THE EROSION OF THE SALDUZ DOCTRINE IN THE CASES OF IBRAHIM AND OTHERS V. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BEUZE V. BELGIUM

The so-called Salduz doctrine that concerns the right to a fair trial and the right to the defense attorney emerged from the case of Salduz v. Turkey, decided on the part of the European Court of Human Rights where the Grand Chamber found the violation of Article 6, paragraph 3(c) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In this connection, the aim of this paper is twofold. In the first place, the paper aims to demonstrate how the European Court of Human Rights has overturned the two main tenents of the so-called Salduz doctrine derived from its landmark case of Salduz v. Turkey in its later Judgments delivered in the case of Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom and the case of Beuze v. Belgium. The two tenets derived from the Salduz doctrine being examined in the paper are the right to access to the defense attorney as a rule during pre-trial proceedings and the absolute exclusionary rule. In the second place, the paper aims to offer a critique of the standard of compelling reasons employed in the Ibrahim Judgment. In order to achieve its aim, this paper primarily analyses the jurisprudence of the European Human Court of Human Rights in the cases of Salduz v. Turkey, Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom, and Beuze v. Belgium. Besides, the paper also touches upon other judgments of the European Court of Human Rights related to its subject. The paper in question, therefore, primarily relies on the case-law method in achieving its aims. The paper concludes that in overturning the Salduz doctrine in relation to aspects examined in the paper, the European Court of Human Rights has exacerbated the legal standing of the person against whom criminal proceedings are being conducted.

Where is the European Court of Human Rights Heading? Comments on the Grand Chamber Admissibility Decision in the Case of Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (Applications No. 20958/14 and 38334/18)

The aim of this article is to analyse the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: the Court) decision on admissibility in the Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) case from the perspective of the Court’s comments on the status of Crimea and the legality of Russia’s actions. The Court itself observed that it cannot make such findings; nevertheless, did it really refrain from examining facts and evidence which could also be used to prove the illegality of Russian actions? The article is divided into three parts. The first presents the factual background of the case. The next highlights the Court’s declarations about the scope of the case and refusal to engage in assessment of the legality of Russian actions. The third and fourth parts focus on the Court’s examination of the effective control by Russia over Crimea and the issue of jurisdiction, assessing whether the Court limited itself solely to the issues indispensable for a decision on admissibility.

The Effects of the Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-83/19, C-127/19, C-195/19, C-291/19, C-355/19, C- 397/19.The Obligation of the Decisions of the Romanian Constitutional Court and the Supremacy of EU

The supremacy of the Constitution is therefore compatible with the application systems that give application preference to regulations from legislation other than national law, as long as the Constitution itself established this provision, which happens exactly with the provision provided in art. 93, which allows the transfer of powers resulting from the Constitution in favor of an international institution thus constitutionally empowered to regulate matters previously reserved for domestic powers and their application.

The role of the advocate in the ensuring the unity of the judicial practice in civil cases

The presented work highlights the possible ways of the advocate's influence on the implementation by the Supreme Court of the function of ensuring the unity of judicial practice in civil cases. Without denying the status of the Supreme Court as a central institution in the field of forming unified approaches to law enforcement, attention is focused on the fact that the dynamics of procedural legislation in terms of regulating procedures for access to cassation in civil cases allows us to rethink the mission and content of the representative function of a lawyer at the appropriate stage of the civil process. Based on the analysis of the current edition of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, it is argued that the ability of the advocate to be an active subject of influence on the formation of a unified law enforcement practice is most noticeably manifested when overcoming existing filters of access to cassation, in particular, when applying to the Supreme Court with a cassation appeal, which today demands from the advocate extended argumentation when proving the existence of grounds for cassation revision, with a thorough analysis of the established practice of the cassation court and, at times, giving reasons for the need to deviate from such practice and form new law enforcement approaches. Along with the above, among the individual methods of influence of the advocate on ensuring the unity of judicial practice, the filing of a petition for the suspension of proceedings on the basis of a review of a court decision in similar legal relations (in another case) by way of appeal by the chambers of the Supreme Court, as well as a petition to transfer the case for consideration The Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court in connection with the need to resolve an exceptional legal problem.

Case C-650/18 Hungary v. European Parliament (C.J.E.U.)

On June 3, 2021, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), closely following the Advocate General's Opinion, delivered its Grand Chamber judgment in case C-650/18 Hungary v. European Parliament by dismissing Hungary's action. The ruling confirms that the European Parliament (EP) acted within the procedural boundaries of its powers when initiating, by a two-thirds majority vote of its members, proceedings against Hungary for the situation in the country regarding the rule of law, democracy, and other values on which the European Union (EU) is founded. The ruling comes after the Hungarian government decided to challenge the validity of the resolution of the European Parliament of September 12, 2018, which triggered the proceedings foreseen in the event of a clear risk of serious breaches of the foundational values of the EU, including the rule of law, pursuant to Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

ECHR decision to refuse to waive the immunity of a person under article 1 of the protocol no. 6: Individual interpretations of the essence and consequences

In present-day Ukraine, there is no unanimous answer to the question of the essence and consequences of the ECHR decision to refuse to waive immunity under Article 1 of the Protocol No. 6 either in the national criminal procedural legislation, or in the theory of criminal procedure, or among judges, investigators, prosecutors. Therefore, the purpose of the present paper is to try to attempt to formulate individual approaches to address this issue. The relevance of the subject under study is conditioned upon its theoretical and practical components. The former is that there this area is heavily understudied, and judicial practice, among other things, requires a certain scientific basis to formulate individual positions in their unity. The dilemma proposed in the title of this study was also addressed by members of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Supreme Court, who were approached by judges of the Grand Chamber for scientific opinions, emphasising the urgency and necessity of feedback from practitioners. To formulate the individual approaches serving the purpose of this study, the authors employed such general and special research methods as dialectical, induction and deduction, Aristotelian, system-structural, sampling method, comparison, and legal forecasting. Notwithstanding the fact that the ECHR decision to refuse to waive the immunity stipulated in Article 1 of the Protocol No. 6, adopted by its plenary session in accordance with Article 4 of the Protocol No. 6 to the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council of Europe, is “procedural”, it was proven that the Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court has the authority to conduct proceedings on the application of such a person to review the judgment precisely in exceptional circumstances. It is emphasised that the ECHR decision should be considered as one that does not aim at the final assessment of criminal proceedings, so it cannot be equated with the decision of an international judicial institution, which would state Ukraine's violation of international obligations in court and the order of its execution will differ. The authors also address the fact that the consequences of the ECHR decision to refuse to waive the immunity stipulated in Article 1 of the Protocol No. 6 are critical. After all, such a decision of the European Court of Human Rights is the “bell” for Ukraine, which, among other things, may hint at the probability that the Court will identify the facts of human rights violations

What Are Grand Chambers for?

In multi-panelled higher jurisdictions, a larger, extended formation of judges tends to be established within the court. It bears various names: the grand chamber, the extended chamber, the expanded composition, the reunion of several chambers, a court sitting en banc, an extended section or a division of a court. In larger but not too large jurisdictions, the same role is adopted by the plenary. For ease of reference, I shall refer to all such extended judicial formations with the generic name ‘grand chamber’. To bear the same name does not necessarily mean to perform the same function. As a Czech lawyer, I have always intuitively assumed that the role of such a body within an apex court is to unify the case law. In the Czech Republic, as well as in a number of other supreme continental jurisdictions for that matter, there tends to be only one reason for the presence of a grand chamber within a supreme court: to unify the diverging lines of case law and to set a clear line of precedent. However, that has never really been the job description, least of all the practice, of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘Court’). This begs the question: what may then be other structural reasons for the existence of such a body within an apex jurisdiction? What is the specific role, function, and ensuing justification for the Grand Chamber of the Court? This article offers some personal reflections on that question. It is structured as follows: it begins with a short comparative overview of some of the grand chambers within European (national) courts, overseas in the common law world, as well as at the European Court of Human Rights, in order to tease out the functional rationale for various types of extended judicial compositions within those systems (Part I). Next, two types of such functional justifications for grand chambers in the form of ideal models are identified (Part II). Finally, those justifications are then considered in light of the legislative design and the current practice of the Grand Chamber of the Court, before concluding with two modest suggestions (Part III).

Hanan v. Germany (Eur. Ct. H.R.)

In February 2021, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in favor of Germany in the case Hanan v. Germany, concerning a 2009 NATO airstrike in Kunduz (Afghanistan) resulting in the deaths of many civilians.

Hirst v United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 681, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber)

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Hirst v United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 681, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber). This case note concerns the provisions limiting the voting rights of prisoners, and the extent to which the United Kingdom is bound to follow the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.