrect reversal of the logic of evidence. The ecological fallacy involves incorrectly attributing proportions derived from large groups to smaller groups or individuals.