THE PROPOSED LEGALIZATION OF PROSTITUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA – FRAMING THE DEBATE FROM A LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE

The debates surrounding the issue of whether or not prostitution or sex work ought to be legal or illegal have a long and convoluted history, both in South Africa and abroad. This article seeks to provide greater clarity and focus to current debates on this complex issue, in particular from a liberal perspective. By examining certain of the main issues at stake for those committed to the broad tenets of liberal ideology, the article hopes to bring at least some measure of clarity and focus to a contentious set of theoretical and empirical questions. It is argued that, from a liberal perspective, to interfere with the freedom of each South African to make his or her own moral choices is to interfere with the very foundation of South Africa’s hard-won constitutional democracy. In order to convince those committed to truly liberal principles of the need for the criminal law to prohibit sex work, it must be shown that it causes either “harm” or “offence” to others. Liberals will accept neither the principle of “legal moralism” nor that of “legal paternalism” as legitimate reasons to criminalize sex work.

Weltmacht und Demokratie

This volume addresses the international challenges that the US faces in the post-Trump era. Will President Joe Biden succeed in restoring the traditional leadership role of the US? What are the international and domestic hurdles for Biden in advancing his foreign policy agenda? Drawing on a liberal perspective in international relations, the chapters highlight how domestic and international politics are intertwined. Societal interests, partisan polarisation, and executive–legislative relations shape the hegemon’s international role in various policy areas, such as arms control and climate and trade policy, but also regarding the country’s relationships towards friends and foes. The book brings together the expertise of scholars who specialise in the US and transatlantic relations, in celebration of Jürgen Wilzewski. With contributions by Hakan Akbulut, Johannes Artz, Florian Böller, Gordon Friedrichs, Gerlinde Groitl, Steffen Hagemann, Lukas Herr, Katja Leikert, Marcus Höreth, Gerhard Mangott, Marcus Müller, Ronja Ritthaler-Andree, Peter Rudolf, Oliver Thränert, Söhnke Schreyer, David Sirakov, Georg Wenzelburger and Reinhard Wolf.

Malaysian Sikh Youths’ Perception of Diverse Sexual Identities

Malaysia is well known to the world audience as a multicultural nation and a country dominated by religious beliefs, including religions such as Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism. However, over the years, Malaysia has been doing its rounds in the papers for its strict rules over the denial of human rights for the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) community. In 2015, Malaysia’s ex–Prime Minister Najib Razak openly declared his take on the LGBT community by equating them to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and claiming that both are ‘enemies of Islam’. Whereas Islamic religious authorities have made clear their stance on LGBT communities, the Malaysian Consultative Council on Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST) has taken a much-blanketed approach on the matter. The group is against any violent attack against, harassment or intimidation of and threat to the LGBT community, but the very essence of this stand is oxymoronic, as they have not done anything to prevent such incidents from taking place either. Sikhism has a liberal perspective on acceptance, regarding aspects such as gender, race, ethnicity and age, to name a few, that one would interpret it is an LGBT-friendly religion. Hence, this article is a humble attempt at understanding the Malaysian Sikh youths’ perspectives on the ever-growing branches of sexual identity. This article will add to the literature on Sikhs’ attitudes towards homosexuality, especially in Southeast Asia.

E-cigarettes: The Long-Term Liberal Perspective

The debate for and against making e-cigarettes available to smokers is to a large extent empirical. We do not know the long-term health effects of vaping and we do not know how smokers will respond to e-cigarettes over time. In addition to these empirical uncertainties, however, there are difficult moral issues to consider. One such issue is that many smokers in some sense choose to smoke. Though smoking is addictive and though many start young, it does not seem impossible to plan for and implement cessation. Yet many choose not to do so and we arguably have some reason to respect this choice. I propose that liberal opposition to strict tobacco control, based on respect for choice, is mitigated when e-cigarettes are available, since they are such a close substitute. Making e-cigarettes available to smokers might therefore not only enable switching in practice, but may make tougher tobacco control more justified. Another moral issue is that making e-cigarettes widely available might induce many people to vape, who would otherwise have neither vaped nor smoked. If this is so, the price of using e-cigarettes to accelerate smoking cessation may be a long-term vaping epidemic. Since vaping is less harmful than smoking, both individuals and society will have less reason to end this epidemic and so it may endure longer than the smoking epidemic would otherwise have done. This raises further questions around the weighing of reduced harm to current smokers against increased harm to future vapers. Implications Because they are a close substitute, e-cigarettes makes tougher tobacco control more morally and politically feasible. Because e-cigarettes are less harmful than combustibles, making them available may accelerate smoking cessation but also lead to a long-term vaping epidemic, as we have less reason to combat vaping, once established. Moral evaluation of this possible scenario requires considering at least three things: (1) the cost of addiction to autonomy, in addition to health effects, (2) possible distributional effects due to differences between current smokers and future vapers, and (3) the fact that a possible vaping epidemic affects mainly future people and future society.

How can political liberalism respond to contemporary populism?

Populism – which positions a ‘true people’ in opposition to a corrupt elite – is often contrasted with liberalism. This article initially outlines the incompatibility between populism and normative theories of political liberalism. It argues that populism is an unreasonable form of politics by liberals’ standards because: it unfairly excludes those who are not deemed to be part of the true ‘people’; and it is objectionably anti-pluralist in the way that it assumes unity amongst the ‘people’. Despite this, it is hard to derive specific duties to contain or challenge populism per se from a liberal perspective, though such a duty might be present for some forms of contemporary right-wing populism that combine populism with illiberal goals. Underpinning this view is a belief that many populist movements articulate grievances that are at least somewhat legitimate. The article concludes by arguing that there might be circumstances where a populist movement could, against this backdrop of injustice, advance the liberal cause. However, this is not because there are ways of dissolving the tension between political liberalism and populism, but because political liberals might be justified in violating the regulatory norms that they believe ought to govern politics in some, exceptional, circumstances.

False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences

The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rationality flaw (they are typically formed for reasons of the wrong kind) but that it's not clear that this flaw matters morally or politically. What matters is whether they suffer from an autonomy flaw. To answer this question, the author develops an account of autonomy failure, according to which a preference is nonautonomous if an injustice played an appropriate role in its causal history. The author then discusses the moral implications—and in an initial way, the political ones as well—of proclaiming a preference, or consent based on it, nonautonomous in this way.