Are politically engaged citizens more democratic? A glimpse from Brazil

A significant part of the Western literature on democracy assumes that political participation leads to citizens being more committed to democratic values. However, we do not know to what extent this is true in young democracies with an authoritarian tradition. Hence, this article aims to examine whether politically engaged Brazilians are more democratic. To do so, we analyzed whether there is any association between political participation, support for democracy, and democracy relativization through multivariate regression models. Our database comprises a representative sample of 2417 interviews with the electorate of São Paulo in 2019. The results show a statistically significant association between unconventional political participation and support for democracy. General political participation is associated with non-relativization of democracy only, showing a limited relationship between support for democracy and participation. Other variables, such as political interest, political knowledge, and interpersonal trust, are also associated with higher support for democracy.

Stable Support for Democracy in East and Southeast Asia? Examining Citizens’ Trust in Democratic Institutions

Recent democratic regressions and crises suggest democracy is at risk across East and Southeast Asia. One of the factors that can determine democratic stability are citizens’ attitudes. While previous research has concentrated on support for democracy-in-principle, this contribution argues that it is political trust, i.e. support for democracy-in-practice, which is crucial for democratic stability. For democracies to be stable, political trust should be high as well as rooted in long-term factors like liberal democratic value orientations or social trust to protect it from short-term fluctuations following economic crises or political scandals. This contribution therefore examines not only the current levels and development of political trust but also whether it is influenced more by long-term factors (liberal democratic value orientations, social trust) or short-term factors (economic performance evaluations, incumbent support). The empirical analysis shows political trust in five East and Southeast Asian democracies (Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan) to be mostly mediocre and primarily dependent on economic performance evaluations and incumbent support. Among the five democracies, citizens in Japan appear most resilient to democratic regressions; on the other hand, Taiwanese democracy seems least equipped to master future crises.

Latin America's post-COVID democratic pressures rise

Significance The latest survey suggests that, while the COVID-19 pandemic and the related economic downturn did not, at least initially, undermine support for democracy, the pressure of demands on it will continue to mount. Impacts Only half of the 49% of Latin Americans who prefer democracy as a system of government are satisfied with its results. Low-income countries are particularly vulnerable to populist candidates who offer a quick fix to their country’s problems. The ability of Latin American governments to address inequality will be crucial for the region’s future social cohesion.

Populist Democrats? Unpacking the Relationship Between Populism and (Liberal) Democracy at the Citizen Level

It is widely feared that the onset of populism poses a threat to democracy, as citizens' support for democracy is essential for its legitimacy and stability. Yet, the relationship between populism and democracy at the citizen level remains poorly understood, particularly with respect to support for liberal democracy. Data measuring citizens' populist attitudes in conjunction with a comprehensive range of measures of democratic support has been lacking. Using unique data from the Netherlands, we study the relationship between individuals' populist attitudes and their attitudes towards democracy in three studies. We examine the association between populism and support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy (Study 1); populism and support for liberal democracy (Study 2); and populism and support for majoritarian conceptions of democracy (Study 3). We find that while populist citizens are dissatisfied with how democracy works, they are no less supportive of the principle of democracy. Contrary to most theorizing, we find that populist citizens are largely supportive of key institutions of liberal democracy, but reject mediated representation through political parties. At the same time, populists strongly support forms of unconstrained majoritarian rule. These findings suggest that the relationship between populism and support for (liberal) democracy is more complicated than commonly assumed.

The Role of Actual Democracy in the Link between National Identity and Support for Democracy

This article analyzes the interplay between national identity and democracy. Multilevel models were tested using European Value Survey (EVS 2017), which includes 30 countries in total. On the individual level, emphasis on non-voluntary features of national identity, where national membership depends on the accident of origin, relates to lower support for democracy. At the country level, the level of actual democracy was taken in to account (Varieties of Democracy 2017). In general, higher levels of actual democracy correlate with stronger support for the ideal democracy, yet, a high level of actual democracy amplifies the negative relationship between non-voluntary national identity and support for democracy.

Questioning the Compass of the Western Media: Early Perceptions of the July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey

This study investigates how the Western media reacted immediately after the July 15, 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, in which a group of armed forces loyal to FETÖ aimed to overthrow Turkey’s democratically elected government. To this end, 91 news reports and articles in ten newspapers from the U.S., the UK, Germany, and France, dating from July 15 to July 18, 2016, were analyzed. Based on content analysis, the early perceptions of the Western media were categorized by sentiment as positive, neutral, or negative in terms of their tone, feeling, and emotion regarding the coup attempt. The findings show that only 42 publications were neutral only reporting the news, while 44 publications were positive about the coup attempt favoring the junta and failing to support the democratically elected government. On the other hand, only five publications expressed negative opinions about the coup attempt by showing strong support for democracy and expressing anti-coup views. Frequency analysis also shows that the most commonly used keywords and phrases in the news and articles were Erdoğan’s authoritarianism (58 times), the polarization of society (32 times), Erdoğan’s oppression (28 times), Erdoğan dividing the country (16 times), and the instability of Erdoğan’s regime/dictatorship (15 times). Overall, the analysis shows that journalists are not free of bias; most of them missed or neglected the damaging consequences of the coup attempt on Turkish democracy and society due to their negative perceptions about the incumbent government.