The Political Economy of the EU Approach to the Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar

European institutions have repeatedly represented the EU as an actor that can use the attractiveness of its market to promote human rights internationally. From this perspective, EU trade sanctions represent a hard power tool to push the government of states accused of major human rights violations to abide by international law. In its reaction to the Rohingya crisis in 2018, despite the European Parliament’s call for the lifting of Myanmar’s trade preferences, the Council of the EU stated that it would rather tackle the problem by taking a “constructive approach” based on dialogue. We provide a political-economy explanation of this choice, making a plausible case that the political pressures from European importers and exporters, not to jeopardise trade relations with Myanmar, prevailed over the demands of European protectionist groups and NGOs advocating a tougher position. The firms interested in maintaining preferential trade relations with Myanmar were primarily motivated by a desire to avoid a disruption of trade and investment links within global value chains (GVCs) so that they could continue competing with Chinese enterprises.

Structural Economic Vulnerability and the Utilization of Unilateral Trade Preferences: Does Development Aid Matter?

This article has investigated the effect of structural economic vulnerability on the utilization of non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs) offered by the 'Quadrilaterals' and whether development aid flows alter this effect. It considers two major blocks of NRTPs, namely the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs and 'other trade preferences programs'. The analysis uses a panel dataset of 84 beneficiary countries of both NRTPs and development aid, over the period of 2002-2019. Results reveal that a rise in the level of structural economic vulnerability reduces the utilization rates of both GSP programs and other trade preference programs. At the same time, when the level of structural economic vulnerability falls, countries tend to use both blocks of NRTPs in a complementarity way. While development aid inflows foster the utilization of the two blocks of NRTPs, the increase of these resource inflows in the context of greater structural economic vulnerability leads beneficiary countries to strengthen the utilization of other trade preferences programs at the expense of the utilization of GSP programs. The implications of these results are discussed in the conclusion section of the article.

Chapter 6: Russia’s Regional Free Trade Agreements and Agri-Food Trade After 2014

This chapter analyses changes in Russia’s agri-food trade relations after 2014 with a specific focus on regional trade agreements. The introduction of countersanctions against Western countries in 2014 spurred the need to replace some of Russia’s most important foreign food trade partners. Free trade agreements can be effective instruments to boost trade and strengthen ties between countries. Russia is a latecomer in the race for free trade agreements, but a series of agreements have been negotiated since 2015. The portfolio of free trade agreements is still in an early stage, but there is a clear turn to Asia in Russia’s trade. China’s role in total trade as well as in agri-food trade with Russia is considerably strengthened despite the lack of trade preferences so far.

Effect of the Utilization of Unilateral Trade Preferences on Foreign Direct Investment flows to Beneficiary Countries

This article has explored the effect of non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs) offered by the QUAD countries to developing countries on the foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to these developing countries. The analysis has used an unbalanced panel dataset of 108 beneficiary countries of NRTPs over the period 2002-2019. By means of the two-step system GMM, it has established that low utilization rates of GSP programs are associated with greater FDI flows to less advanced beneficiary countries, including, least developed countries (LDCs). However, high utilization rates of GSP programs induces greater FDI flows to advanced beneficiary countries, including NonLDCs. In addition, low (high) utilization rates of other trade preferences generate higher FDI flows to less advanced beneficiary countries (relatively advanced countries). The analysis has also shown that GSP programs and other trade preferences are strongly complementary in enhancing FDI inflows, especially for high utilization rates of other trade preferences programs. The utilization of each of these two blocks of NRTPs induces greater FDI flows to countries that endeavour to export increasingly complex products, or those with lower dependence on natural resources. Finally, the utilization of NRTPs generates higher FDI inflows to countries that substantially liberalize their trade regimes. JEL Classification: F13; F14; F20.

Effect of the Utilization of Non-Reciprocal Trade Preferences offered by the QUAD on Economic Complexity in Beneficiary Countries

This article aims to contribute to the nascent literature on the effect of non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs) on industrialization in beneficiary countries. In so doing, it complements the few existing works on the effect of NRTPs on export product diversification by investigating the effect of NRTPs (both the Generalized System of Preferences- GSP programs- and other non-reciprocal trade preferences) offered by the QUAD countries on the level of economic complexity in beneficiary countries. The analysis has relied on 110 beneficiary countries of these NRTPs over the period 2002–2018, and made primarily use of the two-step system Generalized Methods of Moments estimator. The findings are quite interesting. First, beneficiary countries tend to use GSP programs (rather than other trade preferences) to achieve greater economic complexity, and the positive effect of the utilization of GSP programs on economic complexity is higher for high income beneficiary countries than relatively less advanced beneficiary countries. Second, both GSP programs and other non-reciprocal trade preferences are strongly complementary in promoting economic complexity in beneficiary countries, in particular if their usage reach high levels. Third, the utilization of NRTPs enhances economic complexity in countries that receive high foreign direct investment flows. Finally, development aid flows are strongly complementary with the utilization of NRTPs in fostering economic complexity in beneficiary countries, especially for high amounts of development aid. This suggests the need for preference-granting countries (that are also suppliers of development aid) to offer both generous NRTPs and higher development aid flows if those NRTPs are to be effective in expanding the manufacturing base in the beneficiary countries.Jel Classification: F13; F14; O14.

Polarized we trade? Intraparty polarization and US trade policy

Research indicates that polarization has led to an increasing dispersion between moderate and more extreme voters within both parties. Intraparty polarization supposedly affects the nature of interparty competition as it creates political space for new political realignments and the rise of anti-establishment candidates. This article examines the extent and impact of intraparty polarization in Congress on US trade policy. Specifically, the article examines whether (and which) trade policy preferences are distributed within and between both parties, as well as how intraparty polarization has influenced the outcome of US trade negotiations. It is theorized that intraparty polarization causes crosscutting legislative coalitions around specific trade policies and political realignments around ideological factions, with consequences for the outcome of trade negotiations. By relying on a unique dataset of congressional letters and co-sponsorship legislation, the article first derives trade policy preferences from members of Congress and computes their ideological means. Two contemporary cases of US trade policy are examined: The Transpacific Partnership Agreement and the US–Mexico–Canada Agreement. Via a structured-focused comparison of both cases, the paper finally assesses under which combinations of preference-based and ideology-based intraparty polarization Congress manages to ratify trade agreements. Findings suggest that both parties are intrinsically polarized between free trade and fair trade preferences yet show variance in their degree of ideology-based intraparty polarization. These findings contribute to existing work on bipartisanship as well as factions in the foreign policy realm, as it shows under which circumstances legislators can build crosscutting coalitions around foreign policies.

Labor Market Volatility, Gender, and Trade Preferences

What explains divides in the public’s support for trade protection? Traditional economic arguments primarily focus on individuals’ expectations for increased or decreased wages in the face of greater economic openness, yet studies testing such wage-based concerns identify a different divide as well: even after accounting for wage effects, women are typically more supportive of trade protection. We argue that trade-induced employment volatility and the resulting concerns for employment stability are overlooked factors that help explain the gender divide in attitudes. Due to both structural discrimination and societal norms, we theorize that working women are more responsive to the threat of trade-related employment instability than male counterparts. Using an experiment fielded on national samples in the USA and Canada, we find that most respondents have weak reactions to volatility, but volatility has a significant effect on women who are the most vulnerable to trade’s disruptive effects – those working in import-competing industries and those with limited education.

The Comparative Legitimacy of Arms Exports - A Conjoint Experiment in Germany and France

Despite fierce politicization and heated public debates in arms-exporting democracies, systematic research on mass public preferences on arms trade is lacking. Combining political economy models of arms trade with the literatures on trade preferences and foreign policy attitudes, we argue that citizens trade off economic incentives, strategic interests and moral considerations when assessing arms trade and that deeply rooted `strategic cultures’ lead to differences in citizen preferences between countries. To derive the implicit weighting of different features of arms trade, we draw on population-representative conjoint survey experiments (N=6,617), fielded in November/December 2020 in two of the global top-5 exporting countries of major arms: Germany and France. We find that both country populations show structured preferences towards arms exports which predominantly center around their moral repercussions. However, German respondents place more weight on moral consequences and, compared to French respondents, a larger share is in fundamental opposition. We conclude that these diverging preferences potentially conflict with plans of a common European defense and security policy.